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COPYRIGHT
Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this thesis rests with its author. This
copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is under-
stood to recognise that its copyright rests with its author and no information derived
from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author.
This thesis may be made available for consultation within the University library and
may be photocopied or lent to other libraries for the purposes of consultation.Abstract
It is recognised that normative systems, and in particular electronic institutions and
contracts are a potentiallypowerful means formakingagent interactionsin multi-agent
systems effective and efﬁcient. However, correctly specifying the behaviour of such
systemsisadifﬁcultproblem. Designersarefaced withtwoconcurrent, complextasks:
ﬁrstly they must specify the relationships (overtime) between agents’ actions and their
effects, and secondly they must also consider how agents’ actions are to be regulated
through the deﬁnition of agents’ permissions and obligations. Such systems are typi-
cally complex, and given this complexityit may be difﬁcult for a designer to determine
whether their original objectives have been captured by the speciﬁcation of the system.
In this dissertation we seek to address some of the problems associated with institu-
tional speciﬁcation. In order to do this we present a model for specifying institutions
based on the notion of socially constructed reality that accounts not only for how the
action and events which constitute the institution are described, but also how they are
regulated. Institutionsmay be used in a numberof ways, and may account for concepts
at varying levels of abstraction. Recognising this we also investigatehow several insti-
tutions, each accounting for a particular aspect of a society may be composed and how
the relationships between these institutions may be expressed. Given this model, we
then demonstrate how, using the answer set programming paradigm institutional spec-
iﬁcations based on our model may be checked for the absence or presence of certain
(un)desirable properties.
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13Chapter 1
Introduction
Agent mediated electronic institutions are a class of multi-agent system where agents
coordinate their activities and interact to achieve their personal goals. What differenti-
ates electronic institutions from existing classes of multi-agent systems is the presence
of a set of social norms or regulations which govern the institution. Norms differ from
existing mechanisms for specifying agent behaviour in that, while there is an expecta-
tion for norms to be upheld, there is no absolute requirement for this to be the case.
That is to say, the system may still be considered to be operating within its speciﬁca-
tion even when the norms of the system are not all upheld by each and every agent
involved in the system.
This work focuses on the construction and analysis of agent-mediated electronic insti-
tutions, in particular how the speciﬁcation and representation of normative aspects of
the institution at a high level can be translated and reﬁned into practical application in
a multi-agent system. We are especially concerned with the processes used by multi-
agent systemsto detect violationsof thosenormsand enforce any sanctionswhich may
follow.
1.1 A Motivating Example
In the following section we try to illustrate some of the reasons for using normative
conceptsand someofthekeyproblemswiththisapproach. Westartwithatoyexample
14drawn from the real world:
We set the scene in a remote village which is governed by a single village
elder. Thiselderhas aresponsibilityto preservethewell-beingofallofthe
villagers to the best of her ability. In this village there is a single village
well which serves as a source for all of the villagers’ water. The village
is in a relatively dry region so the amount of water which can be drawn
from the well in a given year is limited. After a rainy season the well
is replenished, but during the dry season it is unlikely to be replenished
until the following year. Ignoring the elder’s other responsibilities to the
villagers we shall consider how she might go about ensuring that the well
does not run dry.
We state the elder’s goal with respect to the preservation of the water supply in the
village as follows:
Ensure that in a given dry season the well does not run dry.
Assuming that the well yields sufﬁcient water in a given dry season to supply each and
every villager with enough water to survive, the elder might reason that the most likely
cause for the well running dry would be one or more villagers using more than their
fair share of water. Assuming that the elder determines (by, for example, examining
possible water availability or using previous year’s water usage) that a fair share of
water for each villager is three buckets a day, we may reﬁne the above goal as follows:
Ensurethat in a given dry seasonno villagertakes more than threebuckets
of water a day from the well.
Ignoring population change, the successful implementation of this goal should be suf-
ﬁcient to preserve the water supply of the village in a given year. The ﬁrst problem
is that villagers might not share the same information or reasoning power about the
availability of water from the well. In order for villagers to be made aware of the
potential risk to the village of individuals taking more than their fair share the elder
might choose to make the above goal explicit. The elder might do this by placing a
sign above the well stating:
15It is forbidden for villagers to take more than three buckets of water from
the well a day during a given dry season.
This statement constitutes a possible regulation on the use of the well which, if ob-
served should maintain the elder’s original goal of preserving the water supply in the
village in a given dry season. The regulation is stated in such a way that any villager
taking more than their fair share of water will be in violation of this regulation.
Howeverthispresentstheproblemthatwhilewemightexpectthemajorityofmembers
of the village to share the elder’s goal of mutual preservation, this isn’t necessarily so.
Some individuals might not share the elder’s view of what is a reasonable allocation
of water, or might simply ignore the needs of other villagers and take more water than
their share for their own proﬁt.
The elder now has a problem, in that she has identiﬁed a code of behaviour which she
wishes the villagers to observe but she has no way of forcing the villagers to comply
withthiscodeofbehaviour. Theeldermay chooseto re-thinktheway that access tothe
well is controlled in order to make it impossible for a villager to break the regulation:
She might for instance place a locked cover on the well, thus preventing villagers from
obtaining water without her permission.
While this would allow the elder to prevent all violations of the stated regulation it
presents a problem: because the elder is the only villager to have access to the well
she must be present each time a villager wishes to draw water a process which would
necessarily use a large amount of her time. In essence villagers would be delegating
their ability to access the well to the elder, or whoever she had chosen to control access
to the well.
Instead of directly controlling access to the well, a more reasonable approach might
be the instigation of a system which allows villagers to draw more than their share but
imposes a penalty upon those villagers who draw more than their share. The choice
for the level of this penalty or sanction may depend on a number of factors such as
how often villagers have drawn water in the past and/or how much water remains in
the well. The purpose of the penalty may simply be to deter villagers from violating
the regulation, or to repair the overall cost to the village of the well running dry.
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(the local currency) for each violation of the well regulations. We will not consider
how the value of this ﬁne is determined and assume that this ﬁgure is the one that the
elder has determined to be sufﬁcient sanction for violation of the regulation.
In order that villagers are made aware of the ﬁne, the elder re-states the rule as follows:
It is forbidden for villagers to take more than three buckets of water from
the well a day during a given dry season.
Any villager drawing more than three buckets of water a day must pay 100
Groats to the village elder.
The elder does not have to restrict access to the well, freeing up her time for other
pursuits. But the new regulation presents a second problem: suppose that a villager
does violate the rule and draw four buckets of water in a given day and the villager is
required to pay a ﬁne but the villager then chooses not to (or is incapable of) paying
the ﬁne. In this case, the villager has violated the well regulations but has not been
subjected to the relevant sanction for their violation; in fact it is up to the villager to
impose the sanction of paying the ﬁne upon themselves! With the regulation stated as
it is the elder is not able to subject the villager to further sanction, nor does she have
any further means of preventing the villager who violated the regulation from doing so
again.
In order to rectify this situation the elder revises the rule once more, as follows:
It is forbidden for villagers to take more than three buckets of water from
the well a day during a given dry season.
Any villager drawing more than three buckets of water a day must pay a
ﬁne of 100 Groats to the village elder.
Any villager failing to pay a ﬁne due to the village elder within one week
will be placed into the village prison for one month.
In this case, when a villager fails to pay a ﬁne for drawing too much water, the village
elder gains the power under the regulations to place the villager in jail, an action which
(we assume) can be conducted irrespective of the actions of the villager in question.
17Of course there are other issues relating to this newly-formed legislation, for instance
how does the elder know when a villager has drawn more than their share of water?
Or, what if the villager escapes to an adjacent village to avoid paying a ﬁne? We leave
these questions aside and focus instead on the changes that the regulations introduce
to the society.
In the ﬁrst case villagers now have a choice when it comes to drawing their fourth
bucket of water on a given day, if they decide not to draw the fourth bucket, they will
remain in compliance with the well regulations. If, however a villager chooses to draw
a fourth pail, by reading the regulations they know that they must pay a 100 groat ﬁne
to the elder for breaking the rules. It may be that the villager has a great personal need
for the fourth bucket of water, or they may simply be wealthy, in which case they may
choose to pay the ﬁne as part of the cost of drawing their fourth bucket. The ﬁnal
sanction however (that of being put in prison) is not dependent on the actions of the
villager, once the villager has failed to pay the ﬁne, the elder has the power to remove
the villager’s freedom to participate in village life (and hence draw water).
This form of regulation is typical of the types of normative systems we are interested
in modelling and incorporating in to multi-agent systems, we need only replace the
elder with a system designer, the villagers with software agents and the well with
some ﬁnite resource such as CPU usage, memory or network bandwidth and we ﬁnd
ourselves with a system which is similar to many computational resource allocation
problems found in distributed computing.
We summarise the key aspects of social regulation as we see them as follows:
Regulations allow for the expression of the objectives of their authors. In the vil-
lage example the elder’s ongoing objective was to prevent a shortage of water in
the village; howeverthis is an internal mental attitudeof the elder which may not
be shared or even be within the grasp of the villagers. Through the codiﬁcation
of the above rule into clear regulation the elder is able to prevent, or at least limit
the likely occurrence of one case where her objective might not be met.
Regulations allow these objectives to affect the objectives of those subject to them.
While in the above case it might be reasonable to assume that a water shortage
would ultimately be to the detriment of any member of the village this is not
necessarily so. Individual villagers may place their own personal goals above
18those of the society, or may simply not share the society’s goals. Imposing
sanctions for violated regulations encourages the adjustment of individual’s
attitudes and objectives to those which are consistent with the objective of the
regulation. In the above case, even though a villager may not have the objective
of preventing a water shortage in the village, they will probably prefer not to
pay ﬁnes on a regular basis and will almost certainly prefer being free to being
placed in prison.
Regulations act as a substitute for knowledge and reasoning power. In the above
case, the elder was able to reason that villagers drawing more than their fair
share of water from the village well may lead to a shortage of water, however it
may not be the case that the villagers themselves would be able to come to the
same conclusion. A villager may be unaware of the seasonal shortage of water,
or may simply lack the reasoning capability to associate the action of drawing
too much water with a subsequent shortage of water. By (in part) expressing an
interpretation of their objective explicitly in a form which related directly to the
actions of those who are subject to the regulation (the villagers), the elder was
able to bypass this possible lack of reasoning power or knowledge on the part
of an ignorant or negligent user.
In the case of the above regulation a villager need not know about water short-
ages or weather patterns instead they need only reason that by performing a
given action (drawing too much water) they may necessarily be subject to a di-
rect sanction (a ﬁne, or being put into prison).
Norms indirectly prevent undesirable states of affairs In the aboveexamplethe el-
der wished to reduce the risk of a water shortage in the village, however her only
mechanism for directly bringing about this state of affairs was to take physical
control of the well and ensure that only a given amount of water was drawn. In
this case, the cost of directly enforcing a state of affairs may be so high as to
make it impractical and in many other cases there may be no means available for
performing such direct regulation. In these cases norms indirectly bring about
the desired state of affairs by changing the behaviour of agents participating in
the system.
In the above case we discussed a human society; there are however a number of signif-
icant problems which present themselves in order for us to apply normative concepts
such as these to the governance of multi-agent systems which are less clear in human
systems:
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concepts? In the above case, many of the aspects of the regulations are implicit.
In an electronic system we cannot rely upon informal or assumed knowledge in
order for agents to interpret rules. The language we choose has to be capable of
representing elements of the system including agents’ actions, and the states of
affairs to which they relate, as well as how those actions are governed within the
system in terms of agents’ permissions and obligations.
Logical Clarity and Consistency The language we choose must be unambiguous
and have a clear semantics for interpretation. While it is often the case that we
ﬁnd humans discussing the precise meaning of the regulations around us, we do
not expect computational agents to have this ability. As such it must be the case
that any language for representing normative aspects of multi-agent systems
must be both logically sound and complete.
Computational Complexity While the presence of a formal model for describing
normative systems is necessary for building normative multi-agent systems it
is not sufﬁcient on its own. We must also consider how agents interpret this lan-
guage to reason about their own actions and the actions of others. In particular
we must consider how agents acquire sufﬁcient information to make decisions
about whether or not other agents are in violation and we must ensure that these
decisionscan bereached in a reasonable timeusinga reasonable amountofcom-
puting power. In many cases an agent must make a decision on how to act (such
as a villager deciding whether or not they must pay a ﬁne) in a given amount of
time and any system for representing normative properties of multi-agent sys-
tems must allow for these decisions to be made in that time.
Engineering Systems While concise syntax and consistent semantics are obviously
important,wemustnotforget thefact thatweexpect systemsofrules forgovern-
ing multi-agent systems to be designed by humans. As such we must consider
how a human designer should go about translating their intentions accurately
into written rules in this language.
1.2 What is an Electronic Institution?
An institution is a multi-agent system where agents’ behaviour is governed by a set of
published norms, rules or regulations which bring about a set of expected behaviours
for agents interacting in a social context.
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participating agents are explicit and can be written down in a form which is machine
processable. Further to this we assume that it is possible for agents within the system
to interpret those expectations and decide whether or not, given sufﬁcient information,
they themselves and other agents they interact with are in compliance or violation with
those norms.
The notion of an institution and their recognition as a fundamental mechanism for the
advancement of trade is widely accepted in contemporary economics and social the-
ory. Institutions play a role in the regulation of trade, international relations, ﬁnancial
markets and the management of natural and synthetic resources through some regula-
tory framework that guides and controls the actions of participants. Agent-mediated
electronic institutions are a social metaphor that emulates the procedures, interactions,
role assignments and enforcement activities that exist in human institutions.
One might question the relevance of modelling man-made electronic institutions in a
multi-agent systems context. Observing institutions from a social theoretic perspec-
tive, one of the underlying principles of institutional emergence is the establishment
of frameworks either by decree or through an incremental evolution over time. These
frameworks allow societies and organisations to structure and regulate their own activ-
ities; thisis certainlythecase in politicalinstitutionsand in someeconomicinstitutions
such as cooperatives or publicly-ownedcompanies where there is direct feedback from
system users to control its own governance. However, the structures and rules of the
majority of human institutions that one can imagine, such as banking and trading sys-
tems, mobile phone provision, educational and health care institutions, are imposed
upon their participants by external decree (albeit with a varying degree of feedback
from the systems’ users).
At present it is clear that despite ongoing work in agent coordination, collaboration,
self-organising systems and negotiation in multi-agent systems. Agents will not be
capable of constructing their own institution-likestructures for some time, if ever. The
descriptionofagivenhumaninstitution,whosedeﬁnitionmay appearrelativelysimple
may draw on very high-level aspects of human cognition and social behaviour that fall
outside of current research into artiﬁcial intelligence.
The institutions we are concerned with are designed by humans, possibly as models of
similarsystems in human interaction (taking into account certain practical impossibili-
21tiesandpossibilitiesinmulti-agentsystemsengineering)wheretherulesand structures
are imposed upon a society of agents. Those agents are then free to interact to the de-
gree allowed by their own autonomy within the constraints imposed by the system.
One could consider electronic institutions in relation to conventional software engi-
neering approaches such as the uniﬁed modelling language UML, where the goal of
system speciﬁcation is to capture and specify (as completely as possible) the correct
functioning behaviour of a system so that this behaviour can be rigorously enforced in
implementation to the exclusion of all else. However, with electronic institutions the
aim is to capture the minimal required functional aspects of a system simultaneously
and to specify undesirable behaviours and how they should be dealt with in as general
a way as possible.
1.3 Motivation
The ﬁeld of multi-agent systems is an increasingly broad area of study which can
summarised as the uniﬁcation of the ﬁelds of distributed artiﬁcial intelligence (DAI)
and software engineering.
Historically those concerned with the engineering of multi-agent systems have con-
centrated on:
• Agent-centred aspects, such as theformal aspects of agent design. These include
ﬁnding adequate logics to model various aspects of agents’ internal states and
the effects of communicative actions on those states as well as the means for
implementing agents based on these theories.
• Society-oriented aspects such as how agents coordinate and communicate, the
structure and semantics of the interactions which take place and the structure of
the societies which are created. Research in this ﬁeld has led to a body of work
relating to the engineering of multi-agent societies, both drawing on methodolo-
gies from conventional software engineering and building new ones.
The study of institutions draws on work in both of these areas because the institu-
tions we are concerned with are engineered by humans and hence require a signiﬁcant
22amount of human effort while the agents participating in the resulting system must
have sufﬁcient intelligence and internal reasoning to participate in the institution.
In this dissertation however, beyond some minimal and reasonable assumptions about
the capabilities of participating agent we are not concerned with the internal details of
agents’ construction. Instead we focus on how agent societies are speciﬁed and how
they can be built as electronic institutions. We do not consider how, for instance agents
internal mental attitudes toward one another, or the institutions that they participate
may be constructed. We also do not intend to cover in depth how a designer might go
about capturing the system requirements and norms at an abstract level and how they
are represented at this level, nor do we consider how these requirements may change
over time in response to changes in behaviour of agents in the system. While all of
these aspects are interesting areas of study in their own right, they are left as areas for
further study.
Part of the goal of engineering electronic institutions is to strike a balance between
agents’ autonomy and the restrictions placed on that autonomy by the norms of the
society. This balance must be considered not only in the speciﬁcation of the institu-
tion but also in its implementation. One of the goals of creating institutions is societal
openness in so much as agents built using a variety of tools and methodologies should
be able to participate in an institution with the greatest degree of autonomy possible.
This goal has an implication for the openness of the underlying agent architecture used
to implement the institution. Existing architectures for implementing electronic insti-
tutionshave failed to maintain agents’autonomy at thelowest level of implementation,
relying on tightly speciﬁed protocols which do not allow for deviation and centrally
manage agents’ messaging capabilities in order to enforce those protocols and the sys-
tem norms. It is this preservation of autonomy that forms the basis of this work: we
seek to capture and specify the institution to the extent that it can be executed in the
presence and with respect to its social norms without limiting the resulting imple-
mentation to a trivial centrally-coordinated interaction framework based on explicit
protocols for that interaction.
A single institution embodies a set of regulated behaviours relating to one aspect of an
agent’s social existence, in many cases however an agent will participate in a number
of societies and each of these societies may be governed by several institutions, each
relating to a distinct aspect of social existence in that society. While in many cases
the institutions will be distinct from one another, in others they may inter-lock and
23despite being speciﬁed independently may have mutual dependencies which must be
speciﬁed correctly in order for each institution to function correctly and regulate its
own aspect of the society. The second motivation of this thesis is to discover how
these dependencies are formed, and how their correct function can be speciﬁed and the
resultant system veriﬁed for correctness.
1.4 Thesis Contributions
In this thesis we consider the speciﬁcation of normative aspects of agent interaction
throughtheuseofelectronicinstitutions. Themaincontributionofthethesisisamodel
for specifying agent interactions through electronic institutions based on the answer-
set programming paradigm. The approach taken allows us to specify how normative
aspects of agent interaction may be deﬁned and reasoned about both ofﬂine for the
purposes of veriﬁcation and validation and online for the purposes of agent reasoning.
The ﬁrst contribution of this thesis is a system of speciﬁcation which captures funda-
mental aspects of electronic institutions, speciﬁcally how actions, events, obligations,
permissions and institutionalised power can be incorporated into a language for rep-
resenting norms and regulations in the context of single institutions. The model we
proposehas concise formal semantics, and we show how speciﬁcations for singleinsti-
tutions based on this model may be represented as answer set programs encapsulating
these semantics. These programs may in turn be used to both execute the institution
online (i.e. observe the status of the institution as it evolves over time in response to
the actions of agents participating in it) and also to verify properties (such as whether
a particular social objective is maintained by the regulations of the institution) ofﬂine.
In the ﬁrst case we consider only the speciﬁcation of single institutions; the second
contribution of this thesis is an understanding of how relationships between multiple
institutions may be speciﬁed. In this case it becomes possible for dependencies to
arisebetween institutions,we analysetheeffects ofthesedependencies and address the
problem of how they may be represented allowing us to show how single institutions
can be composed into broader schemes of social regulation. Again we demonstrate
how these relationships may be represented as answer set programs, and show how
systems based on composed institutions may be veriﬁed for correctness.
241.5 Thesis Outline
In chapter 2 we outline the state of the art in the study of normative systems and
virtualinstitutions. Wealso discussrelevant approaches to problemspeciﬁcation
and reasoning in artiﬁcial intelligence.
In chapter 3 we introduce our model for specifying institutions, we discuss how no-
tions of actions, events, time and deontic principals such as obligation and per-
mission may be incorporated into the speciﬁcation of institutions. We then use
these concepts to produce a formal model suitable for the speciﬁcation of single
institutions in which particular aspects of agent interaction may be speciﬁed.
In chapter 4 we discuss cases where agents may be subject to the regulation of more
than one institution, and cases where systems may be designed to incorporate
multiple institutions, some possibly residing outside of the control of the de-
signer. We extend the model we deﬁne for single institutions in chapter 3 to take
into account the speciﬁcation relationships between institutions — where one
institution depends on, or is expressed in terms of another. We go on to discuss
how this extended model for institutions can be used to express how institutions
may be composed and incorporated, and how this composition can be employed
to engineer complex speciﬁcations from individual institutional speciﬁcations.
In chapter 5 we show how speciﬁcations of both single and multiple institutions can
be represented as declarative logic programs with answer set semantics. We
show how queries relating to the correctness of these speciﬁcations may be en-
coded andused toverifyproperties ofthespeciﬁcationsusinganswersetsolvers.
In chapter 6 we describe our action language InstAL for representing institutionsin a
human-readable format. We then demonstrate the effectiveness of the speciﬁca-
tion mechanism deﬁned in chapters 3 and 4 with two extended of case studies.
In chapter 7 we summarise and discuss future directions.
1.6 Some Deﬁnitions
Within the literature a plethora of deﬁnitions have been put forward in the ﬁeld of
normative systems. In this section we outline the conventions used in the rest of this
thesis.
Agent An agent from [Woo02] is considered to be a unitary party which is capable of
25autonomous action and heterogeneous behaviour (with respect to other agents).
Throughoutthethesis, we assumethat on thewholethe agents we talk about will
implemented as computer programs, however this is not a necessary assumption
and in most cases agents may also be played by human beings.
Society A society is a collection of two or more agents.
Norm Derived from the Latin word norma meaning “angle measure” or “law-like
rule”, the term is applied differently in different contexts in the literature. In
sociology it (often referred to as a “social norm”) tends to refer to an “acceptable
pattern of behaviour” which is mutually accepted within a given society. In
philosophy however, the term tends to refer to interpretations that are subjective
either relative to an individual or group of individuals.
The deﬁnition we use through the thesis falls more on the side of sociology,
and can be summarised as a description of some class of socially acceptable or
unacceptable behaviour.
Normsthemselvesmay beexpressedat vastlydifferinglevelsofspeciﬁcity, from
completely abstract statements such as “you ought to be good” to concrete ones,
such as “you must have taken the rubbish out by Tuesday night”
Violation A violation describes a point in time at which an agent ceased to be in
compliance with a norm or rule. For instance with “you must have taken the
rubbish out by Tuesday night” a violation would occur at the end of Tuesday
night (however that is deﬁned) if the rubbish has not been taken out.
For some norms, such as “you should always be nice to your brother” viola-
tions can be said to occur whoever you perform the action “being nasty to your
brother” which is contrary to the norm.
Sanction A sanction is any action or actions which have the purpose of responding
to some breach in normative behaviour. Sanctions are typically punitive and
directed at the agent or agents responsible for bringing about the violation.
Institution In this thesis we use the term Institution to describe a set of rules and
semantics which should hold in relation to a speciﬁc aspect of interaction in a
given society. An institution may consist of constitutive rules which deﬁne how
the institution (and hence all of the members of the society associated with it)
should interpret events which occur, and regulative rules which deﬁne socially
acceptable behaviours for the members of the society. These rules correspond-
26ingly deﬁne the norms of the institution. Unless otherwise speciﬁed we assume
that the term refers to institutions which apply to computational agents.
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Background
2.1 Introduction
The application of normative concepts to the design and regulation of distributed sys-
tems, particularly those involving intelligent agents has been a matter of study for
some years now. Research has covered how norms may be computationally repre-
sented, how these computational representations of norms should be interpreted and
how agents might go about using them to inﬂuence their reasoning abilities.
In this chapter we discuss what constitutes an agent society and the importance of so-
cial regulation as a means for governing the behaviour of agents with possibly hetero-
geneousgoals. Wethenoutlinesomeexistingapproachestocapturingsocialregulation
inmulti-agentsystems,includinglookingat howsuchsystemsmaybeformalised, how
this may be used to create speciﬁcations from which systems can be built, and ﬁnally
how these systemsmay be implementedas part of distributed computing environments
and multi-agent systems.
In the ﬁnal part of this chapter we introduce the Answer Set programming paradigm
which we use throughout the remainder of this dissertation. We discuss the syntax and
semantics of the language and how these may be used to reason about both static and
dynamic domains.
282.2 Multi-agent Societies
The multi-agent systems metaphor (best summarised in [Woo02]) has received a great
deal of study in recent years as a means for implementingcomplexand robust software
systems.
The development of programming languages and tool kits for distributed computation
has been an area of study in computer science for some time, and the development
of systems such as CORBA [COR], DCOM, MPI and more recently SOAP, has made
it possible to build large, scalable systems whose implementation is spread across a
number of computing resources. Within these systems the tendency has been to try
and make distributed development as similar as possible to conventional uni-processor
development. The paradigm of agent-based computing arose from perceived ﬂaws in
existing approaches to developing distributed computing systems.
In the ﬁeld of conventional distributed software development as in uni-processor soft-
ware development, system designs are typically split up into a number of components
or objects each with a speciﬁed programmatic interface and function which may be
divided among the available computing resources. These distributed components are
not endowed with any special status beyond that of a software program, and commu-
nication is simply treated as the exchange of structured data over a (possibly unreli-
able) network. A particular feature of these existing approaches is that the behaviour
of the system as a whole is dependant on the components performing within their
speciﬁcations. 1. In contrast to this notion of regimented component behaviour, in
multi-agent systems, it is (typically) assumed or expected that the components of the
system (agents) will embody some notion of internal autonomy, and will be free to act
or perform according to their own speciﬁcations and that these speciﬁcations may or
may not be consistent with the behaviour of the agent system as a whole. This notion
of autonomy or the freedom of an agent to achieve its own goals, leads us to a world
which is considerably more open than a conventional distributed computing environ-
ment, both in terms of the number and types of action which are available to agents
and in terms of the internal models which may be applied to the construction of the
agents themselves.
1It is false to say that conventionaldistributed computingapproachesdonot considerinstances when
componentsmay fail or act unreliably,howeverthese instances are typicallytreated as exceptionswhich
must be rectiﬁed.
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may be highlighted further by examining how the introduction of some degree of au-
tonomy affects the system’s ability to function as a whole, leading us to the concept of
an agent society. In distributed systems it is almost universally assumed that the com-
ponentsin thesystemwill behavecooperatively(i.e. correctly functioningcomponents
will not be designed to impede the behaviour of other components or the system as a
whole.). In contrast most multi-agent systems relax this assumption of component
homogeneity — the fact that agents may act autonomously and have their own goals
leads to the possibilityof agents having conﬂicting or disjointgoals. It may be that one
agent is expressly intent upon disrupting the behaviour of another, or that one agent
may not consider requests from another agent as being important (according to some
internal metric) enough to warrant their attention.
It is this property of agent heterogeneity which leads to the notion of a multi-agent
society — if agents may act uncooperatively, how can desirable systemic properties
(such as the achievement of some function or goal) be maintained or imposed?
In [ST92, MT95, ST95] Shoham and Tennenholtz et al. observe that when designing
multi-agent systems, the commonly taken approach of specifying how agents should
behave individually, is insufﬁcient for ensuring the correct behaviour of a system as a
whole which is based on those agents. Shoham and Tennenholtz instead propose the
use of social laws which encapsulate the properties necessary for the correct behaviour
ofthesystemas awhole. Theselaws, then act as constraintson theexecutionofagents,
ensuring that the desirable systemic properties are enforced. Shoham and Tennenholtz
deﬁne social laws as follows (from [ST95, page 1]):
“laws which guarantee the successful coexistence of multiple programs
and programmers”
In [ST95] the authors illustrate their approach and the utility of such laws with an
agent-based robot simulation which we summarise here. The simulation consists of
an environment, represented by a ﬁnite two-dimensional grid and a number of robots
which may move autonomously around the vertices of the grid. If it is the case that
two robots move onto the same vertex then a crash occurs. Robots are only capable of
sensing objects in their immediate environment (on adjacent vertices). It is assumed
that each robot has an internal goal of reaching a particular point on the grid and that
the robot is capable of the reasoning necessary to make their way to that point.
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own goals irrespective of the other robots then it is clear that collisions may occur
when two agents enter the same square. If however robots are programmed with some
collision avoidance behaviour (such as not moving into adjacent squares if they are
occupied) then collisions will certainly be less likely, however they will still occur on
some occasions (for example when two robots attempt to move into the same square
from opposite directions). In the second case it also becomes possible for deadlock
situations to occur where one or more robots may be unable to achieve their goal(s).
Assuming that the system designer wishes to avoid robot collisions at all cost Shoham
and Tennenholtz initially propose the following social law (from [ST95, page 8]) as a
means of avoiding both collisions and deadlocks:
Trafﬁc Law 1
Each robot is required to moveconstantly. The direction of motion is ﬁxed
as follows. On even rows each robot must move left, while in odd rows
it must move right. It is required to move up when it is on the rightmost
column. Finally, it is required to move down when it is on either the
leftmost column of even rows or on the second rightmost column of odd
rows. The movement is therefore in a “snake-like” structure, and deﬁnes
a Hamiltonian cycle on the grid.
The authors observe that if this law is upheld then it becomes impossible for agents
to collide and that regardless of other robots’ actions each robot may always achieve
their goal eventually. The utility of the law is clear in that by its imposition it becomes
impossiblefor some undesirable state (collisions) to occur. The authors go on to reﬁne
theiroriginallawinanumberofways inordertotakeintoaccount boththeinefﬁciency
(in terms of increasing the necessary number of moves a robot must make) of the
original law and a number of variations in the environment.
We make the following observations about multi-agent systems with respect to
Shoham and Tennenholtz’s social laws:
• It may be the case that ensuring the correct behaviour of a multi-agent system as
a whole is outside of the capability of the individual agents within the system.
• Byimposinganartiﬁcialorderorstructurewhichregulatesthesystemasawhole
upon the individuals of the system, it becomes possible (at least in the above
31example) to ensure that undesirable system states are avoided.
• That the imposition of such a structure while beneﬁting the system as a whole,
may come at a cost to the individuals in the system.
2.3 Normative Multi-agent Societies
While the types of explicit constraints imposed on a system described by Shoham and
Tennenholtz may demonstrably lead to better functioning systems, this approach is
necessarily detrimental to agents’ autonomy — in their example they did not consider
the case where it was possible for agents to violate the laws as stated. If agents’
actions must necessarily be limited in order for desirable properties to be maintained
we must place corresponding operational constraints on the agents’ environment in
order to ensure that these constraints are met. In response to these constraints, many
researchers haveproposedtheuseofnormativeconstraintsasameanstoregulateagent
societies.
Rather than expressing absolute constraints on a system, normative constraints sepa-
rate ideal states from sub-ideal ones and allow for the inclusion of both in the resultant
model. Where as a social law might say “property X must necessarily hold”, a corre-
sponding normative constraint might say “it ought to be the case that the property X
holds” and treat all situations where X does not hold as sub-ideal.
2.4 Deontic Principles
We now turn away from theutilityof social regulationto the process by which it can be
speciﬁed and formalised. Attempts to formalise legal reasoning in classical logics date
back to 1926 when Mally proposed the ﬁrst formal logic for reasoning with deontic
(the study of duties and obligations) properties (in [Mal26] referenced via [Lok04]).
Mally’s original approach has since been reﬁned and extended in a number of ways,
leading to an entire ﬁeld of study. The most notable classical logic to be deﬁned in this
ﬁeld is standard deontic logic (SDL), originally due to [vW51]. SDL is a modal logic
including modality O(X) which may be read as obligation or ought – “it ought to be
the case that X is true”, or “it is obligatory that X is true”. At ﬁrst sight it seems that
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statements in a logically concise way. However on inspection it became clear that in
many cases, apparently simple formula may lead to counter-intuitive or contradictory
conclusions according to the axioms of the logical system as in the case of the “gentle
murder” paradox described in [For84].
2.4.1 Normative Positions
In parallel to the development of formal logics to describe deontic properties legal the-
orists were also attempting to classify and formalise the types of situations and legal
positions which arose within the law. Within the world of legal theory, the categori-
sation of legal positions including power, duty, right, permission, liability, disability,
claim and immunity and the relationships between these positions, due to Hohfeld
[Hoh19], is of particular interest.
As well as serving to disambiguate legal terminology from the perspective of a human
attempting to read or write the law, these positions and their analogues have also been
used as the basis for formalising legal language in a logical form. In [Kan72, Lin77]
Kanger and Lindahl use standard deontic logic to formalise a theory of normative po-
sitions. A normative position extends the conventional deontic modality by directing
obligationsbetween agents or groups of agents, such that (for instance) a givenobliga-
tion can be said to be held by a givenagent (to a givenagent). The Kanger-Lindahl the-
ory and its extension by Sergot in [Ser01] considers the relationship between actions,
and captures many of the fundamental legal positions identiﬁed by Hohfeld, allowing
one to categorise and enumerate the types of position which may exist between two or
more agents.
2.4.2 Dynamic Deontic Logic
We stated that the formalisation of deontic properties has led to the exposure of a
number of apparent paradoxes. In many cases these paradoxes are attributable to the
way that actions and time are encapsulated in propositional logic. A number of logics
attempt to overcome these deﬁciencies by making explicit reference to the way in
which normative positions evolve over time. Of particular note in this ﬁeld is Meyer’s
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¬φ
φ ∧ ψ
φ ∨ ψ
φ → ψ
φ ≡ ψ
Standard propositional connectives (proposition)
[α]φ It is necessary that after executing α, φ is true (proposition)
α;β Execute α then execute β (action)
α&β Execute α and β in parallel (action)
α ∪ β Choose either α or β non-deterministically and execute it. (action)
α∗
Execute α a non-deterministically chosen ﬁnite number of
times (zero or more).
(action)
φ? Test φ; proceed if true, fail if false (action)
Table 2.1: Summary of syntax of dynamic logic syntax (from [Har84, page 128]), for
action formulae α,β and propositional formulae φ and ψ
re-formulation of the deontic logic SDL in dynamic logic [Mey88, Mey99].
Dynamic logic ([Har84, HKT00]) differs from classical logics, in that it allows for
the explicit treatment of actions or events and their consequences, as well as allowing
for concurrent, sequential and non-deterministic actions (a summary of the syntax of
dynamic logic is given in Table 2.1). Dynamic logic formulae are divided into action
formulaewhichrelatetotheexecutionofactions,and theirsequence; andpropositional
formulae which may be combined to capture complex properties relating to sequences
of actions and their consequences.
Meyer’s extends dynamiclogic with a number of new propositionalformulae shown in
Table 2.2. As with standard deontic logic, he includes the notions of prohibition (F),
obligation (O) and permission (P) (of which only one is needed to deﬁne the other
two). In Meyer’s dynamic deontic logic, each of these deontic positions is re-written
in terms of the performance of actions, in such a way that executing action when it is
forbidden, or performing an action when another is obliged necessarily leads to a state
in which the violation property V holds.
34V The violation symbol
F(α) It is forbidden to do α
O(α) It is obligatory to do α
P(α) It is permitted to do α
F(α) ≡ [α]V Doing alpha necessarily leads to V
O(α) ≡ F(¯ α) α is obligatory is equivalent to it being forbid-
den to do not α
P(α) ≡ ¬F(α) α is permitted is equivalent to it not being for-
bidden
Table 2.2: Meyer’s deontic dynamic logic
2.4.3 Temporal Aspects of Normative Systems
Meyer’s dynamic deontic logic represented a step forward in the consideration of the
temporal aspects of obligation. However when considering the types of obligations we
expect to see in the real world, several problems arise. Let us take for example the
obligation in Meyer’s dynamic logic [α]O(β) : “executing α leads to the obligation
to execute β” — if α has been executed then the only non-violating subsequent step,
is the execution of β. While this may represent one valid state of affairs, in reality
we also wish to consider the case where doing α creates an obligation to do β at some
pointin the future, but not necessarily immediately. Like theformulae[α]O(β)∧O(γ):
“executing α leads to the obligation to execute β and the obligation to execute γ” will
necessarily lead to a violation after the execution of α.
Deadlines
Many of the obligations in real life have some explicit or implicit deadline associated
with their satisfaction or violation, for instance the statement “you ought to take the
rubbish out” is more likely to be interpreted as “you ought to take the rubbish out
before the community refuse operatives arrive” or “you ought to take the rubbish out
before the kitchen starts to smell bad” than “taking the rubbish out should be the next
thing that you do” or “at some unspeciﬁed point in the future the rubbish should be
taken out”.
In [DWV96] F. Dignum et al. model this kind of deadline in deontic logic in a similar
fashion to Meyer, using a model of dense integer time (where real-time intervals be-
35tween time points are ﬁxed). F. Dignum et al. use formulae of the form O(φ < α < ψ)
to stand for the fact that when φ becomes true, then α ought to be done before ψ be-
comes true, where φ and ψ are some points in time (which may be expressed either in
absolute terms or relative to some other time point, such as now) and α is an action.
The authors use this model to deﬁne two additional types of obligation:
• Immediate obligations :O!(α)
def
≡ O(α < now + 1) : “Action α ought to be
done immediately” where O(α < φ) is a shorthand for O(true < α < φ)
corresponding to Meyer’s dynamic logic obligations.
• Obligations allowing for more preferable actions to be performed before the
obliged action: O?(α)
def
≡ O(true < αPREV(β) ∧ PREFER(α,β) “Action
α ought to be done before it is the case that β has been done, when β is less
preferable to α”
Additionally there as an operator for describing recurring obligations which we do not
discuss here.
In [DBDM04] V. Dignum et al. introduce the syntax O(α ≺ δ) for obligations based
on deadlines, which states that “It is obligatory for α to occur before δ” where both α
and δ are actions. In this case a violation occurs in cases where the obligation holds
and δ occurs before α. The authors investigate the notion of exploiting deadlines to
express obligations by showing that a number of the paradoxes present in SDL do not
manifest themselves when represented in the form of deadlines.
The key observations which we make about the use of deadlines for specifying deontic
properties are summarised as follows:
• In contrast to Meyer’s approach deadlines allow us to represent multiple depen-
dent or independent obligations at a single point in time.
• When combined with a notion of preference conﬂicting obligations can also be
accounted for (as is also the case in the work of Chlovy and Cuppens in [CC])
• Deadlines make obligations decidable: If we assume that the deadline event will
eventually occur (which is true in the case that the deadline is a speciﬁc point in
time) then it will always be the case that we will eventually be able to determine
the status of the obligation.
36Norms in Temporal Logics
Temporal logics ([Pri57, Pnu77]) have been developed as a means for representing
temporal aspects of systems and a number of languages have been deﬁned, based on
existing temporal logics, to capture normative properties.
A key beneﬁt of temporal logics is the ability to capture in a declarative form, not
only particular states of the world (as in the propositional logic for instance) but also
sequences of events or actions and the states which occur between them. In the case of
branching temporal logics such as computational tree logic (CTL) [CES86] and CTL∗
the possible states of the world are viewed as a tree which branches from the current
state into the future, according to which actions have been executed, and formulaemay
be quantiﬁed by whether it is true in the next state, in all states up until a given formula
holds true, in any future state and all future states.
Variants of the temporal logic CTL∗ are used by both Veridicchio and Colombetti
in [VC03] and V. Dignum in [Dig04, chapter 4, pages 99-113], [DBDM04] to capture
normativespeciﬁcations ofmulti-agentsystems. In bothcases temporal logicformulae
are used to capture the instances in time when agents have violated and complied with
a given norm.
2.4.4 Abstraction and Norms
A key question in addressing normative systems is, at what level do we specify the
norms? For instance, the norm “you ought to be good” represents a high-level of
abstraction in comparison to the norm “you ought to put the rubbish out before 8am on
Tuesday mornings”. F. Dignum addresses this problem in [Dig02] and identiﬁes three
broad classes of norm speciﬁcity:
Abstract Norms Abstract norms represent the statutes, values and (perceived) overall
objectives in a society. Dignum summarises abstract norms thus (from [Dig02,
page 7]):
1. They are referring to an abstract action that can be implemented in many
ways
372. They use terms that are vague and that have to be deﬁned separately
3. They abstract from temporal aspects
4. They abstract from agents and/or roles
5. They refer to actions or situations that are not (directly) controllable and/or
checkable by the institution
Concrete Norms Concrete norms represent the explicit codiﬁcation and disambigua-
tion of the abstract norms. Dignum summarises how the above aspects of ab-
stract norms may be realised: In the case where abstract norms refer to abstract
actions, these must be grounded to “real” actions. Ontological ambiguities must
be resolved into decidable speciﬁcations. Implicit aspects of abstract norms
must be made explicit and codiﬁed. The agents and/or roles relevant to the
abstract norms must be made explicit. Finally, un-checkable or un-controllable
aspects of norms must be examined and assimilated with constraints which may
be checked.
Procedures In order for the speciﬁed concrete norms to have any effect, there must be
mechanisms in the environment (institution) which allow for their enforcement.
Theseprocedures may includeoperational constraints on agents’actions, as well
as rules governing how and when normative states should be determined, and
protocols for addressing violations and imposing sanctions.
It is clear, at least to humans, that norms have some meaning at all three of these
levels, and that in our everyday life we use all three classes of speciﬁcity, for instance,
in the case of “you ought to be good” we might consider “killing someone” a concrete
representation of a violation of this norm, and “being sent to prison for life” as valid
procedure for the enforcement of this norm.
[Sal03, GD04] investigate this taxonomy of norms in more detail and discuss how
norms may be translated from higher levels of abstraction into implementations.
2.5 Social Semantics for Agent Interaction
Within agent societies we assume that certain information is shared and mutually un-
derstood by agents participating in the society. Research on agent communication has
38focused on the creation of ontological descriptions of domains using languages such
as DAML [dama] and OWL [damb] to deﬁne common concepts and relationships be-
tween them. In the same way, within societies, there is a need to establish a similar
level of mutual understanding in order for agents within societies to communicate ef-
fectively.
Social semantics can be considered as the set of mutually understood, mutually
adopted rules which form a necessary basis for the interpretation of regulatory aspects
of the system.
Within philosophy, in [Sea95] Searle gives an account in which facts which may be
held to be true by participants in a society may be broken down into: brute facts, which
follow from a common-sense understanding of the world (i.e. “the cup is on the table”,
“the earth is spherical”), and those facts which are created by a society (i.e. “Ben and
Sam are married”). The latter class of facts, described by Searle as institutional facts,
only have meaning within a given context. Brute facts are observable and institutional
facts are not, so how do institutional facts come into being? Searle accounts for the
creation of institutional facts by deﬁning the notion of a constitutive rule, which de-
scribes when doing an action in one context counts as performing another action in a
second context. By taking the physical world as the ﬁrst context and deﬁning when
the presence of certain states or the performance actions in the physical world count as
the presence of certain states or the performance of certain actions in the institutional
world institutional facts may be created.
2.5.1 Social Semantics vs. Mentalistic Approaches
Much of the work on creating rational agents has focused on the modelling of agents’
internal mental states, and attitudes, for instance in [RG91, RG95] Rao and Georgeff
describe how an agent’s attitudes may be decomposed into beliefs, desires and inten-
tions. In [CL90b, CL90a] Cohen and Levesque propose a corresponding approach
for addressing the semantics of agent communication. Founded on speech-act the-
ory [Aus62, Sea69], their approach associates a communicative action between two or
more agents with some assumed mental state in the sender (a feasibility precondition)
and a change in mental state in the recipients of the communication (a rational effect).
This mentalisticapproach forms the basis for the FIPA agent communication language
39[Fou00], however a number of criticisms have been raised (see [Sin98, Woo98, PM99,
Sin99, Col00] for some examples).
We summarise these as follows:
Assumption of Common Rationality The mentalistic model assumes a common ra-
tionality for participating agents, in order for a stable semantics to occur each
agent must interpret each communication in a uniform way and draw the same
sorts of conclusions about the intended meaning of that communicative act.
Veriﬁability Aperhapsmoreseriousproblemwithaccountingforspeechactsinterms
of mental states occurs when we consider the problem of verifying whether or
not the speaker truly held the necessary preconditions in their mental state im-
plied by when they issued the message.
Models of normative aspects of agent systems based on social semantics (rather than
mentalisticsemantics)address thesedeﬁciencies. Thesemodelslimittheinterpretation
of the semantics of interaction to properties which may be derived from the point of
view of an external observer. Using social semantics for communication removes the
de-facto need for agentsto haveto reason aboutotheragents’mentalstatesdirectly; for
example in the case of an auction room, where an agent issues a “bid” message: In the
mentalistic approach one might suggest that the bid represented an agents intention
to win the auction, in contrast in the social model we might simply imply that the
occurrence of a “bid” message simply binds the agent to pay the price they have bid.
2.5.2 Constitutive Aspects of Normative Systems
As we have observed, Searle’s account of institutional facts and brute facts leads to the
question: how do the latter class come into being? Searle accounts for this relationship
with the notionof “counts-as” whereby real-world actions and states can beconsidered
to bring about institutional actions and states.
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In his study of the philosophy of action [Gol76], Goldman describes an account of
action generation, which corresponds to this relationship for actions and events. Gold-
man providesan account [Gol76, page 22]of fourcases where actions in the real world
may be considered to generate actions in another (institutional context) as follows:
Causal Generation An agent performs some action (in the real world) which gener-
ates an effect (i.e. John ﬂips a light switch, which causes the light bulb to light
up). This effect then causes the generation of a corresponding action in the in-
stitutional world (John turns the lights on). It should be noted that it is not the
ﬂipping of the switch itself which is associated with the generation of “turns the
light on” but any action which brings about the lighting of the light bulb.
Simple Generation An agent performs an action in a given context and this, by its
nature, generates an action in the institutional world. This generation may be
conditional on some state of affairs in the ﬁrst context.
Conventional Generation As with simple generation, but the generation is condi-
tional on some property in the ﬁrst and/or second context. i.e. moving a piece
in chess generates a check-mate, but only if the move and position are valid).
In the case of conventional generation the condition for generating the resultant
action in the second context may be seen as a social convention.
Augmentation Generation Where an event is generated which elaborates on the
event from which it is generated. In this case the generated event is fundamen-
tally linked to the meaning of the original event. Goldman cites the example of
“John ran quickly” as an elaboration on the event of “John ran”.
Goldman’s approach is relatively broad, and uses the notion of generation between
actions to account for a number of different types of relationships between actions. In
many cases it is not clear, or it is debatable which type of generation is occurring, in
some senses this stems from the fact that Goldman was trying to capture a deﬁnition
of human action where such ambiguities are often present.
The most important type of generation recognised by Goldman for this work, is that
of conventional generation, in this case the basis, or the rules which deﬁne a given
41relationship between two or more actions originate in the society in which the action
occurs, and are comparable to the types of social norms we are interested in.
Institutionalised Power
Therelationshipbetweenbrutefact andinstitutionalfactidentiﬁedbySearleandothers
is accounted for formally by the notion of counts-as in [JS96], which corresponds to
Goldman’s notion of conventional generation.
In their formalisation of the notion of institutionalised power in [JS96] Jones and Ser-
got argue for the necessity of distinguishing between:
i) legal power
ii) the physical capability to carry out the acts necessary for the exercise
of legal power, and
iii) the permission to carry out those acts.
Institutionalised power acts as a constraint on the generation of actions, and can be
viewed as the dual of capability in the real world. Just as in the real world we may
be concerned with our capability to directly bring about some state of affairs, in the
legal(“institutional”)world weshould beconcerned about when thecreation of certain
states is considered valid. In contrast, permission is independent of capability as an
agent may be permitted to perform an action for which they are not empowered or
likewise capable of doing an action which they are not permitted to do.
In [JS96] Jones and Sergot use the notion of institutionalised power as a means for
modelling conventional generation; using the logic of action Ea. This logic accounts
for the notion of agency by allowing the association of an agent with performance of a
givenaction orthe creation of a givenstate ofaffairs. Using this logicJones and Sergot
formalise conventional generation with a counts-as operator which formally allows for
the deﬁnition of conventional generation.
422.5.3 Commitment-based Approaches
Thenotionofsocialcommitment,ﬁrstintroducedinthecontextofmulti-agentsystems
by [Cri95] has been used extensively to model the types of deontic properties we are
concerned with in this dissertation.
Commitments are applied practically to the ﬁeld of multi-agent systems by Singh et
al. in [Sin99, VS99, Sin00, YS02, CS03].
Singh deﬁnes a commitmentin [Sin99] as a 4-tuple: C(a,b,G,p) where a,b are agents
— the debtor and creditor respectively, G is a group of agents — the context group
and p is a proposition — the discharge condition. The presence of a commitment of
the form C(a,b,G,p) may be read as “Within social group G, agent a is committed to
agent b to bring about p”.
Singh deﬁnes a number of primitiveoperators for the creation, discharge, cancellation,
release, delegation and assignment of commitments within a social group and relates
how (many of) these may be associated with speech acts. In the same paper Singh also
shows how many normative positions such as pledges, oughts, taboos and conven-
tions, may be naturally represented (at some level) by commitments, and how sets of
commitments may be grouped and associated with roles (see Section 2.6.1, page 44).
While commitments are ﬂexible in many ways, in some cases the use of such a low-
level approach does not allow some normative scenarios to be captured. A particular
instance of this occurs in the case of collective commitments as identiﬁed in [PJ03];
in some cases we wish for a group of agents to be committed to the achievement of
a goal as if they were one agent, such that any agent fulﬁlling the goal is sufﬁcient
for each and every agent to be dispensed of its commitment. While it is possible to
commit each agent individually to the achievement of a goal in Singh’s account of
commitments, this is not the same as a collective commitment, as the fulﬁlment of
the collective goal by a single agent leaves the remaining agents committed to the
achievement of the (now satisﬁed) goal.
The notion of commitment is also used in the context of electronic institutions by
Fornara, Vigan` o and Colombetti in [FVC04, VFC05, VFC06]. In this case commit-
ments are used as the basis for describing the semantics of agent communication lan-
guages. Unlike Singh’s approach to commitment, the authors directly account for the
43notions of conventional generation and empowerment (which they term Authorisa-
tion). In this ontological approach to the deﬁnition of communication frameworks,
abstract communicative and normative actions can be tied to concrete communicative
actions with counts-as relations. This approach is similar in many respects to the ap-
proach we take in Chapter 3.
2.6 Pragmatic Issues in Normative Multi-agent Sys-
tems
The idea of building agent systems which capture some notion of what we as humans
would call a society has been studied extensively, and has formed the basis for a large
part of current research into the engineering of multi-agent systems. The notion of
agent societies stems partly out of the desire to build systems which embody many
of the perceived beneﬁts of human societies (such as generation of wealth, economic
efﬁciency, robustness in the face of a number of possible failures) and partly out of the
wish to integrate agents systems with the rapidly growing establishment of electroni-
cally based human societies associated with the growth of the Internet.
2.6.1 Social Structure
Many approaches to engineering multi-agent systems take the view that within these
systems it is beneﬁcial to establish some form of social structure by classifying agents
according the roles which agents are expected to play. Role classiﬁcations are used in
methodologies such as Gaia [WJK00, ZJW03] and others [GKMP03, RA01, Dig04]
in an analogous way to classes in object oriented programming. Each role embodies
some prototypical elements which agents fulﬁlling that role are expected to embody,
or fulﬁl through their behaviour. Additionally roles can be used as a means of coarsely
classifying groups of permissions, obligations and institutional powers in such a way
as to limit the need to reason about these aspects outside of the scope of agents partic-
ipating in a given role.
442.6.2 Open vs. Closed Societies
The study of agent-based systems has led to a great deal of understanding about the
way in which agents may be built in order to go about their business and achieve their
goals, however a number of assumptions are often placed either on other agents in the
system (such as reliability or veracity), or on the environment or system in which the
agents act or operate.
In everyday human existence the only deﬁnite limit on our capabilities is that placed
on our physical forms by the world — in essence we are free to act as we choose.
In artiﬁcial societies and multi-agent systems as a whole this environment and the
constraints it places on an agent’s execution are less well-deﬁned. While it is possible
to specify that the agent is free to do as she pleases within the limits of the computer or
network in which it is executing, this property poses a number of signiﬁcant problems
when it comes to actually building agents. In answer to these problems, designers
of agent systems must typically make assumptions about, or place constraints on the
underlying environment in which their agents operate.
In [Dav00, Dav01] Davidsson studies these types of constraints in the context of arti-
ﬁcial societies and produces the following broad taxonomy for existing approaches to
the development of agent societies:
Open Societies are those societies in which agents are free to join the society as they
please (simply by communicating with other agents) and while there may be
a common communication language or limited set of social roles and regula-
tions there are no other implicit boundaries to agents’ interactions. In this case
we must assume no implicit guarantees of agent reliability, trustworthiness or
veracity. Open societies have the property of allowing a great deal of agent free-
dom (i.e. anything the agent is capable of is possible in the society) at the cost
of reliability and internal complexity of the participating agents. In order for
an agent to participate effectively in such a society it must be capable of deal-
ing with other agents’ malicious, unreliable or simply unexpected behaviours as
well as being able to reason in an open way about how its own behaviour will
effect the system.
Closed Societies are those societies in which the agents participating in the society
andtheconstraintsonthesystemarestrictlydeﬁnedat designtime. AsDavidson
points out in [Dav01, page 4]
45The MASis designed to solveaset of problems, speciﬁed by thesoci-
ety owner. The solving of these problems is then distributed between
the agents of the MAS.
Closed societies can be seen as an extension of existing distributed computing
techniques, with the process substitutedfor agents. Closed societies have the ad-
vantage that, as all properties of the system are designed and hence known a pri-
ori, many difﬁcult problems in agent reasoning can be eliminated. For instance
we could make the assumption that all agents behave rationally and truthfully,
or that the environment makes it possible for agents to observe every event and
state of the world. Such assumptions make the problem of developing the agents
themselves much easier for a designer, at the cost of generality and the potential
for future changes to the underlying societal structure.
Davidsson goes on to deﬁne two further reﬁnements to the above models:
Semi-open Artiﬁcial Societies are societies where agents may enter the society, but
may be subject to certain constraints imposed by that society, and where the
environment in which they operate is tailored to the enforcement of these se-
lected constraints. The society itself still consists of agents communicating au-
tonomously, and individual agents will still be able to act maliciously, however
such behaviours may be detected by other agents with the help of the environ-
ment. Davidsson argues that semi-open societies only slightly limit the capa-
bilities of agents in comparison to truly open societies, and that making the
boundary between the society (and environment) well-deﬁned allows design-
ers to focus on the underlying issues of goal achievement in the implementation
of agents.
Semi-closed Agent Societies are the ﬁnal type of society which Davidsson considers
and are those in which the society itself is closed (i.e. the types and behaviours
ofagents deﬁned in thesystemare ﬁxed apriori)butexternal agents mayinteract
with members of the society or with each other via some external interface to the
society. In this case, the behaviours of some agents (those inside the society) is
ﬁxed and known, leading to much greater potential for stability and reliability,
while the behaviours of those agents outside the society is left open. In semi-
closed societies the types of behaviour possible within or through interaction
with the society are ﬁxed, so there is deﬁned scope for agents interacting outside
ofthelimitationsdeﬁned withinsocieties. Thesemi-closedmodelforsocietiesis
particularly appropriate in cases where some parts of the overall system require
46thepropertiesoftheclosedmodel(Davidssoncitesanexampleofatravelagency
for booking ﬂights) while other parts are better left as an open system.
The reality of how open a given society will be depends largely on the choices of its
designers and implementers. That said, it is clear for the larger class of normative
systems, more open models tend to be closer to our intuitive understanding of social
systems in the human world. We do not adopt a particular model for how the societies
we are interested in specifying in this thesis should be implemented but these factors
must be taken into account.
2.6.3 Life-cycle
An important question in the consideration of normative systems is how and when
norms or groups of norms come into being or cease to have an effect.
In the human world, many institutions such as contracts, have a distinct life-cycle:
they are created when the contract is signed, and the cease to have any force when the
contract is dissolved. In contrast, institutionssuch as the law seem to exist indeﬁnitely.
Mar´ ın and Sartor analyse this problem in [MS99a] where they consider the concept
of a norm’s external time as the interval in which a norm is applicable (i.e. when it
may have some possible effect) and its internal time as the time in which the norm’s
conditionaleffect actuallycomes intoforce. Theirapproach (whichisformalisedusing
the event calculus) can be summarised as “wrapping” an existing conditional norm
with an interval stating when that norm may have an effect.
2.6.4 Violation, Enforcement and Sanction
A lot of work has focused on the representation of norms and regulations, the focus
of much of this work has dealt with the problem of how you distinguish between sit-
uations in which agents are in compliance with or in violation of these norms. An
important question which follows from this is: Once you know that an agent has vio-
lated a norm, what do you do about it?
47The processes for enforcing contracts in human societies are typically broken down
into two distinct processes which may independently or cooperatively support the en-
forcement of the terms of a contract.
Private Enforcement
The ﬁrst of these processes, typically called private enforcement in contract law de-
scribes processes by which a wronged party (that is, a party against whom a violation
has occurred according to the terms of a contract) might bring about sanctioning the
violating party through their own action. In the most general case the wronged party
might simply adjust their future behaviour to reﬂect a lower expectation of compli-
ance with future contracts with the violating party. This form of reputation-based
enforcement has formed the basis for the formation of sale contracts on sites such as
eBay, where despite the presence of a limited framework for the public enforcement of
contracts buyers and sellers use reputation information extensively to make decisions
about whether to engage in sales.
Trust and reputation in distributed systems have been studied extensively in the con-
text of multi-agent systems and other distributed computing environments, [RHJ04]
contains a good overview of the state of the art and current research questions. The
key concept in systems incorporating models of trust and reputation is that agents’ past
performance can be used to build a model of their expected future performance, these
models may then be used by individual agents to make decisions about how to act with
respect to these agents.
The formulation of models of trust can be viewed as an agent design problem, as
decisionsbased upon thesemodelsaretheresponsibilityofagents makingthem. There
is however a relationship between broader multi-agent systems engineering problems
including those relating to institutional multi-agent systems discussed in this thesis. In
order for agents to form models of trust it is necessary for those agents to be aware of
when other agents have failed to meet up to expectations.
In the context of regulated multi-agent systems, private enforcement does not rely
on external descriptions of sanctions, as sanctions are imposed indirectly by agents
through their own actions (or using independent mechanisms for aggregating reliabil-
ity information such as [SS01]). An advantage of private enforcement is that agents
48may decide for themselves if a violation by another agent should lead to that agent
being sanctioned and how severe that sanction might be. Conversely, private enforce-
ment has a number of disadvantages, ﬁrstly in order for sanctions to have any effect
it must be assumed that agents will participate in future interactions with the violated
agent or society (in the case that negativeinformation about the agent’s performance is
disseminated), while this might be reasonable for human societies the transient model
of identity (agents may typically discard an identity which is associated with a poor
reputation and assume a new unknown one) and the fact that it is unlikely that there
will be a single society of agents (agents may cease interacting in one society and
move to another) both mean that sanctions may go effectively un-enforced. Private
enforcement also limits the strength of sanctions to those within the powers of vio-
lated agents, the purpose of sanctions may be seen as twofold: on the one hand they
discourage violations of norms, on the other they may also be used to restore some or
all of the cost to the violated individual or society of the original violation. In private
enforcement, because violated agents have no power over violating agents other than
to affect their future interactions restorative sanctions will be difﬁcult to impose.
Public Enforcement
Whereas private enforcement relies heavily on the capacity for agents to both form
models of other agents’ behaviour and select actions based on those models public en-
forcement works by making explicit the sanctions for violating regulations. By incor-
porating sanctions explicitly as actions into the descriptions it should become possible
for agents to reason directly with some degree of conﬁdence about the effects of their
own or other agents’ violations.
In the case of private enforcement the violated agent is responsible for bringing about
the sanction against the violating agent (by for instance refusing to interact with that
agent in future, or informing other agents of the violation) in public enforcement the
sanction may be imposed by a third party agent against the violating agent. Examples
of this kind of enforcement in human societies might include ﬁnes or imprisonment
imposed by judicial bodies.
Public enforcement poses a number of questions with regards to the implementation
of sanctions,
49• Who is responsible for enforcing the sanction?
• Once a violation has taken place, can the sanction for that violation effectively
be imposed, regardless of the actions of the violating agent(s).
A number of possible solutions to the second problem are used in human societies.
A commonly found example in human contracts occurs when there is some degree of
uncertainty about one party’s possible performance in the contract and a solution is to
include some form of deposit.
1. Alice and Bob agree to interact according to some contract.
2. UnderthiscontractAlicepaysadepositof100GroatstoBob asadepositagainst
violation.
3. Alice violates the terms of the contract, and is liable to a sanction of 50 Groats.
4. Bob deducts this from Alice’s initial deposit.
5. Upon termination of the contract any remaining deposit is returned to Alice.
Assuming that the contract is upheld correctly by Bob, violations for which the sanc-
tion is paying less than or equal to paying the remaining deposit can always be upheld
by Bob. However, in the case that Bob does not comply with the terms of the contract
Alice has no capability to either recover their deposit or imposeany ﬁnancial sanctions
against Bob.
Another more typical approach to public enforcement is to delegate the power of en-
forcement to a third party agent or set of agents who always have the capability to
sanction parties in the case of violation. This model is more in-line with the way that
human contracts are typically executed where violations in contracts may be enforced
through civil courts which have explicit powers to impose contract sanctions.
502.7 Approaches to Specifying Normative Systems
In this section we present relevant existing approaches to the problem of specifying
normative multi-agent systems.
2.7.1 The e-Institutor Framework
The objective of the e-Institutor framework is the construction of agent-mediated elec-
tronic institutions (they use the term from [Nor91]). The framework consists of a
formal speciﬁcation of electronic institutions [RA01, EPS01, ERAS+01], a tool (IS-
LANDER) for editing these speciﬁcations [EdlCS02] and a run-time environment
(AMELI) for the execution of agent systems based on these speciﬁcations: [MJBJ04].
The key components of speciﬁcations in this framework may be summarised as:
Roles A set of Roles, which are divided into Institutionalroles and External roles, and
a role hierarchy, which denotes when two or more roles conﬂict.
Dialogic[al Structure] A dialogical (or dialogic) structure , containing a set of conver-
sation protocols [MPRA99, RA01] which deﬁne how agents may interact with
one another, these are expressed in terms of ﬁnite-state machines. Transitions
indicate when agents assuming particular roles may communicate.
Performative Structure A performative structure, which divides the institution into
scenes, each of which refer to a conversation protocol in the dialogical structure.
Scenes in the performative structure are linked by transitions which indicate
when agents may enter and move between these scenes.
Norms A set of norms. Norms in the e-Institutor are expressed as a form of condi-
tional obligation directed toward a particular agent. A “norm” in the framework
consists of: an antecedent which describes when the norm is triggered and a de-
feasible antecedent which describes when the norm is satisﬁed. Both of these
are expressed in terms of communicative acts within a given scene.
The implementation of the framework ([MJBJ04]) acts as a mediation environment,
enforcing norms and protocols on behalf of agents participating in the system, this is
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done through the implementation of governor agents, each of which acts as a media-
tor in the overall system on behalf of an agent (see Figure 2.1, from [MJBJ04, page
2]). The governors themselves enact a closed multi-agent system (following speciﬁc
protocols deterministically) in order to ensure that violations of protocols are noted
and sanctions are brought into effect. Agents may “join” the environment at will by
connecting through a governor, navigate the performative structure, interact indirectly
with other agents who share the same scene, and leave when permitted to by current
obligations and their position in the performative structure.
The following observations may be made about the framework: The execution envi-
ronment (described in [MJBJ04]) unconditionally enforces both the conversation pro-
tocol rules, and the obligations entailed by norms of the institution, while violations
are detected at the interface to the system, their effect is not passed on. In essence it
is impossible for agents to either deviate from the prescribed interaction patterns or,
more importantly effectively violate any obligations they have acquired — in the case
where an agent attempts to perform an interaction which would lead to the necessary
non-fulﬁlmentof an obligation,theeffect of theinteraction is blocked. In this sensewe
would consider what the authors call norms to actually be a type of constraint. Finally
the types of norms which can be represented within the framework are limited to those
which can be expressedas conditionalobligationsoverspeech acts withinthelanguage
of the conversation protocols, this in itself is reasonable, however it signiﬁcantly limits
the overall expressiveness of the normative language.
52Figure 2.2: Architectural diagram of the OperA framework
2.7.2 OperA
In [Dig04] V. Dignum describes a framework for specifying organisations founded on
the concept of a social contracts.
The formal basis for these contracts can be found in [DMDW03] where Dignum de-
scribes the language LCR (discussed in Section 2.4.3, page 37), an extension of the
temporal logic CTL∗ including deontic properties and a mechanism for reasoning
about agents’ actions.
The OperA framework is composed of three components:
Organisational Model The organisationalmodel accounts for the underlyingabstract
speciﬁcation of an organisation, it consists of: a speciﬁcation of a social struc-
ture, describing the types of roles which are available to agents in the organi-
sation and the dependencies between them, and an interaction structure, which
acts as a template for the possible interaction of agents assuming those roles.
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scribed above, in that the possible interactions between agents within the organ-
isation are decomposed into a set of scenes, each containing a possible type of
interaction. These scenes are connected in such a way that agents may move
between them in order to achieve their goals.
In contrast to conversation protocols in the e-Institutor framework, interaction
within OperA’s scenes is speciﬁed using landmarks. Landmarks (based on
[KHCM02]) can be summarised as a set of partially ordered descriptions of
the necessary and/or desirable intermediate states through which an interaction
must travel in order for it to achieve one or more results. Landmarks allow
for the speciﬁcation of the results of possible interactions without prescribing
exactly how those results should be brought about.
Social Model Roles in OperA are speciﬁed as social contracts, in such a way that the
process of an agent adopting a given role is equivalent to that agent adopting
the terms of contract associated with it. In the case of OperA, a social contract
outlines an agent’s responsibilities within the framework, including their obliga-
tionsand permissionswithrespect tointeractionwithinscenes of theframework.
Interaction Model Scenes in OperA, are abstract entities in so as they omit the exact
details of how the objectives of the scene should be achieved. In order for in-
teraction within a scene to occur, agents (or designers) must decide on a deﬁnite
protocol to enact within the scene (ensuring that such a protocol brings about
the necessary intermediates states described by the scene’s landmarks). Dignum
suggests a number of alternatives for determining the protocols within scenes,
including on-the-ﬂy negotiation by the agents about to enact the scene.
The relationship between these different models is shown in Figure 2.2.
V. Dignum’s work provides a holistic approach to the speciﬁcations of organisations,
allowing for a high-degree of generality in both the way that interactions are speciﬁed
and regulated, and in theway that thoseinteractionsare composedand enacted through
the roles of the organisation. The model which is proposed does not focus speciﬁcally
on how it should be implemented, while it is true that the formalisation of contract
using temporal logics leads to a semantics which could be interpreted in a running
system, the model itself does not prescribe how such a system might be built, or the
contracts enforced within it.
542.7.3 Artikis et al.
In [Ale03, ASP03] Artikis et al. address the problem of describing executable spec-
iﬁcations for normative systems. Artikis takes a formal approach, building on the
work of [Ser01, JS96] to show how normative properties such as obligation and in-
stitutional power may be expressed and understood in terms of the relativised action
logic Ea. They go on to realise examples of operational speciﬁcations of such proto-
cols which may be interpreted using the event calculus [KS86] and the action language
C+ [EJV+04] (discussed below in Section 2.10, page 80). Artikis gives examples in
[Ale03] of how roles, obligations, permissions and institutionalised power may be for-
malised in the above systems, how speciﬁcations based on the event calculus may be
executed (visualisedin situ), and ﬁnally how speciﬁcations in C+ may be analysed and
queried using the Causal Calculator (a tool for analysing models written in a subset of
the action language C+ ).
Their work focuses on the modelling of normative protocols (deﬁned in terms of ac-
tions which are observable in the real world), and shows how these models may be
enacted as speciﬁcations for a variety of ofﬂine and a small number of online cases.
While their work does include a formalisation of institutionalised power, based on
the work in [JS96], it does not consider conventional generation explicitly, instead
they assume a model where every institutional action corresponds to exactly one real-
world action and the relationship between the occurrence of the real-world action is
constrained through the notion of institutional power — the power for an action to be
performed effectively.
2.8 C+(++)
Related to the work of Artikis et al. is the action language C+(++) described by Ser-
got in [Ser04]. C+(++) is deﬁned as an extension to the causal-theories-based action
language C+ (discussed in Section 2.10 below) and includes the notions of counts-as
(in a related form to that described by Jones and Sergot in [JS96]). As well as the
mechanism for specifying when states or actions are permitted or forbidden. Sergot
deﬁnes the semantics of C+(++) in terms of transition systems, but also notes that they
may be translated back into the underlying logic of causal explanations used by the
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the C+ language, allowing problems to be solved and reasoned over using the SAT-
based CCalc reasoning tool designed for the C+ language. At present no implemen-
tation of C+(++) exists, however a number of the features of the language are demon-
strated in the work of Artikis above.
2.9 Answer Set Programming
Answer set programming (ASP)2 is a declarative logic programming paradigm that
admits reasoning about possible world views in the absence of complete information.
Due to its formal semantics, and combined with efﬁcient heuristic solvers, answer set
programming provides an excellent basis from which derived models may be queried.
We use ASP throughout this dissertation and give an overview of the syntax of the
language, its semantics and the tools which may be used to solve answer set programs.
As with other logic-programming techniques one of the perceived advantages of using
ASP is that its rigorous and formal semantics allow us to reason in a formal and useful
way about the semantics of programs. In essence an answer set program can be seen
as a formalisation of the underlying reasoning problem in its own right, with the ad-
vantage of being able to execute this formalisation directly through the use of answer
set solvers.
ASP is a powerful and intuitive non-monotonic logic programming language for mod-
elling, reasoning and veriﬁcation tasks. One common question asked of researchers
working on non-monotonic logic programming systems such as ASP is ‘Prolog has
been around for many years and is a mature technology, why not just use that?’. The
short answer is that Prolog has a number of limitations both in concept and design
that make it unsuitable for many knowledge representation and ‘real world’ reasoning
tasks.
As with comparing any languages or language paradigms the key issues here are suit-
ability and ease of expression in the problem domain in question.
2Also referred to in the literature as AnsProlog, A-Prolog, AnsSet-Prolog, and Extended Logic Pro-
gramming
56Negation is problematic in logic programming languages and Prolog is no exception.
A variety of different mechanisms for computing when the negation of a predicate
is true and a variety of different intuitions of what this means have been proposed
[Den03]. The most common approach is to compute negation as failure, i.e. not(p)
is true if p cannot be proved using the current program; and to characterise this as
classical negation i.e. every proposition is either true or false and cannot be both. This
combination creates a problem referred to as the closed world assumption when using
Prolog to model real world reasoning. By equating negation as failure with classical
negation anything that cannot be proven to be true is known to be false, essentially
assuming that everything that is known about the world is contained in the program.
In contrast the semantics used in ASP naturally give rise to two different forms of
negation: negation as failure and constraint-based negation. Negation as failure, (i.e.
we cannot prove p to be true) is characterised as epistemic negation, (i.e. we do not
know p to be true). Constraint-based negation introduces constraints that prevent cer-
tain combinations of atoms from being simultaneously true in any answer set. This
is characterised as classical negation as it is possible to prevent a and ¬a both being
simultaneously true, a sufﬁcient condition for modelling classical negation. This is
a signiﬁcant advantage in some reasoning tasks as it allows reasoning about incom-
plete information, and is supported by the intuition that “I do not know that P is true”
(auto-epistemic negation) and “I know that P is not true” (classical negation) are fun-
damentally different. Critically the closed world assumption is not present in ASP, as
negation as failure is not associated with classical negation.
One key difference with Prolog is that the semantics of ASP naturally give rise to
multiple possible world views in which the program is consistent. The number and
composition of these varies with the program. This type of reasoning is indirectly pos-
sible in Prolog using the cut operator, however this presents its own problems and can
lead to confusion as the multiple possible views may manifest themselves differently
dependant on the query asked (due to the procedural nature of prolog rules). In ASP
terms Prolog would answer a query on a as true if there is at least one answer set in
which a is true. However there is no notion of in which answer set this is true. Thus
a subsequent query on b might also return true, but without another query it would not
be possible to infer if a and b could be simultaneously true.
In Prolog the language used for querying a knowledge base is strongly linked with the
language that is used for representing the knowledge base. Knowledge is essentially
57stored in the form ‘to answer a question about X we must answer questions about Y
and Z’ (notated as X : −Y,Z.). In ASP there is a strong distinction between the
two: The program itself is used to generate answer sets, and the query language then
constrains these to only those which are consistent with the query. The separation
helps clarify the conceptual difference between representing or manipulating data and
querying it. It also allows the query semantics to make full use of the multiplepossible
world views provided.
ASP is particularly suited to model-based reasoning. An answer set programming
problemtypicallystartswiththedeﬁnitionofadomainorclassofproblemaboutwhich
we wish to reason. Such deﬁnitions (written as answer-set programs) are constructed
in such a way that each possible world in the domain corresponds to an answer set of
the program. Queries may then be constructed over this domain in order to determine
if particular models are valid according to the deﬁnition by extending the program to
limit the answer sets produced to those which match the models we are interested in.
The ability to perform model based reasoning is not an exclusive property of answer
set programming. For instance, in ﬁrst order logic, a given sentence may have many
models with which it is consistent. ASP is unusual in that unlike ﬁrst order logic, it is
associated with a practical problem solving framework and a set of tools which may be
used to automatically solve real-world problems in reasonable time. While ﬁrst order
logic is considerably more expressive than ASP (allowing the expression predicates
with inﬁnite domains, for example), this expressiveness means that existing tools for
reasoning with ﬁrst-order systems typically require human intervention either in the
process of specifying problems or in order to prove properties about them.
Answer set programming has been successfully applied in domains such as plan-
ning [EFL+02a, Lif02], conﬁguration and veriﬁcation [SN99], super-optimisation
[BCDVF06], diagnosis [EFLP99], game theory [DVV99] and multi-agent sys-
tems [BG00, BG02, DVV04, BC05, CDVP06c] where [BC05, CDVP06c] use
answer set programming to reason about the behaviour of a group of agents, while
[BG00, BG02, DVV04] use the formalism to model the reasoning capabilities,
knowledge and beliefs of a single agent within a multi-agent system.
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A number of syntactic variants of ASP exist — the broadest of which is referred to
as AnsProlog∗ (using the notation of [Bar03]). Within this dissertation we limit our-
selves to the use of syntactic and functional subgroup of AnsProlog∗, referred to as
AnsDatalog⊥ which we describe here.
The language of an ASP program consists of a set of constants, a set set of n-ary
predicates, a set of n-ary function symbols and a set of variables.
Constants are expressed as a sequence of characters starting with a lower-case letter.
Variables are expressed a sequence of letters starting with an upper case letter. N-ary
predicates are expressed as a sequence of characters (the predicate name) starting with
a lower-case letter followed by a bracketed list of zero or more arguments. In the case
that a predicate has zero arguments, the brackets are omitted. N-ary Function symbols
are expressed as a sequence of characters starting with a lower-case letter followed by
a bracketed list of one or more arguments.
The above alphabet forms the basis for an ASP program. This alphabet used to the
deﬁne terms, atoms and rules which make up a program.
Terms in ASP are recursively deﬁned as follows (from [Bar03, page 9]):
i) A variable is a term
ii) A constant is a term
iii) If f is an n-ary function symbol and t1,...,tn are terms then f(t1,...,tn) is a
term.
For instance, if V is a variable, f is a function symbol with a single argument, and c is
a constant then all of the following are terms:
c V f(c) f(V) f(f(c))) f(f(f(c)))
Terms may beapplied to thearguments of predicates to form atoms. Atomsare deﬁned
as follows:
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ii) If pn is a predicate with n arguments, and t1,...,tn are terms, then pn(t1,...,tn)
is an atom.
For instance, if p0 is a predicate with zero arguments, p1 is a predicate with one argu-
ment, p2 is a predicate with two arguments and c, V, f(c) are terms, the following are
atoms:
p0 p1(V) p1(c) p2(c,V) p2(f(c),V)
A term is referred to as ground if is not a variable or does not contain variables in the
arguments to any function symbols it contains. An atom is referred to as ground if all
of its arguments are ground. Terms and atoms are referred to as unground if they are
not ground.
A literal in AnsProlog∗ is an atom p(t1,...,tn) or its classical negation
¬p(t1,...,tn) (i.e. p(t1,...,tn) can be shown not to be true). AnsProlog⊥ omits
negated literals so all AnsProlog⊥ literals are positive.
An extended literal in AnsProlog⊥ is a literal p(t1,...,tn) or not p(t1,...,tn) with
not referring to negation as failure (i.e. p(t1,...,tn) cannot be proven to be true).
An AnsProlog⊥ program is made up of a set of rules. Each rule has the form:
l.
or
h ← l1,...,ln,not ln+1,...,not lm.
Where h is a literal or ⊥ and l and li 1 ≤ i ≤ m are literals.
We refer to h as the head of the rule, denoted by Head(r) for rule r and {l1,...,lm}
as the body of the rule, denoted Body(r). A rule is said to be ground if all literals in
the head and body of the rule are ground.
Terms applied to predicates in rules may contain variables, in order to interpret a rule
60containingvariables, theruleis expandedthroughaprocess called grounding. Ground-
ing translates a program containing variables in to a program containing no variables.
In order to ground a program we must ﬁrst determine the Herbrand universe of the
program (written UΠ for a program Π). This is deﬁned as the set of all ground terms
which can be formed with the constants and function symbols in the program.
The Herbrand base of a program (written BΠ for a program Π) is deﬁned as the set
of all atoms which can be formed by applying elements of UΠ to the arguments of the
predicate symbols in Π.
A program Π is grounded by taking each rule in Π and applying each possible
grounded term in UΠ to each variable in each rule of Π.
This process is perhaps best illustrated by example, given the following unground
program:
bird(tweety).
bird(polly).
has feathers(X) ← bird(X).
The Herbrand universe of the program includes the terms tweety, and polly, and
these are used to expand the variable X in the third rule. The Herbrand base of this
program includes the atoms bird(tweety), bird(polly), has feathers(tweety)
and has feathers(polly).
Having computed the Herbrand universe, a set of ground instances of a rule may be
obtained by replacing each variable symbol by one of the terms in the Herbrand uni-
verse. In the case where an atom contains multiple variables then each permutation
of the possible values for each variable is included. The ground version of a program
(written ground(Π) for program Π) is the set of all ground instances of all the rules in
the original program.
For the above example we would obtain the following ground program:
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bird(polly).
has feathers(tweety) ← bird(tweety).
has feathers(polly) ← bird(polly).
It should be noted that for an unground program containing function symbols, the
Herbrand universeand Herbrand base will always be be inﬁnite. For a ground program
the Herbrand Universe and Herbrand Universe will both be ﬁnite.
In the case where the Herbrand universe is inﬁnite, the above process may lead to an
inﬁnite number of grounded rules, consider the following simple unground program:
p(a).
p(f(X)) ← p(X)
The unground representation of this program is inﬁnite and consists of the rules:
p(a).
p(f(a)) ← p(a)
p(f(f(a))) ← p(f(a))
p(f(f(f(a)))) ← p(f(f(a)))
p(f(f(f(f(a))))) ← p(f(f(f(a))))
...
Current ASP solvers operate only on ground programs with ﬁnite sets of rules, as a
consequence of this, we limit acceptable unground programs to only those which have
a ﬁnite ground representation.
In order to constrain programs to those with only ﬁnite numbers of rules we introduce
two constraints on the structure of rules and programs. The ﬁrst of these constraints is
the range restriction property, and is speciﬁed as follows: An unground rule is range
restricted, if each variable in the rule appears in at least one positive atom (not negated
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its rules are range restricted. The range restriction property requires that each variable
be associated with one or more predicates in the body of the rule.
The second property applies to the whole program and is called the domain restriction
propertyand is speciﬁed as follows: A rule is domain restricted if every variable which
appears in the rule also appears in a positive domain predicate in the body of the rule.
A program is domain restricted if all rules of the program are domain restricted. A
predicate is a domain predicate if a ground atom derived from that predicate appears
in the head of at least one rule with an empty body (as a fact) and the predicate does
not appear in the head of any rules with non-empty bodies.
The program :
p(a).
p(f(X)) ← p(X)
is range restricted but not domain restricted, as the predicate p appears in the head of
both a domain restricted rule and a non-domain restricted rule.
While variables allow a great deal of ﬂexibility and syntactic clarity of programs, it
should be noted that in the worst case the number of rules generated by the grounding
process may be exponentially larger than the original program.
We now turn to the intuitive semantics of ASP programs, given a rule of the form:
l0 ← l1,...,ln,not ln+1,...,not lm.
An intuitivedeﬁnition of the semantics of rules of this form can be given as follows: if
all positive atoms (those without negation as failure) in the body of the rule: l1,...,ln
areknowntobetrueandnoneofthenegatedliteralsinthebodyln+1,...,lm areknown
to be true, then the head of the rule l0 can also be considered to be true. In the case
that l0 is false (⊥), then this indicates a contradiction.
When speaking about the status of rules with respect to a given set of ground atoms we
use the terms applicable and applied. A rule is said to be applicable with respect to a
setofatomsS, ifallofthepositiveliteralsinthebodyarein theset: li ∈ S,1 ≤ i ≤ n,
63and none of the negated literals are in the set lj  ∈ S,n+1 ≤ m. A rule is applied if it
is applicable and the head literal l0 is also in the set. When every rule in the program
is either applied or not applicable, the set S of atoms which only appear in the heads
of applied rules is said to be an answer set. We discuss the formal deﬁnition of answer
sets further in Section 2.9.2, page 65.
In addition to adding literals to the answer sets of a program, rules can also be used to
indicate inconsistencies in a given answer set of literals. We refer to rules of this form
as constraint rules (or simply constraints). A constraint in AnsProlog
⊥ is a rule of the
form:
⊥ ← b1,...,bm,not bm+1,...,not bk
A rule of this form indicates that if the body of the rule is applicable, then the current
set of considered literals is not considered as an answer set of the program. We discuss
the deﬁnition of answer sets further in Section 2.9.2, page 65. In the standard syntax of
AnsProlog⊥ wemay omitthe⊥symbolfrom constraintrules and assumeits presence
in any rule with an empty head.
Finally we refer to facts in programs as an abbreviation for rules of the form b ← ⊤,
for a given atom b. Again in the remainder of the thesis we treat the ⊤ as being
implicit, and assume its presence in any rule with an empty body.
Syntactic Extensions
A number of syntactic extensions to AnsProlog have been proposed, the most impor-
tant of these for this thesis is the use of choice rules.
Choice rules are a syntactic extension of AnsProlog
⊥ for selecting applicable atoms
non-deterministically from a set of possible atoms. A choice rule of the form:
{h1,...,hn} ← bn+1,...,bm,not bm+1,...,not bk
states that if every positive atom in the body of the rule bn+1,...,bm is applied, and
every negated atom is not applicable then any subset of {h1,...,hn} is applicable.
Consider the following program containing the choice rule:
64a.
{b,c} ← a.
The valid answer sets of this program are {a}, {a,b}, {a,c}, and {a,b,c}.
Choice rules may be eliminated from a program by re-writing each rule as follows.
Given a choice rule
{l0,...,lm} ← el0 ...,eln
where l0...m are literals and el0...m are literals. For each literal li in the head of a choice
rule we introduce a new atom l′
i such that l′
i is not in the Herbrand base of the original
program. We then replace the original rule with a set of 2m rules such that for each
literal in the head or the original rule we have two rules of the form:
li ← el0,...,eln,not el
′
i.
l
′
i ← not li.
These two rules serve to create a choice between the inclusion of li in the program or
not as it can only be the case that one of li and l′
i are true.
2.9.2 Semantics of Answer Set Programs
Having deﬁned the syntax of AnsProlog⊥ programs we now turn to their semantics.
In this section we deal only with ground programs (where variable terms have been
eliminated by grounding) where the Herbrand Base of the program is ﬁnite.
An answer set program consists of a set of statements, called rules. Each rule l ← B
is made of two parts namely the body B, which is a set of extended literals, and a head
literal l. It should be read as: ”if all the elements of B are true, so is the head l” or “l”
is supported if all elements of B are considered to be true. Obviously we only assume
those literals to be true that are actually supported. This form of reasoning is referred
to as the minimal model semantics.
An interpretation of a program Π is any set of literals of the program’s Herbrand Base:
I ⊂ BΠ. We use interpretations to deﬁne models of a program, as follows:
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(constraints) and l ← B ∈ Π, where B is the set of (non-negated) literals in the body
of the rule and l is a literal. An interpretation I ⊂ BΠ of the program Π is a model of
the program Π iff for each rule of the program the following is true:
h ← B ∈ Π
  h ≡ ⊥ : B  ⊆ I
h  ≡ ⊥ : B ⊆ I ⇒ l ∈ I
A model M is a minimal model of Π if, given the set of all models of Π:
{M1,...,Mn},   ∃j,1 ≤ j ≤ n such that Mj is a strict subset of M.
Models of programs represent interpretations of the program which include atoms that
are supported by one or more rules of the program. A minimal model of a program is
a model in which only supported atoms are included.
The above deﬁnitions do not take into account negation-as-failure, in this case rules
of the program may contain negated literals which must not be in the interpretation of
the program in order for the rule to be supported. In order to account for programs
containing negation-as-failure, we deﬁne a reduct or transformation, often referred to
as the Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation (from [GL88]) as follows:
Deﬁnition 2 Let Π be a ground program. The Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation of Π
w.r.t an interpretation I where I ⊆ BΠ, is the program ΠI containing rules l ← B
such that for all rules of the form l ← B,not C ∈ Π , C ∩ I = ∅
The reduced program includes all rules of the original program omitting any rules
which contain negated literals which are in the interpretation. The answer sets of a
program are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3 A set of ground atoms I is an answer set of Π iff I is the minimal model
of ΠI.
The uncertain nature of negation-as-failure gives rise to several answer sets, which
are all acceptable solutions to the problem that has been modelled. It is in this non-
determinism that the strength of answer set programming lies. We refer to the set of
answer sets for a program Π as AΠ.
66Consider the simple program Π:
a ← .
b ← a,not c.
c ← a,not b.
The Herbrand base of this program (the set of all atoms used in rules in the program)
BΠ contains the atoms {a,b,c}.
The program has interpretations
{{},{a},{b},{c},{a,b},{a,c},{b,c},{a,b,c}}
Given the interpretation J = {a,b}, and the Gelfond Lifschitz transformation ΠJ:
a ← .
b ← a.
The interpretation J is a model of Π, as the atoms in J are supported by both rules.
This interpretationis also a minimalmodel withrespect to ΠJ as it includesonly atoms
supported by the program.
In contrast, given the interpretation K = {c} and the transformation ΠK:
a ← .
c ← a.
The interpretation K is not a model of ΠK as it does not include the atom a which is
supported by ΠK.
Finally given the interpretation L = {a,b,c} and the Gelfond Lifschitz transformation
ΠL
a ← .
The interpretation L is a model of ΠL as it includes a but is not a minimal model as
it includes the atoms {b,c} which are not supported by ΠL. The same is also true for
67the empty set {}.
The answer sets of the above program are the interpretations {a,b} and {a,c}.
Reasoning with ASP
guilty ← evidence. (2.2.1)
evidence ← trusted witness. (2.2.2)
trusted witness ← not lying,witness. (2.2.3)
witness. (2.2.4)
believe ← not disbelieve. (2.2.5)
disbelieve ← not believe. (2.2.6)
lying ← disbelieve. (2.2.7)
Figure 2.3: Program for jury example
We now continue with a slightly more complex example which demonstrates the type
of reasoning which ASP allows. Consider the following situation: A jury member has
to decide if the accused is guilty or not based on evidence provided by a witness. The
only problem for the jury member is to decide whether they trust this witness or not.
This situation can be represented by the program shown in Figure 2.3. In this program
the rules are summarised as follows:
2.2.1 If there is evidence then the accused is guilty.
2.2.2 If we have a trusted witness then we consider what they say as evidence.
2.2.3 If we have a witness, and they are not lying then we have a trusted witness.
2.2.4 We have a witness.
2.2.5 If we do not disbelieve the witness then we believe them.
2.2.6 If we do not believe the witness then we disbelieve them.
2.2.7 If we disbelieve the witness then they are lying.
The program has exactly two answer sets as follows:
i) {guilty,evidence,trusted witness,witness,believe}
ii) {witness,lying,disbelieve}
68These two answer sets indicate that the jury member has to decide on the credibility of
the witness and her decision is vital for her judgement of the accused.
2.9.3 Answer Set Programming and Dynamic Domains
As well as being used to represent static reasoning problems such as the simple exam-
ple above, ASP has been applied to the problem of dynamic domains where situations
evolve over time.
Answer set program may be used to represent actions and change in descriptions, by
encoding possible sequences of actions and events and their consequences as models
of a program it becomes possibleto query the program for sequences which match cer-
tain properties. These queries may be used for the purpose of temporal projection (i.e.
determining what the effects of a known sequence of actions are), planning (determin-
ing what sequence(s) of actions lead to a particular state or effect) and investigating
general properties of the encoded action description itself.
While the deﬁnition of such action descriptions in ASP is possible, the syntactic com-
plexity and repetitive nature of the programs may be cumbersome and difﬁcult for a
human to write. These deﬁciencies may be mitigated by introducing propositional ac-
tion languages for writing human-readable speciﬁcations of these action descriptions,
which may then be translated or implemented using either answer set solvers or other
reasoning techniques such as SAT.
Since the development of the planning system STRIPS [FN71], many such languages
have been proposed in order to provide declarative, human-readable descriptions of
the effects of actions and events. In [GL98a] Gelfond and Lifschitz summarise action
languages thus:
“Abstract action languages are formal models of parts of the natural lan-
guage that are used for talking about the effects of actions.”
The semantics of action languages are typically described over a transition system
where each state (or situation) is composed of the valuations of zero or more ﬂuents
and each transition is accounted for by one or more action symbols.
69The action language A [GL92, GL93] is one such language based on answer set pro-
gramming. The alphabet of A consists of two nonempty, disjoint sets which deﬁne a
set of ﬂuents and actions respectively. A ﬂuent expression is a ﬂuent f or its negation
¬f.
A given A description may be broken down into three parts consisting of an action
description, an observation description and a query which we describe as follows:
Action descriptions in A are deﬁned using a set of action laws of the form:
a causes f if p1,...,pn,¬q1,...,¬qr.
where a is an action and f and p1...n,q1...r are ﬂuents.
Each action law deﬁnes the effects of an action on a single ﬂuent conditional on the
truth values of zero or more ﬂuents. The intuitivesemantics for such an action descrip-
tion may be summarised as “After the execution of action a, f will hold in the next
state, if p1,...,pn hold in the current state, and q1,...,qr do not hold in the current
state”.
For instance the two laws:
take box causes have box if box on table,¬box glued to table.
take box causes ¬box on table if box on table,¬box glued to table.
Both laws describe the action take box (taking a box). The ﬁrst law states that ex-
ecution this action will cause the ﬂuent have box (having the box) to be true, if the
ﬂuent box on table is also true, and the ﬂuent box glued to table is false. The second
law states that execution of this action will cause the ﬂuent box on table to be false
if that ﬂuent is true when the action is executed, and the ﬂuent box glued to table is
false when the action is executed.
In addition to an action description language, A also deﬁnes an observation language
which allows us to account for both things which are known about the state of the
world and actions which are known to have occurred. These are encoded using rules
of the form:
f after a1,...,am
where f is a ﬂuent literal and a1,...am are actions. Rules of the above form state that
70that after the occurrence of the sequence of actions a1,...,am the literal f is true. In
the case where the sequence of actions is empty the syntax:
initially f
is used, indicating that literal f is true in the initial situation.
Finally, A allows for the deﬁnition of queries using the same syntax for observations.
A query of the form
f after a1,...,am
is said to be entailed by a given action description in the presence of a set of obser-
vations, if for all initial states entailed by the observations over the action description,
the ﬂuent f holds after the execution of actions a1,...,am.
The semantics of A are based on transition systems with each state corresponding to
the truth value of zero or more ﬂuents. An action language description in A may
also be translated into an answer set program. A number of such translations exist
(see [Bar03, page 199] for an account of several of them) to handle different types
of reasoning. The simplest of these accounts for temporal projection with a complete
initial state, this translation deﬁned the answer set program ΠA as follows:
Each ﬂuent in the A description is mapped to a constant (term) in ASP, we use atoms
of the form holds(f,s) to indicate that ﬂuent f holds in state s. For each action law
of the form described above, if the ﬂuent f in the head of the law is positive, we add a
rule of the following form to ΠA.
holds(f,res(a,S)) ← holds(p1,S),...,holds(pn,S)
not holds(q1,S),...,not holds(qr,S)
Where a is an ASP constant corresponding to the action a, S is a state, and res(a,S)
is a term representing the state achieved after the execution of action a in state S.
In the case that the ﬂuent f in the head of an action law is negated we add a rule of the
form:
ab(f,a,S) ← holds(p1,S),...,holds(pn,S)
not holds(q1,S),...,not holds(qr,S)
71Where f is the ASP constant representing the the ﬂuent f in A. These rules indicate
that in a state S where a ﬂuent f holds and f is terminated by the occurrence of action
a in state S then the ﬂuent f is removed from the state following the execution of a in
state S.
Finally we deﬁne rules which govern the inertia of ﬂuents. For each ﬂuent in the
language we deﬁne a rule of the form:
holds(F,res(A,S)) ← holds(F,S),not ab(F,A,S)
This rule states that if a ﬂuent F holds in a state S and the inertia of F is not overridden
by the occurrence of action A in the state S then F holds in the state which follows from
the execution of action A in state S.
The programs of the above type may be used to assimilate sequences of actions
in order to determine which ﬂuents hold after those actions have occurred.
Take for instance the simple action description above. The translated an-
swer set program for the two laws in this description would be as follows:
holds(have box,res(take box,S)) ← holds(box on table,S),
not holds(box glued to table,S).
ab(box on table,res(take box,S)) ← holds(box on table,S),
not holds(box glued to table,S).
holds(have box,res(take box,S)) ← holds(have box,S),
not ab(have box,take box,S).
holds(box on table,
res(take box,S)) ← holds(box on table,S),
not ab(box on table,take box,S).
holds(box glued to table,
res(take box,S)) ← holds(box glued to table,S),
not ab(box glued to table,take box,S).
Observationsand queries in A can also be expressedin ASP; for instancethefollowing
initial situation:
72initially ¬have box
initially ¬box glued to table
initially box on table
indicating that the box is not held, the box is not glued to the table and that the box is
on the table would be encoded as the following fact in ASP:
holds(box on table,s0).
Likewise the query :
box on table after take box
which asks if the box is on the table after the execution of the take box action, would
be encoded as:
state(s0).
state(res(take box,s0)).
⊥ ← not holds(have box,res(take box,s0)).
The ﬁrst two rules indicate that we consider two states; the initial state s0 and the state
following the execution of the action take box from the initial state. The third rule
constrains the answer sets produced to only those in which the ﬂuent have box holds
in the latter state.
When combined with the translation of the action description given above a single
answer set is obtained in which the query is satisﬁed:
{ holds(box on table,s0)
holds(have box,res(take box,s0))
holds(box on table,res(take box,s0))
ab(box on table,res(take box,s0))
state(s0)
state(res(take box,s0)) }
indicating that the query was satisﬁed.
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a number of alternative semantics may be considered. The most important extension
to the above semantics is where we reify the deﬁnition of holdsat literals by deﬁning
both their inferred presence and absence (using classical negation as well as negation
as failure). In addition to the types of temporal projection problem described in the
example above, A has also been used for planning [Bar96].
The above characterisation of A is based on a branching model of time, such that
each situation or state is expressed as the composition of the performance of the action
which leads to that state. This corresponds to the model of time used by the situ-
ation calculus discussed in Section 2.10, page 77. A similar characterisation of the
semantics of A exist for linear time where states are expressed in terms as points on a
time line corresponding to the model of time used by the event calculus discussed in
Section 2.10, page 78.
2.9.4 Tools For Computing Answer Sets
A number of algorithms have been proposed for computing the answer sets of a logic
program, leading to the deﬁnition of many answer set solvers. Each of these takes a
(possibly unground) answer set program, a query over the program (i.e. which models
to include or omit) and produces the answer sets which correspond to the program and
query (based on the semantics deﬁned above). We focus on four solvers which address
different aspects of answer set solving.
The SMODELS System
The SMODELS system introduced in [NS97] was theﬁrst answer set programming sys-
temwhichincludedanefﬁcient solvingalgorithm(discussedin[NS96])and associated
tools to assist the practical application of answer set programming.
The SMODELS system consists of two programs: the SMODELS solver, which ﬁnds
answer sets to ground-programs (without variables) represented in an efﬁcient internal
format; and the parse (described in [Sim00, NS00]) pre-processor which takes un-
ground answer set programs and produces a program in the required input format for
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The language accepted by the lapse tool which we refer to as AnsPrologsm is an
extension of AnsProlog∗ and includes the following additional features (described in
[NS00]):
Cardinality rules Inadditiontochoicerulesoftheformmentionedabove,the SMOD-
ELS system also supports cardinality rules which extend the above syntax with
an upper and lower bound for the number of atoms which may be picked by a
choice rule. A cardinality rule of the form:
N{h1,...,hn}X ← bn+1,...,bm,not bm+1,...,not bk
where N and X are natural numbers indicates that at least N atoms and no more
than X atoms should be picked from the set enclosed in curly brackets. As with
choice rules, the body of the rule must be applicable in order for any atoms in
the head to be picked. In the case where either N or X are left unspeciﬁed then no
lower or upper limit is imposed on the number of atoms which may be picked
by the rule.
Weighted atoms and Weight Constraint Rules These allow an integer quantity
(weight) to be associated with each atom in the program. These weights
may be used in a similar way to cardinality rules to constrain a set of atoms
which are picked in a choice rule to only those atoms whose weights sum to a
particular value. Additionally the weights of atoms may be used to calculate
the accumulated weight of a given answer set. By associating higher or lower
weights with atoms in more or less preferred answer sets, this process makes it
possible to rank answer sets by preference (based on the sum of the weights of
the atoms which appear in that answer set).
SMODELS is capable of reasoning efﬁciently with programs which contain large num-
bers of rules and atoms, and has been applied to a number of practical reasoning do-
mains including (for instance) a system for diagnosing faults in components of the
space shuttle [NBG+01], and the bounded model checking of large Petri nets involv-
ing millions of states [HN01].
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The DLVsystem [LPF+02, ELM+98] originated as a system for reasoning in Disjunc-
tive Datalog — an extension of answer set programming which includes exclusive
disjunction in the head of rules. As well as supporting disjunction, DLValso handles a
large subset of the AnsProlog∗ language and is capable of solving problems involving
large numbers of rules efﬁciently.
In addition to problem solving using conventional ASP syntax, DLVhas also been ex-
tended to includefront ends for languages such as SQL as well as planning and domain
representation with the action language DLV
K[EFL+02b] which has similar syntax
and semantics to the action languages A and C+ (discussed below) but is particularly
suited to planning in the absence of complete information.
CModels & ASSAT
Answer set solvers such as SMODELS and DLVproduce answer sets efﬁciently using
carefully adapted heuristic algorithms designed for that purpose. In recent years the
study of complex reasoning and problem solving systems has lead to the deﬁnition of
a number of efﬁcient algorithms for solving the more general Boolean satisﬁability
problem (see [MMZ+01] for an example). These advances have led to the develop-
ment ofASSAT [F. 02] and CModels [LM04, Lie05] fordetermininganswersets using
Boolean satisﬁability (SAT) solvers.
Both of these systems translate an answer set program (with some constraints on the
program structure) into a Boolean satisﬁability problem containing a set of Boolean
formula which describe the constraints on the atoms in the program. These satisﬁabil-
ity problems may then be solved directly using a SAT solverwhich yields the solutions
to the satisﬁability problem and which may in turn be translated back into answer sets
of the program.
SAT based answerset solvershavebeen shownto perform wellwhen compared tocon-
ventional solvers, outperforming their conventional counterparts [Lie05] by an order
of magnitude in some cases while performing signiﬁcantly worse in others.
762.10 Alternative Reasoning Approaches
The problem of how a given domain is represented, in terms of the actions which are
possible in that domain and their effects, is one that has been studied extensively since
the inception of the ﬁeld of artiﬁcial intelligence. While a complete study of this ﬁeld
is far beyond the scope of this thesis, we summarise two approaches based on ﬁrst
order logic (the Situation Calculus and the Event Calculus), and contrast these with a
number of approaches based in propositional logic.
The Situation Calculus
The situation calculus, introduced by McCarthy and Hayes in [MH69] is one of the
earliest examples of an attempt to formalise a model for action and change for use
within artiﬁcial intelligence. The situation calculus revolves around the deﬁnition of a
set of ﬂuents, which describe both the corresponding (hypothetical) state of world and
the effects of the performance of actions upon that state.
We give a brief outline of the situation calculus, based on Reiter’s formalisation in
[Rei91], [Rei01, page 47].
Situations in the situation calculus refer to states of the world and each situation con-
tains the conclusions about some aspects of that world, at a particular point in time,
in terms of the valuation of a set of situation ﬂuents. Situation ﬂuents in the situation
calculus are treated as propositions, and are relative to particular situations. For exam-
ple, the ﬂuent On(Monkey,Table,σ) states that in situation σ the monkey is on the
table. We use functions of the form Poss(α,σ) to indicate that action α is possible or
executable in situation σ.
Change in the situation calculus is expressed through a successor function which takes
some action and situation and produces a new situation. Reiter deﬁnes the successor
function σ′ = do(α,σ) for this purpose (i.e. the new situation σ′ is brought about
by the execution of action α in situation σ) although other formalisms use differing
terminology (see [Mue06, page 272] for an overview of these various formalisations).
For example, given an action Jump(X,Y) indicating that object X has jumped from
77object Y and a Boolean ﬂuent On(X,Y,σ) indicating that object X is on top of Y, we
deﬁne the semantics of this action as follows.
Poss(Jump(X,Y),σ) ← On(X,Y,σ)
¬On(X,Y,σ
′) ← σ
′ = do(Jump(X,Y),σ)
On(X,Y,σ)
The ﬁrst axiom states that it is only possible for X to jump from Y in situation σ, if X
is on top of Y in situation σ. The second axiom states that if X does jump from Y in
situation σ then X is not considered to be on Y in the situation σ′ which immediately
follows σ.
In their presentation McCarthy and Hayes observe a number of deﬁciencies in their
approach. Most notable of these is the frame problem which stems from the fact that
description in the situation calculus operates on partial descriptions of the world.
It should be noted that McCarthy and Hayes use the term ﬂuent to refer to both propo-
sitions which relate to state as well as functions which relate to changes in state. In
the remainder of this chapter, and in following chapters we use this term to refer ex-
clusively to propositions relating to states.
A number of systems have been developed based on the theory of situation calculus
including GOLOG [LRL+97].
The Event Calculus
A number of approaches have been proposed as solutions to the frame problem in
situation calculus, the most notable of these is the event calculus. Originally proposed
by Kowalski and Sergot in [KS86], the event calculus expresses both how events (or
actions) may change the valuations of ﬂuents, and how the valuations of ﬂuents may
be determined, over time, based on the occurrence of events. Event calculus solves the
frame problem by reifying when ﬂuents hold in particular time points.
78Clipped(t1,f,t2)
def
≡∃ a,t   Happens(a,t) ∧ t1 ≤ t ≤ t2 (EC1)
Terminates(a,f,t)
Declipped(t1,f,t2)
def
≡∃ a,t   Happens(a,t) ∧ t1 ≤ t ≤ t2 (EC1)
Initiates(a,f,t)
HoldsAt(f,t1) ←[Happens(a,t1) ∧ Initiates(a,f,t1) (EC3)
∧ t1 < t2 ∧ ¬Clipped(t1,f,t2)]
¬HoldsAt(f,t1) ←[Happens(a,t1) ∧ Initiates(a,f,t1) (EC4)
∧ t1 < t2 ∧ ¬Declipped(t1,f,t2)]
HoldsAt(f,t2) ←[HoldsAt(f,t1) ∧ t1 < t2 (EC5)
∧ ¬Clipped(t1,f,t2)]
¬HoldsAt(f,t2) ←[¬HoldsAt(f,t1) ∧ t1 < t2 (EC6)
∧ ¬Declipped(t1,f,t2)]
Figure 2.4: Domain independent axioms of the Simpliﬁed Event Calculus
We include a brief summary of the event calculus and its axioms as follows: The more
commonly used simpliﬁed event calculus (from [Sha97b, Sha99, MS02, MS99b]) is
axiomatised in Figure 2.4.
In this axiomatisation, Declipped(t1,f,t2) and Clipped(t1,f,t2) are some events
that cause a ﬂuent to cease and start holding (respectively) between times t1 and t2,
Happens(a,t) denotes that event a happens at time point t, HoldsAt(f,t) denotes that
ﬂuent f holds at time point t and Initiates(a,f,t) and Terminates(a,f,t) denote
that event a causes ﬂuent f to start and stop holding respectively.
The axioms in Figure 2.4 represent domain independent axioms in event calculus, in
addition an event calculus theory must deﬁne domain dependant axioms which deﬁne
how theﬂuents Initiates and Terminates are brought about in relation to givenevents.
For instance the theory “Pulling the door handle opens the door, pushing the door
handle closes the door” may be expressed using the events Pull and Push denoting
pulling and pushing the handle and the ﬂuent Open denoting when the door is open as:
Initiates(a,f,t)
def
≡[a = Pull,f = Open,¬HoldsAt(Open,t)]
Terminates(a,f,t)
def
≡[a = Push,f = Open,HoldsAt(Open,t)]
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sense law of inertia: that is, once a ﬂuent is initiated by some event, it holds until it
is terminated by some other event. The original version of the event calculus included
features for specifyingconcurrent eventsand for expressingwhen ﬂuents do notfollow
the common-sense law of inertia, we omit these features from the discussion here.
The eventcalculus is deﬁned as aformal logic, howevera numberof toolsexistfor rea-
soning using descriptions based on the logic. Historically these have relied on abduc-
tion[DMB92]ortheorem proving[Sha97a], howeverrecent work by Mueller[Mue04]
describes a model-based reasoning technique based on SAT-solvers using a variant of
the event calculus.
The Action Language C+
First and second order logical formalisms such as the situation calculus and the event
calculus provide an expressive means for modelling change and time in dynamic sys-
tems, however these systems come at a computational cost, and present tools for
reasoning with both of these systems make a broad class of reasoning problems in-
tractable. In contrast to these higher order techniques, a number of approaches based
on proposition logic have been proposed including the action languages A [GL93],
and DLV
Kmentioned above.
ThelanguageC+ isanotableexampleofoneoftheselanguagesandwasﬁrst proposed
in by Giunchiglia, Lee and Lifschitz in [GLLT01] as an extension to the language C
[GL98b], which in turn derives much of its syntax from the language A.
C+ extends the syntax of the languages A and C with the inclusion of dynamic laws
and multi-valuedﬂuents. Whereas thedeterminationofthevalueof everyﬂuent in A is
dependent only on the previous state and the actions which have occurred, C+ permits
the deﬁnition of a second class of ﬂuents call dynamic ﬂuents. The value of these
ﬂuents in a given state is based on an expression which is evaluated over the other (dy-
namic or otherwise) ﬂuents in the current state. This addition makes the representation
of a number of properties in the language simple and more succinct. Multi-valued
ﬂuents are ﬂuents which may take on a number of values, in contrast to the Boolean
ﬂuents in A which may only be true or false in a given state.
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must represent each of these N values as a Boolean ﬂuent, leading to 2N possible
combinations of ﬂuent values, of which only one may be true at a given time. Multi-
valuedﬂuents reduce thenumberofpossiblestate-ﬂuents for such aproperty to exactly
N leading to a corresponding decrease in model size.
In contrast to A which has a semantics based on answer set programs, C+ is based
on the logic of causal theories. A causal theory deﬁnes under what circumstances the
valuation of a formula can be considered to be caused and hence the necessary and
sufﬁcient conditions for that formula to be held to be true in an interpretation.
[GLLT01] deﬁnes a translation between causal theories and Boolean satisﬁability
problems allowing the solution of problem description in C+ using Boolean sat-
isﬁability solvers (c.f. CModels discussed in Section 2.9.4). This translation is
implemented in the reasoning tool CCalc [cca].
2.11 Summary
In this chapter we started by presenting an overviewof research relevant to the study of
the formalisation and speciﬁcation of normative multi-agent systems, the observations
from this are summarised as follows:
i) We identiﬁed the importance of regulation in multi-agent societies, and the im-
portance that this regulation should be normative— that it should follow from the
decisions made by agents rather than being an intrinsic part of the system itself.
ii) We outlined several approaches to the formalisation of norms and deontic prop-
erties which have been applied in multi-agent systems, in particular the use of
permissions, prohibitions and obligations and the differing ways that these may
be manifested. Speciﬁcally, we highlighted the importance of the inclusion of
deadlines in the speciﬁcations of obligations.
iii) We then noted the fact that norms may be applied at different levels of abstraction,
and discussed how these may be accounted for.
iv) We discussed how normative systems should be based on social semantics rather
81than individual mental attitudes of agents, as these provide an agent-independent
representation of normative states.
v) We identiﬁed that, in part, the deﬁnition of these semantics is constitutive —
that is, they deﬁne not only how societies are regulated, but how members of
societies should interpret particular types of actions. In this context we identiﬁed
the importance of conventional generation and institutionalised power.
vi) We then went on to discuss a number of pragmatic issues which apply to the deﬁ-
nition of normative multi-agent systems including the notions of social structure,
the openness of a society, the life-cycle of institutions and enforcement mecha-
nisms.
vii) We summarised a number of existing systems for the representation and imple-
mentation of normative concepts in multi-agent systems.
In the second part of this chapter we introduced answer set programming which we use
as the basis for reasoning about institutions in the remainder of this dissertation. We
discussed the basic syntax of the language, including some syntactic extensions, and
its semantics. We also showed how ASP may be used to reason in dynamic domains
by summarising the action language A and gave an overview of four commonly used
answer set solvers. Finally we discussed three alternative approaches to representation
and reasoning about dynamic domains.
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A Model for Specifying Institutions
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we have discussed what constitutes a normative agent system
and a number of approaches which have been proposed to solve the problems of de-
scribing how agents’ activities may be regulated in such systems.
In this chapter, which is the ﬁrst containing original material, we clarify the assump-
tions that we will make about the nature of institutions, in particular how institutions
come into being and how the semantics they deﬁne affect agents’ interactions. We go
on to formalise a model for specifying institutions and their life-cycle, based on these
assumptions.
The purpose of this chapter is to deﬁne a model and semantics for single institutions,
each deﬁning and regulating a particular aspect of the social behaviour in a group
of agents. In subsequent chapters we will use the material here as the basis for an
extended model which accounts for multiple institutions and their interactions.
Parts of this chapter have been presented in [CDVP06b, CDVP06a].
83NORMS
INSTITUTIONS SOCIETIES
characterize establish
instantiated in
Figure 3.1: Relationship between the emergence of norms and institutions in a society
and its behaviour.
3.2 Institutions as Speciﬁcation Entities
The concept of an institution has long been used in economics, legal theory and polit-
ical science to refer to developed systems of regulation which enable or assist human
interaction at a high-level. In English terminology, use of the word ‘institution’ is typ-
ically limited to describing ubiquitous entities such as “ﬁnancial institutions” or “legal
institutions”.
This thesis is, however, concerned with the development and application of a model
for institutions in the context of multi-agent systems where the presence and function
of entities such as those found in the human sphere are less well deﬁned. The most
important observation we make about institutions is that the function and nature are
mutually understood by a signiﬁcant part (if not all) of the society which they exist
within. This mutual understanding leads to what we perceive as the most important
beneﬁt of institutions in human society — that through their presence, by modelling
or deﬁning individuals’ expectations, institutions lead to changes in the way that indi-
viduals behave within a society.
In many human institutions (such as banking, insurance, cooperatives, clubs and cor-
porations)thepresentstructure, rulesandperceptionofan institutioncomeas theresult
of hundreds, if not thousands of years of continuous evolution within human society.
In contrast some institutions (like for instance the mechanism for buying goods on the
Internet) have developed relatively recently.
In both the case of more long-standing institutions, and those which have emerged
recently, the nature of the institution in question arises out of a society’s need both to
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Figure 3.2: Relationship between the deﬁnition of institutions and the adoption of
norms in a society.
standardise on a particular way of interacting in order to conduct some activity within
that society. Correspondingly, an institution develops and changes over time in order
to cater for changes in the way that members of a society interact while conducting the
activityforwhichtheinstitutionarose. Inthecaseofemergence, aninstitutionemerges
from a set of behaviours which are adopted voluntarily by members of a society. The
institution typically becomes formally recognisable when a large enough subset of the
population adopt, and rely on these norms as a means for achieving a particular social
goal. Figure 3.1 showsthis relationship, withnorms emerging from societal behaviour,
and the deﬁnition of institutions emerging from those norms.
Within human institutions, the process of an institution developing and evolving over
time, can be attributed in some part to a process of rational design on the part of
those agents who affect the deﬁnition of the institution’s structure. As part of this
process a particular agent or agents make a decision to change the structure of an
institution (or even abandon the adoption of the institution as a whole) in order to
achieve some effect on the society governed by that institution. In the context of multi-
agent systems, present developments make the automation of this kind of reasoning a
practical impossibility at a high-level. Instead, we assume that the institutions we are
concerned with specifying are the outcome of a human design process which occurs
prior to the implementation or creation of the agent system itself.
In the case of institutional design, the process of feed-back between the society, its
norms and the institutions used within it is reversed. When institutions are deﬁned
explicitly by a society the institution is to capture a class of normative behaviour,
and then impose a regulatory framework which subsequently inﬂuences the normative
behaviour of a society. Figure 3.2 shows this relationship for institutions deﬁned by
85or for a society, these institutions in turn reinforce a set of norms which consequently
inﬂuence the behaviour of the society.
In the human world, it is clear that both processes take place with some institutions
emerging naturally from individuals adopting and reinforcing a set of pre-existing so-
cialnorms,andwithotherinstitutionsbeingdesignedwiththeintentionofre-enforcing
or imposing a class of normative behaviour upon a society. In the context of this thesis
we are primarily concerned with the latter type of development, where the primary
source of input to the institutional development process is that of rational design.
3.2.1 Institutional Design
Having established that the types of institution we are concerned with are deﬁned
through external, rational design, we now turn to the design process itself.
The ﬁrst comment we make about this process is that we assume that the institution
is created to serve some purpose which we will call the institutional objective or ob-
jectives, we implicitly assume that this objective is both known and understood by the
designer at the time that the institution is designed. The purpose of institutional design
should be to deﬁne and codify of the rules of the institutionin such a way that, through
the implementation of these rules the institutional objective or objectives are met.
When considering the institutional design process, we can draw an analogy with the
conventional software engineering life cycle, with the institutional objective corre-
sponding to the functional requirements of a software system, and the deﬁnition of the
rules of an institution corresponding to the speciﬁcation of a software system (and to
a certain extent its implementation). In contrast to the conventional software design
process, the speciﬁcation for a society’s behaviour given by an institution’s rules does
not represent the absolute boundaries within which the society must behave. Instead,
these rules represent an ideal set of behaviours for members of the society which may
be followed or violated, according to the choices of the members of that society.
In many cases it may be that for individual members or groups within a society, it is
preferable to conduct interactions which fall within the governance of an institution,
but which do not strictly adhere to the idealised behaviour perceived by the designer
of that institution. In part, the complexity of institutional design derives from the need
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this behaviour leads to a material disadvantage for one or more agents).
This work is in part motivated by the desire to assist this institutional design process,
by making it possible a priori to determine whether or not a given institutional spec-
iﬁcation complies with, or violates the designer’s expectations. In order to do this it
becomes necessary to deﬁne both the means for writing speciﬁcations and a practical
reasoning framework through which properties of the speciﬁcations may be veriﬁed.
3.2.2 Relationship to Normative Systems
An institution is a class of normative system as discussed in (Section 2, page 28),
consisting of both a constitutive component, describing how members of a society
should understand particular actions and events, and a regulatory component, deﬁning
the idealised behaviour of agents in relation to these actions and events.
The ﬁeld of normative systems is broad however, and it is important to distinguish
institutions and multi-agent systems employing institutions from other classes of nor-
mative systems as studied in the literature. In addition to deﬁning constitutive and
regulative aspects of interaction, it is our view that institutions embody two special
properties which are not necessarily assumed in the context of normative systems.
The ﬁrst property relates to how the institution is deﬁned and perceived within a so-
ciety. Many existing normative systems address the problem of regulation from the
point of view of the society being closed 1. In essence it is assumed that all regulations
apply equally to all members of a society at all times. The regulations embodied by
institutions may, however only be in force for a limited period of time, and govern
a subset of the population of an agent society. Consequently institutions deﬁne the
scope of regulation, in terms of which agents are regulated, which of their actions are
regulated, and when (in time) the institution has an effect.
The second property assumed within institutions is that there is an expectation that
institutions are internally consistent such that the regulations of a single institution are
not self-contradictory or mutually defeating. In the ﬁeld of normative systems, where
1See Section 2.6.2, page 45 for Davidsson’s deﬁnition of open and closed societies.
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to consider the possibility for conﬂicting regulations, and how these conﬂicts are re-
solved. Within a single institution, however, where the scope of regulation is deﬁned,
these types of conﬂict are considered to be undesirable, and may be treated as a failure
of the institutional designer to correctly capture the relevant interaction between rules.
This desire for internal consistency through the omission of contradictory or ambigu-
ous rules relates directly to our motivation to provide a framework where properties of
institutions are veriﬁable off-line.
3.2.3 The Scope of Institutions
An institution deﬁnes some aspect of social reality within a society of agents, however
this inﬂuence may be limited in a number of ways, depending on the type of institution
and its purpose. This scope will vary from institution to institution and we break the
limitations of an institution down into the following factors:
Abstraction Some institutions may regulate behaviour at differing levels of abstrac-
tion, with some tending to inﬂuence only speciﬁc actions and others inﬂuencing
broad classes of behaviour.
Constitutive vs. Regulative Likewise, some institutions may focus more on how
some activities are deﬁned (i.e. how they are understood to be brought about
in the society) while others may place more emphasis on the regulation of
pre-deﬁned actions (including those derived from the interpretation of other
institutions).
Temporal Scope Many institutions persist and create states of affairs which are
durable over time, or rely only upon information from recent histories.
Population Scope While the deﬁnition of an institution is assumed to be understood
or known by all agents within an agent society, the agents that the institution
inﬂuences may be limited to a sub-group of that society. That is to say the group
of agents upon which an institution has an effect, may be limited, and may vary
from small groups of agents associated with the performance of a particular task
to all agents in the society.
These factors play a part in distinguishing between classes of institution commonly
described in the human sphere as follows:
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situation and largely focus on solving problems relating to coordination (i.e.
turn-taking) rather than deﬁning the semantics of the communicative interac-
tions which they regulate — they deﬁne when and how an agent must or can act,
in such a way that other participating agents may know the same.
Within the multi-agent systems literature, approaches to deﬁning agent inter-
action protocols, such as those found in [MPRA99] (Conversation protocols),
[GHB00](ConversationPolicies),functionbyidentifyingthesequencesofagent
interactions which are considered valid in order to achieve a given goal or state
of affairs. Protocol-based approaches are widely considered in agent-based soft-
ware engineering methodologies and applied in agent environments. A number
of off-the-shelf protocols have been described for performing operations such as
exchanging information (i.e. request-response) and forming agreements within
groups (i.e. contract-net [Smi80]).
Protocols are typically focused on the syntactic speciﬁcation of interactions and
hence only regulate concrete communicative actions. In addition, they are usu-
ally limited to the duration of the interaction, which is typically short. The scope
for participation in a protocol is normally determined at the start of the protocol
and is most often limited to small numbers of agents.
Contracts Whereas an interaction protocol describes when a given interaction (e.g.
message) may be performed, contracts focus on specifying and regulating the
achievement of some joint action between two or more agents. Contracts must
be formed by explicit agreement among two or more parties.
The level of abstraction of the types of actions regulated by contracts may in-
clude both concrete actions and also abstract actions which may in turn be con-
stituted by the semantics of the contract. The temporal scope of a contract may
vary greatly, depending on the nature of the contract, and the agent scope of a
contract is limited to the contracting parties.
Legal Systems In contrast to contracts and protocols, legal systems are typically fo-
cused on the regulation of a broad class of agent behaviours. Legal systems
(such as common law, or other regulations of a given human society) regulate a
broad class of societal actions, describing which actions are legal, illegal, and
how the performance of these actions ought to be treated. Legal systems may
also treat how contracts and other agreements are enforced.
The actions regulated by legal systems are usually abstract and constituted
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action regulated semantics Scope Scope
Protocol Concrete Regulative Transient Limited
Contract
Abstract Regulative Transient Limited
Concrete Constitutive Persistent
Legal System
Abstract Regulative Persistent Broad
Constitutive
Table 3.1: Comparison of features of different classes of institution
within that system. The temporal scope of a legal system is persistent, in that
there are typically no provisions within the system for its dissolution and the
agent scope covers all members of a society.
In Table 3.1 we summarise the distinctive features of these three types of institution.
3.3 Aspects of Institutional Speciﬁcation
We choose to model an institution as a reactive process, which is created, evolves over
time through the interpretation of events in some external context (the world), and
may be dissolved. Within this process the institution creates states — interpretations
of effects of changes in the world on the institution, which may in turn affect how the
institution changes in the future.
3.3.1 Constitutive Aspects of Institutions
The mechanism through which the institution creates these states is constitutive, it is
the institution and the institution alone which is responsible for deﬁning its own evo-
lution. We choose to express this constitutive mechanism through a set of constitutive
rules, which describe an idealised and possibly abstract interpretation of some aspects
of interaction within an agent society in terms of a corresponding class of concrete and
observable actions and events which may occur within that society.
In addition to describing the state of the institution, we wish to capture events which
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Figure 3.3: A visualisation of the relationship between exogenous events, institutional
events and changes in institutional state.
have some signiﬁcance in the institution (for instance “Alice and Bob get married”).
These events may in turn lead to changes in institutional state, however there are often
cases when the interpretation of an event lies outside of the institution. In for instance,
the case of violations when an institution relies on public enforcement, we wish to
represent the fact that the violation event has occurred, even if this violation does not
necessarily lead to a change in the institutional state.
3.3.2 Events
The use of conventional generation, where an event within the institution is considered
to have occurred as the result of the interpretation of the rules deﬁning the institution
naturally accounts for two different types of events: those which may be considered
to be external (i.e. in an external context) to the institution and those internal to the
deﬁnition of an institution which are generated by either external events, or by other
internal events. Figure 3.3 presents a visualisation of this notion of conventional gen-
eration, showing the generation of ievent1 from the occurrence of exevent1 and the
generation of viol1 from exevent2, which is in turn generated by exevent1.
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Institutional events may be considered to be brought about solely as the result of the
interpretation of the rules of the institution and are intended to capture signiﬁcant oc-
currences within the institution. These events must therefore have some cause, and we
assume that this cause must originate from some stimulus external to the institution.
Exogenous Events
The second class of events we consider originate from some external context, such as
the environment, we call these exogenous events. Within the context of multi-agent
systems we consider possible candidates for the origins of this class of message as:
• Messages passed between agents such as “msg is sent by agent Bob to agent
Alice”.
• Time-related events, such as timeouts (i.e. “00:16 on 23/4/2005”)
• Signals from the environment such as: “The agent Alice starts”.
We make the following initial assumptions about the nature of externally triggered
events:
Unambiguous Two or more agents observing the same stimuli will conclude that the
same event has occurred.
Universally Observable All agents in the current society are capable of observing
events when they occur. While it is clear that this assumption is not necessar-
ily representative of most existing models of multi-agent systems (where, for
instance, messages are only observable by the sender and recipient of the mes-
sage), we make this assumption initiallyas it simpliﬁes the process of specifying
resulting institutional states.
The key to the deﬁnition of these external events is that the determination of the occur-
rence of an external event is assumed to be independent of the current internal states
of the agent(s) observing the event.
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Institutional events represent key points in the evolution of an institution over time
and conventional generation rules describe how institutional events may be generated
and hence be considered to have occurred. However, an important question about the
generation of institutional events is: how is this generation process constrained? We
havesaidthattheconventionalgenerationmaybeconditionalonsomepropertiesofthe
institutional state, however we wish to elaborate on this by deﬁning in general when it
is valid for an institutional event to occur. We use the notion of institutionalisedpower
to describe this constraint, and deﬁne the property of an event being empowered as it
being valid (but not necessarily acceptable) for that event to occur.
The distinction between institutionalised power and the capability for an event to be
generated is subtle, we could say for instance that the empowerment for an event to be
generated was equivalent to the deﬁnition of the generation conditions of that rule.
However, these conditions are intended more as a means of describing the “usual”
requirements for an event’s generation. In contrast empowerment can be considered as
acceptance of an event generation as being valid on the part of the institution.
A good example of the distinction between “the usual cases for generation” and “em-
powerment” is given in the account of declarative power (see Section 2.5.2 page 41 ).
Where an action is linked to some effect such as the creation of a particular normative
position, and this effect is then constrained by the performer’s power to perform the
action with the expected result.
3.3.4 Regulatory Aspects of Institutions
Constitutive rules are associated with the semantics of the institution, they make it
possible for an agent to see a sequence of events which have occurred in the real
world (or some other context which is external to the institution) and then create an
institutional interpretation of those events in terms of the institutional events which
should be considered to have occurred.
With these rules alone however it is not possible for an agent to determine which
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for this aspect of the institution’sfunction we must have a framework which allows for
this sort of classiﬁcation which we outline as follows:
Prohibition and Permission
The ﬁrst aspect of the society’s regulatory function is that of prohibition and permis-
sion. Prohibitions indicate that some state of affairs within the institutionis considered
to be unacceptable or undesirable, and permissions can be seen as their dual such that
if an action is permitted it is considered not to be forbidden.
While it is possible to represent both permission and prohibition at the same time, we
assume that as one may be re-written as the dual of the other (i.e. permission indicates
the absence of prohibition or vice versa), for the sake of simplicity, we may choose
to limit ourselves to the representation of either permission or prohibition leaving one
as an implicitly deﬁned by the absence of the other. For this work we focus solely on
permission, with the absence of permission indicating that an action is forbidden.
Having chosen which operator to use to separate good and bad situations in institution
speciﬁcations, we must then select to what that operator applies. Existing approaches
to normative speciﬁcation have focused on regulating one or both of:
States of the institution In this case we allow statements of the form “it is [not] per-
mitted for situation X to come about” where X describes some state of affairs
in the institution.
Actions and events In thiscase wepermit statementsoftheform “it is[not]permitted
for action α to be performed” where α is some action or event which may occur
within the institution.
In essence both of these approaches are interchangeable, a prohibited action can be
replaced by creating a prohibited state following the execution of that action, and a
prohibited state may be replaced by making all actions which lead to that state prohib-
ited (c.f. Sergot’s Green-Green-Green transition constraints in C+(++) [Ser04]).
The speciﬁcation of permitted or prohibited states makes it simple to specify certain
cases of violation and is hence appealing, in particular it allows for the states to be
94labelled as violating without any consideration as to how those states were reached.
Taking this approach however, introduces a practical problem in the process of spec-
iﬁcation. We typically wish to consider the consequences of a violation, as well as
identifying its occurrence and those consequences such as sanctions (discussed fur-
ther in (Section 3.3.4, page 97)) are likely to be dependent not only on the violation
which has occurred, but also on the action, or some properties of the action which
brought about that state. In the case where we allow for prohibited states, there is no
association between the violation of a prohibition and the action which lead us to that
violation (we have simply arrived in a violating state). Given this we choose to focus
solely on the expression of prohibited actions and events.
It should be noted that from the point of view of reasoning about models the adoption
of a single operator represents a closed world assumption (i.e. we assume that we we
must know all cases where an action is permitted, in order to infer that the action is
forbidden by the absence of permission). From the point of view of analysing and
verifying institutional speciﬁcations this point of view is sufﬁcient as we are always
dealing with complete models. In the case that we were focussing on agent reasoning
we would have to include a mechanism for inferring all three states of “knowing that
an action is permitted”, “knowing that an action is forbidden” and “not knowing if
either is the case”. We discuss this type of reasoning further in Section 7.1.4 page 233.
Obligations
Permissions and prohibitions allow one to make assertions about which actions are
allowedordisallowedat agivenpointintime, as wellas theseconcepts wealso wishto
be able to capture the notion of an agent being required to act, which is typically done
using an obligation operator of some form. In (Section 2.4, page 32), we discussed a
number of possible ways of expressing obligations, including immediate obligations,
prioritised obligations and obligations with deadlines. Before we make a choice for a
deontic operator we ﬁrst discuss the possible shape that such an operator may take.
As with permissions or prohibitions, the subjects of obligations may be either states or
events. In the ﬁrst case the obligations take the form of “A ought [not] to bring about
the state X”, and in the second case we have obligations of the form “A ought to do
action X”. As with permissions and prohibitions these two forms are interchangeable
by replacing actions with states containing the actions as a pre-condition or states with
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opt for an event-oriented operator.
The second question we must ask is whether obligations should be directly associated
with the actions of a particular agent, or whether they shouldsimply be associated with
a particular type of event which in turn may be internally associated with one or more
agents. Intuitively one might see a directed obligation as having the form (in English)
“Agent A ought to do X” and an undirected obligation as having the form “It ought to
be the case that X is done ”. The importance of this distinctionbecomes clear when we
consider obligations on groups: suppose we have an obligation of the form “X must
be done” and we wish for action “X” to be performed by any member of a particular
group. In the case our obligation operator is not directed toward particular agents,
we can simply specify the obligation as is and rely on the on the deﬁnition (in the
constitutive rules of the institution) for what the performance of “X” is considered to
be. If, howeverwechoosetorequirethat allobligationsaredirected then theobligation
“X must be done” must be treated as a set of obligations, applying to each member of
the group, which we consider to be cumbersome. Given this we choose an undirected
operator, relying on the speciﬁcation of the actions within the obligation operator to
associate the obligation with one or more agents.
An important ﬁnal question is whether to treat pairs of statements such as “You ought
to do X before Y” and “You ought to do Y before X” as consistent or inconsistent
according to the our model. Many approaches (such as [DWV96]) choose to eliminate
the apparent conﬂict caused by such statements by introducing a defeating relation
which forces oneorotheroftheobligationsto beoverridden. Whileonecould takethis
approach it is our view that this over simpliﬁes the process of normative speciﬁcation.
In real life normative conﬂicts are commonplace, and in many cases it is our ability to
choose which rule to break which is important (consider the case where a very close
friend asks you to do something which will break the law). Just as we as humans must
make our own decisions about how to handle inconsistencies, we see no reason why
such dilemmas cannot be passed on to agents, and we opt to allow for the possibilityof
inconsistent obligationsin our system. While we permit such conﬂicts, it is not always
the case that they will be considered as acceptable, for instance it may be desirable
to limit the possibility of normative conﬂicts in the case of a particular procedure or
contract. It is our view that such conﬂicts should be eliminated by a process of analysis
and reﬁnement of the rules of the process or contract itself.
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A violation is any case where an agent performs a prohibited action or fails to fulﬁl
one of their obligations and sanction is the process by which that agent is penalised for
bringing about that violation.
An important question about sanctions is whether or not they are distinct from the
norms which they enforce. One approach might be to treat the process of enacting a
sanction as exceptional and this is the approach taken by V´ azquez-Salceda, Dignum
et al in their paper [VSAD04] which describes an operational approach to the spec-
iﬁcation of norms — a sanction is expressed as a plan which must be brought about
by a sanctioning agent in order to penalise the violating agent and also recovers the
institutional state from the effects of the violation. In this sense the sanction is treated
separately from the process of enforcing the norm itself (requiring both special treat-
ment of actions which take part in the process of sanctioning agents and a separate
language for expressing those sanctions), in addition it does not accommodate the pos-
sibility of treating sanctions in a normative way or dealing with cases where sanctions
are not applied as required by sanctioning agents.
As we remarked in (Section 2.6.4, page 47) enforcement may be either enacted indi-
rectly by changes in agents’ behaviour (private enforcement), or directly through the
application of a sanction within the context of the institution (public enforcement). In
the latter case the imposition of the sanction may either be optional - i.e. the violation
merely opens the possibility for the sanctioning agent to bring about the sanction, or
mandatory in which case it is not permitted for the sanctioning agent to not bring about
the sanction. Both of these cases may be expressed as normativerules (either a permis-
sion or an obligation to perform the sanction), which simply follow as consequences
and it is our view that sanctions are more naturally expressed in the language of the
norms which they enforce, and we choose not to give them any special status in our
speciﬁcations.
Sanctions play an important role when considering efﬁcacy of institutions. In order for
a sanction to produce the intended result it must be both applicable and effective. In
the ﬁrst case it must be possible for the sanctioning agent to successfully perform the
actions required in order forthe sanctionto be broughtabout. Likewiseit shouldnot be
possible for the agent being sanctioned to to prevent the applicability of the sanction.
In the case of efﬁcacy, the function (or outcome) of the sanction must be sufﬁcient to
97discourage or negate the social cost of the violation that brought about the sanction in
the ﬁrst place.
The issue of determining or quantifying the cost of a sanction to a given agent is
outside the scope of our approach (as we do not quantify agents’ utilities in our model)
however the issue of determining the applicability of a sanction corresponds directly
with the types of problems we wish to test for in written speciﬁcations.
3.3.5 The Life-Cycle of Institutions
As we remarked in (Section 3.2.3, page 88) institutions may have a temporal scope,
where an institution is only considered to be in force for a given time interval. In order
tocapturethisnotionwithinthespeciﬁcationofinstitutionswemustmakeitclearwhat
it means for an institution to be in force or in existence and likewise what it means for
an institution to cease to have an effect.
The process of creating an institution can be seen as a transition from a point in time
when no rules deﬁned within the institution have any effect, to a subsequent point in
time when those rules have an effect, and likewise the process of destroying or tearing-
down an institution is simply the transition from a point at which the institutionalrules
may have an effect to a point at which they may no longer have any effect.
Given that the focus of this chapter is on single institutions, one might ask what rele-
vance is of cases where the institution in consideration does not have any effect. There
are cases where wemay wish, for instance, to parameterisean institutionupon creation
by associatingparticularvaluesoragents withparticularparameters orroles, wherethe
process of creation may be of importance.
In principle there is no need to give these processes any special status as one could
parametrise all institutional rules directly (as considered by Artikis for speciﬁc rules
in [Ale03, pages 101-102]) in such a way as to take into account the time at which
the institution was active. In the case of the institutional as a whole this may become
cumbersomeand we choose to directly consider the cases when institutionsare created
and destroyed.
983.3.6 Time
An importantaspect of any system designed to model action and change is how it deals
with the problem of representing time. As is pointed out [All91] a number of meth-
ods have been found to be useful in different areas of artiﬁcial intelligence, including
representations based on explicit dating, intervals, and temporal logics.
For the purposes of this thesis we assume a model of time consisting of a set of totally
ordered timeinstants, suchthat at each pointexactly one“real-world” eventmayoccur.
We do not make any assumptions about durations of real time which may take place
between these instants.
3.4 Formal Deﬁnition
We deﬁne an institution as a 5-tuple I :=  E,F,C,G,∆  consisting of a set of in-
stitutional events E, a set of institutional ﬂuents F, a set of causal rules C, a set of
generation rules G and an initial state ∆. A deﬁnition of these sets follows.
3.4.1 Events: E
Each institution deﬁnes a set of event symbols e ∈ E, each of which denotes a type of
event which may occur.
We break the set E down into two disjoint subsets, Eex consisting of exogenous events
and Einst consisting of institutional events.
Exogenous events: Eex consists of events which may be accounted for outside of the
scope of the institution. These may include agent communication events such
as tell(a,b,yes) (a tells b “yes”) and other externally deﬁned events, such as
timeouts.
We additionally deﬁne a subset of the exogenous events: E+, which contain
events which account for the creation of an institution. For a given institution,
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institution is created.
Institutional events: Einst In contrast to exogenous events, institutional events Einst
contains the events which are generated by the institutional semantics.
We break institutional events into the disjoint subsets: institutional actions Eact
which are intended to capture signiﬁcant changes in institutional state, and vi-
olation events Eviol denoting points at which violations have occurred. The set
of violation events is deﬁned such that it contains at least one violation event
corresponding to each institutional action and each exogenous event as follows:
∀e ∈ Eact ∪ Eex : viol(e) ∈ Eviol.
Speciﬁcations may also deﬁne additional violation events in this set, which are
not directly associated with particular exogenous or institutional actions.
We deﬁne the set of dissolution events E× as a subset of the institutional actions.
When a dissolution event occurs within an institution, the institution ceases to
exist.
Deﬁnition 4
E = Eex ∪ Einst (D4.1)
Eex ∩ Einst = ∅ (D4.2)
Einst = Eact ∪ Eviol (D4.3)
Eact ∩ Eviol = ∅ (D4.4)
E× ⊆ Eact (D4.5)
E+ ⊆ Eex (D4.6)
Exogenous events relate only to things which may be observed in the world outside
the institution. In the case that an exogenous event relates to an action performed by
an agent, it should be made clear that the event is associated with observation of the
occurrence of this action. While events may be associated internally (with respect to
an agent) withsomeintentionalstance, there isno external representation ofthisstance
embodied within the description of an institution.
We assume that the institution has no control over when or whether a given exogenous
100event may occur. This view is consistent with the model that the institution provides
an interpretation of rather than a deﬁnition of the world in which it operates. The
interpretation of these external events is expressed inside the institution through the
generation of institutional events. As a given external event may have several distinct
meanings in the context of the institution, each external event may be associated with
the generation of several institutional events. Institutional should be considered as ex-
isting only within the context of the institution and the occurrence of an institutional
event does not bring about any direct effects in the outside world. These events may
bring about indirect effects in the outside world by either changing state of the insti-
tution (thus changing agents’ power,permissions or obligations), or by causing agents
who observer their occurrence to change their internal mental attitudes. The latter case
corresponds to the notion of private enforcement discussed in Section 2.6.4 page 47.
We do not consider cases where multiple exogenous events occur at the same time. In
the context of multi-agent systems this is reasonable, as the external events we deal
with are typically associated with message exchanges where the notion of absolute
simultanaety is meaningless (i.e. it is impossible for two or more agents to send the
same message at the same time). It may be the case that we cannot determine exactly
in which order events have occurred, however we treat these cases as a set of possible
models (where each possible ordering has occurred) rather than in a uniﬁed approach.
This type of reasoning is discussed further in Section 5.3.1 page 152.
3.4.2 Fluents
We now turn to the deﬁnition of the institutional state which we model through the
deﬁnition of a set of ﬂuent properties. We make a distinction between normative ﬂu-
ents, which express normative properties of the institutional state such as permissions,
powers and obligations, and domain ﬂuents which correspond to properties which are
speciﬁc to the institution itself. In both cases we model ﬂuents as propositions which
may be true or false in a given institutional state.
We deﬁne the set D to include all institution-speciﬁc ﬂuents which may be true in the
institutional state.
The set of normative ﬂuents is broken down into sets of ﬂuents relating to powers W,
permissions P and obligations O as follows:
101W A set ofinstitutionalpowerﬂuents of theform pow(e) : e ∈ Eact where each power
proposition denotes the capability of some action e to be brought about in the
institution.
P A set ofeventpermissionﬂuents: perm(e) : e ∈ Eact∪Eex each permissionproposi-
tiondenotesthat itis permittedforaction etobe broughtabout. Wedo not deﬁne
a proposition for “forbidden” but simply deﬁne it as the absence of permission
for that event to be brought about.
O A set of obligations, of the form obl(e,d,v)e ∈ E,d ∈ E,v ∈ Eact. The presence
of an obligation ﬂuent in the institutional state denotes that event e should be
brought about before the occurrence of event d or be subject to the violation v.
We deﬁne the set F as all institutional ﬂuents which may be held to be true in a given
state as follows:
Deﬁnition 5
F = W ∪ P ∪ O ∪ D (D5.1)
W ∩ P ∩ O ∩ D = ∅ (D5.2)
The above deﬁnition describes which ﬂuents may be created within the context of the
institution, however we also wish to consider the life-cycle of the institution. In order
to do this we deﬁne a ﬂuent live which indicates when the institution has been created
and its rulesmay havesomeeffect on theinstitution’sstate. Thetreatment ofthisﬂuent
differs from the institutional ﬂuents, in that its deﬁnition is external to the semantics
of the institution itself. To take this fact into account we deﬁne the set F∗ as the set of
all institutional ﬂuents, including external ﬂuents.
Deﬁnition 6
F
∗ =F ∪ {live} (D6.1)
We then go on to use this deﬁnition to deﬁne the possible states of the institution,
including those in which the institution has not been created as follows:
102Deﬁnition 7
Σ =2
F∗
(D7.1)
It should be noted that not all of these states will be reachable.
Rules in the institution may have an effect in multiple institutional states, and this
effect may be conditional on the institutional state. In order to qualify the effect of
institutional rules over a speciﬁc set of states, we deﬁne a language X of state formula
which allows us to specify which institutional states the rule may apply as follows:
Deﬁnition 8 Given a set of institutionalﬂuent propositionsF the set of state formulae
is deﬁned:
X = 2
F∪¬F
Where F ∪ ¬F denotes the set of literals, including negations over F. It should be
noted that this language is limited to ﬂuents which may be true while the institution is
active.
3.4.3 Causal Rules
Each institution deﬁnes the function C which describes which ﬂuents are initiated and
terminated by the performance of a given action in a state matching some expression.
The function is expressed as C : X ×E → 2F ×2F. Where the ﬁrst set in the range of
the function describes which ﬂuents are initiated by the given event and the second set
represents those ﬂuents terminated by the event.
We use the notation C↑(φ,e) to denote the ﬂuents which are initiated by the event e in
a state matching φ and the notation C↓(φ,e) to denote the ﬂuents which are terminated
by event e in a state matching φ.
1033.4.4 Generation Rules
Each institution deﬁnes an event generation function G which describes when the per-
formance of one event counts-as, or generates, another: G : X × E → 2Einst.
The generation of events may be conditional on some properties in the institutional
state, and one event may generate multiple events. It should be noted that this relation
describes explicitly speciﬁed relationships between events in the institution. There are
cases when events may be generated which are not in this relation, for instance in the
case of unsatisﬁed obligations in (Section 3.5.1, page 105). Additionally this function
represents cases where event generation may occur, however as institutional events
require empowerment, they will only be generated when this property holds. Event
generation is discussed further in (Section 3.5.1, page 105).
3.5 Semantics
During the lifetime of an institution, its state changes due to events that take place.
Each exogenous event possibly generates more events which in turn could create fur-
ther events. Each of these events could have an effect on the current state. The com-
bined effect of these events determines the next state.
We deﬁne the semantics of an institution over a set of states Σ. Each state comprises a
set of ﬂuents in F∗ which are held to be true at a given time. We say that a state S ∈ Σ
satisﬁes ﬂuent f ∈ F∗, denoted S |= f, when f ∈ S. It satisﬁes its negation ¬f, when
f  ∈ S. This notation can be extended to sets φ ∈ X in the following way: S |= φ iff
∀x ∈ φ   S |= x.
Deﬁnition 9 For a given state S ∈ Σ and a given expression φ ∈ X we deﬁne the
operator S |= φ as follows:
S |= φ ⇐

    
    
φ = {} (D9.1)
φ = {p},p ∈ S (D9.2)
φ = {¬p},p / ∈ S (D9.3)
∀p ∈ φ   S |= {p} (D9.4)
1043.5.1 Event Generation
Event generation allows us to consider events which may be seen as being bought
about by the occurrence of a given underlying exogenous event. The intention is to
capture cases such as “saying ’aye’ counts as a valid bid in an auction, if auction has
started” in this case the act of saying “aye” may be seen as one event, and the act of
issuing a valid bid may be seen as an event generated by a bidder saying “aye”. This
approach allows us to specify actions and events and their effects at a high level of
abstraction without being explicit about under exactly which circumstances an event
comes about. We might consider in the same example the case where a bid might be
brought about by a telephone bidder: the action of a buyer bidding over the phone
can be considered as a different type of event to the action of bidding on the ﬂoor of
the auction house, but might bring about the same “bid” action in the auction, with
the telephone buyer being bound by the same obligations as a ﬂoor buyer. We use
the notion of institutional power to constrain when event generation may occur, such
that an event may only be generated if it is empowered to be. In the above example we
might wish to say that bidders may only make valid bids if they are currently registered
withtheauction house, in thiscasewewould associatetheeventofan agent registering
with the auction house with the creation of an institutional power to bid in the auction.
In order to account for event generation we deﬁne an event generation function which
describes which events may be generated in a given state: GR : Σ × 2E → 2E. In a
given state S and a for a given set of events E, GR(S,E) includes all of the events
which must be generated by the occurrence of events E in state S and is deﬁned as
follows:
105Deﬁnition 10 The set of events directly generated by a set of events E when in a state
S is deﬁned as:
GR(S,E) =
{e ∈ E |e ∈ E or
(D10.1)
∃ e
′ ∈ E,φ ∈ X,e ∈ G(φ,e
′)   e ∈ Eact ∧ S |= pow(e) ∧ S |= φ or
(D10.2)
∃ e
′ ∈ E,φ ∈ X,e ∈ G(φ,e
′)   e ∈ Eviol ∧ S |= φ or
(D10.3)
∃ e
′ ∈ E   e = viol(e
′),S |= ¬perm(e
′),e
′  ∈ E+,e
′  ∈ E× or
(D10.4)
∃ e
′ ∈ E,d ∈ E   S |= obl(e
′,d,e)} (D10.5)
With D10.2 we consider event generation explicitly speciﬁed by the institutional re-
lation G. One event generates another event in a given state, if that generation was
speciﬁed by the institution and the current state satisﬁes the conditions for that gen-
eration and the generation is empowered. The ﬁnal condition takes into account the
fact that while an institution may indicate that a given event generation should occur
that generation may only take place if the generated action is empowered in the current
state.
Deﬁnition D10.2 does not include violation events which are generated explicitly by
inclusion in the G relation. These violation events do not need to be empowered and
this fact is taken into account by D10.3.
With D10.4 we consider the generation of violation events as the result of performing
non-permitted actions. A violation is generated if an action is performed and that ac-
tion is not permitted in the current state, and the action is not a creation or a dissolution
event.
With D10.5 we consider the generation of violation events as the result of the failure
to perform obligated actions. For all obligation ﬂuents which are asserted in a given
state, then the occurrence of the deadlineevent d generates the corresponding violation
event v.
106The parallel generation of events, allows for the possibility of an event which fulﬁls an
obligationbeing generated simultaneouslywith its deadline (i.e. the deadlinecounts as
thefulﬁlment of theobligationor theobligationcounts as thefulﬁlment ofthedeadline
or another action counts as both the fulﬁlment of the deadline and the fulﬁlment of the
obligation), while we consider this case as being undesirable in an institutionwe allow
for its speciﬁcation, and say that when it does occur the obligation is considered as not
being fulﬁlled.
Generated events come about from the performance of one exogenous event in a given
state. When applied to itself the function GR is monotonic (from D10.1), so for a
given state S and a given exogenous event eex there exists a ﬁxpoint GR
ω(S,{eex})
which includes all events which are generated by the occurrence this event in this state.
Theorem 1 For a given state S and a given event eobs, GR(S,{eex}) is monotonic
with respect to the set of generated events. (Trivial by D10.1.)
That is to say that given a single exogenous event eex in a given state S, the ﬁrst ap-
plication of GR to the state S and the set of events {eex} will yield a set of events
which includes at least eex. This set will also include events which are immediately
generated through the application of either speciﬁed generation rules in G or due to vi-
olations non-permitted events and unfulﬁlled obligations. Subsequent applications of
GR to the original state and this set will also include events generated by previous iter-
ations (due to D10.1). As the set of events in an institution is ﬁnite, the re-application
of GR will yield a ﬁxpoint GR
ω which deﬁnes the set of all events generated in the
state S.
The above deﬁnitions of GR and GR
ω do not take into account the fact that the in-
stitution might not have been created and as they stand would allow for events to be
generated when this was not the case. We take this into account with the deﬁnition
of the event occurrence function OC which denotes all events which occur which are
relevant to the institution in a given state S ∈ Σ, and for a given exogenous event
eex ∈ Eex:
Deﬁnition 11
OC(S,eex)
def
≡
 
∅ : S |= ¬live,eex  ∈ E+ (D11.1)
GR
ω(S,{eex}) : S |= live GR
ω(S,{eex}) : S  |= live,eex ∈ E+ (D11.2)
107With D11.1, if the institution has not been created, and the exogenous event does not
create it, then no events are considered to have occurred in relation to the institution.
With D11.2, if the institution is live (i.e. it has been created and it has not been dis-
solved)then all events generated by eex are considered to have occurred. With D11.2 if
theinstitutionisnotlive(i.e. ithas notbeencreated orithaspreviouslybeen dissolved)
and eex is a creation event then all events generated by eex are considered to have oc-
curred, note that this also leads to the creation of the institution and the inclusion of
the live ﬂuent in the subsequent state (see Deﬁnition D13.2 below).
3.5.2 Event Effects
Each ﬂuent in F∗ may either be asserted or not in each state in S. The status of ﬂu-
ents may change over time according to which generated actions have occurred in the
previous transition. We assume that ﬂuents follow the common-sense law of inertia, in
that if a ﬂuent is initiated in a given state, then it remains initiated in subsequent states
until it has been terminated.
We deﬁne the function INITI : Σ × Eex → F to determine the ﬂuents which are
initiated in a given state when the institution is active.
Deﬁnition 12 When the institution is active, the set of ﬂuents initiated in a given state
S ∈ Σ by a given exogenous event eex ∈ Eex is deﬁned as:
INITI(S,eex)
def
≡
{p ∈ F
∗ |∃ e ∈ OC(S,eex),φ ∈ X   p ∈ C
↑(φ,e) ∧ S |= φ}
Fluents are initiated withinan institutionif a relation in C speciﬁes that a given eventin
the extended set of generated events for that state and event initiates that proposition,
and the current state satisﬁes the conditions for that initiation.
As with GR the deﬁnition of INITI does not take into account the fact that the institu-
tion may not have been created. We deﬁne a corresponding function INIT : Σ×Eex →
F∗ to take this into account.
108Deﬁnition 13 The set of ﬂuents initiated in a given state S ∈ Σ by a given exogenous
event eex ∈ Eex are deﬁned as:
INIT(S,eex)
def
≡
{f ∈ F
∗ |f ∈ INITI(S,eex),S |= live,∀e ∈ OC(S,eex)   e  ∈ E× or
(D13.1)
f ∈ INITI(S,eex) ∪ ∆ ∪ live,eex ∈ E+,S  |= live, (D13.2)
∀e ∈ OC(S,eex)   e  ∈ E×,}
By D13.1, if the institution is active in state S, then all ﬂuents by speciﬁed
INITI(S,eex) are initiated unless an event which terminates the institution is
generated, in which case no ﬂuents are initiated.
By D13.2 if the institution is not active in state S and a creation event occurs, then all
ﬂuents speciﬁed by INITI(S,eex), the institution’s initial state ∆ and the ﬂuent live
are initiated, unless that event also generates a dissolution event.
It should be noted that by D13.2, when an institution is dissolved, any effects on the
subsequent institutional state (but not any corresponding event generations) are ig-
nored.
We go on to deﬁne the function TERM : Σ × Eex → F∗ to deﬁne which ﬂuents are
terminated in a given state by the occurrence of a given event.
Deﬁnition 14 The set of ﬂuents which are terminated in a given state S ∈ Σ by a
given exogenous action eex ∈ Eex is deﬁned as:
TERM(S,eex)
def
≡
{p ∈ S |∃ e ∈ OC(S,eex),φ ∈ X   p ∈ C
↓(φ,e),S |= φ or (D14.1)
p = obl(e,d,v) ∧ p ∈ S ∧ e ∈ OC(S,eex) or (D14.2)
p = obl(e,d,v) ∧ p ∈ S ∧ d ∈ OC(S,eex) or (D14.3)
e ∈ OC(S,eex) ∧ e ∈ E×} (D14.4)
By D14.1 a ﬂuent is terminated if a relation in C speciﬁes that a given event in the
109extended set of generated events for that state and event terminates that proposition,
and the given state satisﬁes the conditions for that termination. By D14.2,D14.3 an
obligation proposition is terminated if either its deadline or the obligated action are
in the extended set of generated events. By D14.4 all ﬂuents in the institution are
terminated if an dissolution event is generated.
Finally we deﬁne a transition relation for the institution as follows:
Deﬁnition 15
TR(S,eex)
def
≡ {f ∈ F
∗ |f ∈ S,f / ∈ TERM(S,eex) or (D15.1)
f ∈ INIT(S,eex)} (D15.2)
From D15.1, all ﬂuents which are asserted in the current state persist into the next
state, unless they are included in the terminated component of a relation from C.
From D15.2, all ﬂuents included in the initiated component of relations from C which
match the current state and an action in the generation set are included in the following
state.
Conceptually, the transition from one state to the next can be viewed in three distinct
phases. Firstly the exogenous event which causes the transition is considered to have
occurred. In the second phase, the set of all institutional events which are generated
from the original exogenous are determined by repeated iteration of the GR on the
set of generated events and the original state until the full set of generated events is
calculated(i.e. whentheapplicationofGRreturnsthesetofeventswhichwereapplied
to it). In the third phase the set of ﬂuents which are initiated and terminated by the set
of generated events is calculated using the INIT and TERM functions. The successor
state is then computed using the TR function as the union of the set of ﬂuents which
were initiated by the transition and all ﬂuents from the previous state which were not
terminated by the transition.
Each exogenous event may lead to the generation of zero or more institutional events
and each of these may lead to the initiation, or termination of zero or more ﬂuents. In
the deﬁnition above the set of ﬂuents that change from one state to the next is entirely
dependant on previous state and whichever exogenous event causes the transition. It
110is not the case, for example, that an event can bring about the termination of the em-
powerment for itself to occur. When an institutional event occurs the empowerment
and all other conditions for its generation are drawn only from other events which have
occurred and the previous state. Given a state and a given exogenous event, the transi-
tion to the next is also deterministic, for each state and each exogenous event there is
exactly one successor state.
3.5.3 Ordered Traces and Models
Now that we have deﬁned how states may be generated from a previous state and a
single exogenous event, using these we are able to deﬁne traces of multiple events and
their corresponding state evaluations.
Deﬁnition 16 An ordered trace T I
n of institution I and length n is deﬁned as a se-
quence of exogenous events:
T
I
n
def
≡  e0,...,en−1 , ei ∈ E
I
ex,0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1
We use ordered traces to deﬁne models of our institutional semantics as follows:
Deﬁnition 17 A model of an ordered trace T I
n is deﬁned as a tuple MODEL(T I
n) =
 MS,ME  such that MS is a sequence of states: MS =  S0,...,Sn ,Si ⊆ F∗ and
ME is a sequence of events ME =  E0,...,En−1 .
The model MODEL(T I
n) is computed over events in T I
n =  e0,...,en−1  as follows:
MODEL(T
I
n)i
def
≡

 
 
Si = ∅ i = 0 (D17.1)
Si = TR(MSi−1,ei−1) 0 < i ≤ n (D17.2)
Ei = OC(MSi,ei) 0 ≤ i < n (D17.3)
Models describe which events (including those generated by the institution)and which
ﬂuents hold over a series of time instants.
1113.6 A Simple Example: War Institution
In orderto demonstratehow an institutionmay bemodelled in theaboveformalisation,
we give a simple example not based in the ﬁeld of multi-agent systems.
A country is constantlyswingingbetween war and peace withits neighbour. Thecoun-
tries have agreed that when they are at peace, a citizen of the ﬁrst shooting a citizen of
the second counts as murder, when they are at war and a citizen has been conscripted
into the army it is permitted to shoot, and that conscription is only permitted when
the countries are at war. When one country is provoked, it is obliged to start war ﬁrst
before it is allowed to shoot.
The institutional model shown in Figure 3.4 represents the regulations of one of these
countries.
The institution relies on a number of exogenous events, (3.4.4). shoot indicates that
a shooting has occurred, startwar that a war has started, declaretruce that a truce
has been declared callup that the citizens have been called up and provoked that the
country has been provoked.
The institution constitutively describes two events, conscription: when citizens of a
country are called up to ﬁght and murder: when a citizen of one country kills a citizen
of the other without permission (for the sake of simplicity we do not model exactly
which citizen has committed the murder). These are captured through institutional
events conscription and murder as stated by (3.4.5).
A single creation event create is deﬁned and no dissolution events are deﬁned (i.e.
once created the institution is never dissolved).
(3.4.8) indicates all violations that could occur. (3.4.9) deﬁnes one domain ﬂuent stat-
ing that the country is at war, while (3.4.10), (3.4.11), (3.4.12) indicate the empow-
erments, permissions and obligations the country may hold. The decision to start a
war in time of peace results in the institutional creation of a state of war, as shown in
(3.4.14). (3.4.15) generates the obligation to start a war ﬁrst before shooting to avoid
committing a murder whenever being provoked during a period of peace. (3.4.16)
provides the permission to shoot, whenever conscription has taken place, which is em-
112Eex = {shoot,startwar,declaretruce,callup,
provoke,create} (3.4.4)
Eact = {conscript,murder} (3.4.5)
E+ = {create} (3.4.6)
E× = {} (3.4.7)
Eviol = {viol(shoot),viol(startwar),viol(declaretruce),
viol(callup),viol(provoke),viol(conscript),
viol(murder)} (3.4.8)
D = {atwar} (3.4.9)
W = {pow(conscript),pow(murder)} (3.4.10)
P = {perm(shoot),perm(startwar),perm(declaretruce),
perm(callup),perm(provoke),perm(conscript),
perm(murder)} (3.4.11)
O = {obl(startwar,shoot,murder)} (3.4.12)
∆ = {perm(callup),perm(startwar),perm(conscript),
perm(provoke),pow(murder),perm(murder)} (3.4.13)
C
↑(X,E) :  {¬atwar},startwar  → {atwar} (3.4.14)
 {¬atwar},provoke  → {obl(startwar,shoot,murder)} (3.4.15)
 ∅,conscript  → {perm(shoot)} (3.4.16)
 ∅,startwar  → {pow(conscript)} (3.4.17)
C
↓(E,X) :  {atwar},declaretruce  → {atwar,perm(shoot),
pow(conscript)} (3.4.18)
G(E,X) :  ∅,callup  → {conscript} (3.4.19)
 ∅,viol(shoot)  → {murder} (3.4.20)
Figure 3.4: The War Institution
113powered only when a war is started, as indicated by (3.4.17). Declaring a truce will
end the state of war when at war and revoke the permission to shoot and the power
to conscript (3.4.18). When a country issues the callup command, the institution will
treat this as conscription (conscript), when this is empowered (3.4.19). Shooting when
it is not permitted generates a murder event (3.4.20). Initially (3.4.13), the countries
are at peace, and a number of events are empowered and permitted.
The semantics of the formalisation above for this institution may be demonstrated by
examining ordered traces of exogenous events belonging to the institution. We start by
examining a simple trace of the ﬁve events deﬁned as follows:
T
war
5 =  create,provoke,shoot,startwar,declaretruce 
denoting the creation of the institution, a provocation, a shooting, the starting of a war
and ﬁnally the declaration of a truce. The model of this trace is shown in Figure 3.6 on
page 117, in this ﬁgure an ordered sequence of six time instants corresponding to the
states of the institution are shown as linked circles. The events which occur between
these time instants are shown above the links with the underlying observed event being
shown in italics, and all events (thosewhich are generated by theapplication of the GR
function) shown below them. The ﬂuents which are true at a given instant in time are
denoted below the instants. Fluents which are initiated in a given state are highlighted
in bold.
In the model denoted in Figure 3.6 we start at time instant i0 with state being empty.
The transitionfrom this stateto thestatei1 is brought about by the create event which
creates the war institution instantiating the live(war) ﬂuent and other initial ﬂuents
in the set ∆. The following transition provoke initiates the obligation to start a war
before shooting in the state at time instant i2. The next transition is brought about by
the shoot event, this event generates the viol(shoot). The violation is simultaneously
generated by the fact that the shoot event is not permitted in the state at time instant i2
and the presence of the obligation obl(startwar,shoot,murder) which is violated by
the generation of the shoot event. The ﬁnal two events startwar and declaretruce
initiate and terminate the atwar ﬂuent.
Figure 3.5 shows a similar model for the trace:
T
war
5 =  create,provoke,startwar,callup,shoot 
114in which the shoot event does not count as a murder in this case as the occurrence
of the startwar event leads to a state where the callup event counts as the
conscription event, which in turn leads to the initiation of the permission to shoot
(perm(shoot)) in the state associated with time instant i4.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter we stated that the institutions we are concerned with arise from the
outcome of a human led design process. We then discussed the underlying properties
which deﬁne the types ofinstitutionthat weare concerned with. We also identiﬁed that
these institutions may be applied to a broad range of situations with varying degrees
of abstraction, different temporal and agent scopes.
We established that the principles of constitutive social reality, particularly that of
conventional generation may be used to form a natural model for institutions by rep-
resenting the relationship between actions and events in the real world and those iden-
tiﬁed within the institutions in question. We then examined the types of regulation
which may be applied within institutions and argued that permission and obligation
with deadlines are sufﬁcient for modelling regulations, we also noted that institutions
may be transient and that this must be taken into account in their design.
We thenused theseobservationstobuilda formal modelfor thespeciﬁcationof institu-
tions. The model we have presented is based on a set of institution speciﬁc ﬂuents and
normative ﬂuents (relating to possible obligations and permissions in the institution).
These ﬂuents are then used to build a model of the possible states that an institution
may be in over time.
We subsequently deﬁne two classes of events: exogenous events which relate to events
which occur outside of the scope of the institutionand institutionalevents which occur
within the scope of the institution. These events are used to denote particular types of
change within the institution. The occurrence of institutional events is accounted for
through the deﬁnition of generation rules, which associate exogenous events with the
institutional events they generate.
Finally, we account for changes in the institutional state through the deﬁnition of
115causal rules, which link the occurrence of both exogenous and institutionalevents with
changes in the ﬂuents which hold in the state following the occurrence of a given event
or events.
Based on thismodelwe then deﬁned how thesemanticsof an institutionare interpreted
interms ofa setofordered traces ofexogenousevents. Weshowhow, givenasequence
of exogenous events (an ordered trace) a model of the institution may be determined
for these events. A given model deﬁnes the sequence of sets of events which are gen-
erated by the sequence of exogenous events, and a corresponding sequence of states,
denoting the ﬂuents which hold after the execution of a given exogenous event. For
each sequence of exogenous events (ordered trace) a single corresponding institutional
model exists.
Finally we demonstrated the application of these semantics with a simple example.
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Figure 3.5: Model of for trace  create,provoke,shoot,startwar,declaretruce 
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7Chapter 4
Relating and Composing Institutional
Speciﬁcations
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we described a model for specifying single institutions and we
stated in Section 3.1, page 83 that our objective for each of these speciﬁcations was to
capture a particular aspect of agent interaction. Within an agent society a number of
institutions may be speciﬁed and put into force. Each of the agents in this society may
play a role in the enactment of some, all, or none of the institutions which are in place.
We could take the view that each of these types of interaction (such as protocols and
contracts)shouldbeenactedand consideredcompletelyindependently,witheach insti-
tution having its own, independent interpretation of the events taking place. However
this approach is undesirable, as each institution must include the necessary semantics
to encapsulate all aspects of its execution: At the concrete level, each institutionwould
have to deﬁne its semantics exactly in terms of events which are observable in the en-
vironment, as well as incorporating the abstract (institutionally constituted) semantics
for that case; At the abstract level we would like to be able to handle certain categories
of scenario (such as contract violations for instance), which may have numerous dif-
ferences, in a common way. In the case where the institutions enacted by a society
are independent, each of those institutions would necessarily have to duplicate that
common process within their semantics.
118In this chapter we consider the problem of how the normativeproperties of institutions
of the form described in the previous chapter may be composed by design. We develop
a mechanismwhichallowsfor institutionsto beexpressed independentlyof each other,
and then composed into a speciﬁcation for a society as a whole which binds these
individual component speciﬁcations together in such a way that they might be enacted
concurrently.
4.2 Institutional Composition
We now address the question of what it means for a set of institution speciﬁcations to
be composed.
In the model described in Chapter 3 an institution speciﬁcation is deﬁned as a mech-
anism for providing an (institutional) interpretation of a set of external (exogenous)
events — which may be brought about outside of the context of the institution — in
terms of the generation of some institutional events and/or some change to the state
within the institution.
The nature of the type of institutional composition we wish to capture can be sum-
marised as the problem of explaining when an event in one of the institutions in the
society, counts as the occurrence of a corresponding event in another institution in that
society.
4.2.1 An Example: Contract Enforcement
Suppose that in a given society agents conduct some business according to the regu-
lations of a set of contracts, each of which governs some class of interaction within
groups of agents in that society.
Suppose that within this society there is also an enforcement body whose purpose it is
to enforce violations of regulations in society by enacting sanctions upon those agents
who have performed actions which are considered to be illegal (according to that soci-
eties deﬁnition of illegal). Further suppose that the enforcement body is governed by
119a single rule as follows (signiﬁcant events are highlighted in italics):
• If an agent has performed an illegal act (some action which is considered to be
illegal in the society), then a member of the enforcement body must apply some
prescribed sanction to the agent within a given period of time.
Now consider a single type of contract which relates to the lending of money which is
described as follows:
• A loan contract is created when one agent lends money to another agent.
• When a loan is created, after a given period of time the creditor must be reim-
bursed for the value of the loan.
• If after this period of time, the debtor has not repayed the loan then they are
considered to have defaulted on the loan.
• The contract is dissolved when the debtor has been reimbursed for the value the
loan.
The intention of the enforcement institution is to enforce the sanctioning of illegal acts
by ensuring the application of the prescribed sanctions for these acts. The rules of this
institution do not state what kind of acts are to be considered illegal, but simply that if
some action which is considered to be illegal occurs, then it should be sanctioned.
In the loan contract, we do not say exactly which speciﬁc actions account for when an
agent lends money or when a loan must be repayed — be it in instalments or as a lump
sum.
In our particular society we compose these institutions with the following rules:
• Defaulting on a loan is considered to be an illegal act.
• When an agent defaults on a loan then the prescribed sanction for this violation
is that a member of the enforcement body must ﬁne the debtor the remaining
value of the loan and then pay this sum to the creditor of the loan.
• The action of a member of the enforcement body paying the creditor the value
of the loan is considered as reimbursement for the loan.
As we can see, the signiﬁcant events in these two institutionsare linked by rules within
the society, such that in the case where a loan goes unpaid, it will always be the case
120(if the enforcing agent fulﬁls her obligations) that the debtor will be sanctioned.
In another society the rules may be different, for instance it may be the case that a
society forbids the lending of money, in which case the event of creating the loan
contractwouldbetreated as theviolation. In eithercase, boththeloanandenforcement
institutions remain the same, however the rules which govern the actions which they
create are different.
4.2.2 Features of Speciﬁcations
The above example informally illustrates how two independent institutions may be
composed by linking the events which constitute the semantics of each individual in-
stitution. We could express the above speciﬁcation as a single institution using the
syntax deﬁned in the previous chapter. However, in this case the normative aspects of
borrowing money and enforcing contracts are distinct, apart from the rules which link
violations of contracts and their enforcement, and generate obligations on different
groups of agents (those borrowing money and those enforcing contracts). Addition-
ally, the same enforcement process may equally be applied to other, as yet unspeciﬁed
aspects of the society.
We now go on to discuss a number of general cases in which institutional composition
may be applied, and be of some beneﬁt to the process of specifying the institutions
which are composed.
Delegation
In theaboveexamplethecontract institutionon itsown deﬁnes when a loan is violated,
but in the case that a violation occurs, no further action is mandated by the institution
itself. By linking a loan contract to another institution which provides the means for
enforcing that contract, additional force is applied to the violation of defaulting on the
loan (the possibility that the enforcement institution will ﬁne the debtor). In general,
composition of this sort can be seen as a kind of delegation, where one institution (in
this case the loan contract) delegates the enactment of some aspects of their execution
to another institution, which in turn provides some additional function (in this case the
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istate istate′ istate′ istate′′
eventb1 eventb2 eventb3
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istate istate′ istate′ istate′′
eventa1 eventa2
World Model
time
Figure 4.1: Delegation from Institution A to Institution B
enforcement of loan repayments) to the original institution.
Delegationalsoplaysarolewhenconsideringthelife-cycleofinstitutions,intheabove
example, the contract institution is dissolved when the contract is either violated or
when the loan is repayed. In many cases we wish to represent the fact that an agent
violating such a contract may lead to an effect on some aspects of that agent’s ability
to take part in future interactions in the society. In an institution with a short temporal
scope, such as the loan contract, the representation of such an effect may be delegated
to a second institution which persists beyond the scope of the original. We illustrate
this type of compositionin Figure 4.1 where eventa1 in institutionA generates eventb1
ininstitutionB, allowinginstitutionBtointerpretsomeaspect oftheworld(inthiscase
generating eventb2) before returning control to institution A by generating eventa2.
Abstraction/Elaboration
The second case where composition may be used can be seen as the dual of delegation.
When we chose to deﬁne a broad enforcement institution, we could have speciﬁed an
enforcement procedure explicitly for the purposes of applying sanctions for each type
of contract, including one for enforcing the loan procedure. It is likely, however that
such an institution would share many of the same features as other enforcement in-
stitutions leading to a degree of redundancy within the enforcement institution spec-
iﬁcations. The absence of speciﬁcity in the deﬁnition of exactly what type of event
is considered to be an illegal act in the enforcement institution above allows for the
same institution speciﬁcation to be re-used for all contracts where similar classes of
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Figure 4.2: Institution A provides elaboration to Institution B
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Figure 4.3: Temporal Composition of Institution A Followed by Institution B
violation are considered. The same point may be made about the deﬁnition of which
events are signiﬁcant to the loan contract, while it may be the case that these events
(lend and reimburse) could be directly associated with somesignals in theenvironment
it is also the case that they could be generated through the interpretation of some other
institution, such as a negotiation protocol. This type of composition is illustrated in
Figure 4.2 where institution B relies on institution A for the interpretation of events in
the real world.
123Temporal Composition
A case which is not considered in the example above is one which we call temporal
composition. Whereas delegation and abstraction consider cases where two or more
institutions are active concurrently, there are also cases where the types of interaction
prescribed by some institution may be composed according to some deﬁned ordering.
In this case, the completion of some interaction described by one institution may be
seen as a pre-requisite for the creation and subsequent executing of a second institu-
tion. This kind of composition allows for the representation of high-level temporal
relationships between some subset of the institutions in a society and is illustrated in
Figure 4.3 where institution A is composed with institution B. In this case eventa2
both terminates institution A and generates eventb1 which in turn creates institution B.
Speciﬁcation Re-Use
A pragmatic case for composable institutions may be made from the point of view of
the author responsible for deﬁning the normative aspects of the society. By isolating
descriptions of particular aspects of society as single institutions it becomes possible
to verify that particular desirable properties hold in those institutions independently of
how they are composed in a particular agent society. These institution speciﬁcations
may then be re-used in other societies and will retain those desirable properties.
The above example is simple, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that the loan con-
tract could have speciﬁed its own enforcement mechanism, however in a larger exam-
ple with more complex contracts and enforcement procedures, the necessity to deﬁne
a mechanism for enforcement for each possible case of violation in the contract will
quickly become unwieldy.
4.3 Formalising Institutional Composition
In the above example, the rules which describe how the loan contract and enforcement
institution are composed correspond to conventional generation rules in single insti-
tutions, with the reﬁnement that the events which are generated are exogenous events
124in the composed institutions, and the events which bring about these events are insti-
tutional events in these institutions. Additionally whereas event generation in single
institutions may only be conditional upon the state within that institution, event gener-
ation between institutionsmay depend on the state of any of the composed institutions.
Given these similarities, we can account for event generation when institutions are
composed using a generation relation in the same way as we do for single institutions,
but mapping from the institutional events which are brought about by the composed
institutions to exogenous events of those institutions.
In the composition of institutions, we assume that events generated between institu-
tions are conditionalonly upon the states of theinstitutionswhich are being composed,
so we omit descriptions of institutional ﬂuents other than those already described by
the institutions which are being composed.
In the remainder of this chapter, we use the term multi-institution to refer to the com-
position of one or more institution speciﬁcations and the associated rules deﬁning this
composition.
4.3.1 Syntax of Multi-institutions
A multi-institution is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 18 A multi-institution M is deﬁned as a three-tuple:
M
def
≡  Insts,EM,GM 
Where Insts is a set of institution speciﬁcations of the form Insts = {I1,I2,...,In}
and each element of Insts is an institution speciﬁcation of the form Ik
def
≡
 E,F,C,G,∆ , EM is a set of events and GM is an event generation relation.
In the remainder of this chapter we use the subscript notation Ii to refer to a particular
institution in Insts, and the superscript notation Ei, Fi to refer to the events (and
respective subsets) and ﬂuents of institution Ii.
125We require that for each institutionin Insts the set of ﬂuents and the set of institutional
events (but not exogenous events) is pairwise-disjoint with every other institution in
Insts. This requirementcorresponds to our assumptionthat thestateof each institution
is distinct and deﬁned by that institution, and that institutional events represent an
interpretation, speciﬁc to that institution, of some exogenous event. We do not place
this restriction on exogenous events in order to reﬂect the fact that these events may be
derived from the environment, and that two distinct institutions may interpret the same
event in the environment (providing possibly conﬂicting interpretations of the same
event).
For convenience we deﬁne the following sets for a given multi-institution:
Deﬁnition 19 For a given multi-institution M we deﬁne the set E
M,∗
inst as containing
all institutional events of component institutions of M as follows:
E
M,∗
inst
def
≡
 
0≤i≤n
E
i
inst (D19.1)
Such that the institutional events of each institution are disjoint:
∀e ∈ E
i
inst    ∃ I
j ∈ Insts,j  = i   e ∈ E
i
inst (D19.2)
We deﬁne the set EM,∗
ex as containing all exogenous events of component institutions of
M in the same way:
E
M,∗
ex
def
≡
 
0≤i≤n
E
i
ex (D19.3)
We deﬁne the set FM,∗ as containing all institutional ﬂuents of component institutions
of M:
F
M,∗ def
≡
 
0≤i≤n
F
i (D19.4)
such that the sets of ﬂuents of each institution in M are disjoint
∀f ∈ F
i     ∃I
j ∈ Insts,j  = i   f ∈ F
j (D19.5)
We then deﬁne the set X M as the set of all expressions over these ﬂuents 2XM∪¬XM
.
126As with single institutions we make a distinction between events which may be gen-
erated by the semantics of the multi-institution, and those which are accounted for
externally.
For a multi-institution M a set of environment events is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 20 Fora given multi-institutionMwe deﬁnea setof exogenous eventsEM
env
such that:
E
M
env ⊆ E
M,∗
ex (D20.1)
For a given multi-institution M, we deﬁne the set of all events EM as follows:
E
M def
≡ E
M,∗
ex ∪ E
M,∗
inst (D20.2)
In a single institution, exogenous events are those events which are accounted for by
something which occurs outside of the scope of that institution. These events may
be implicitly associated with concrete deﬁnitions, such as timeouts, or the sending and
receivingof messageswitha particularsyntaxorthey maybe abstract, denotingthat an
event which is considered to fulﬁl certain criteria has occurred — where the deﬁnition
of these criteria lie outside of the scope of the institution.
In the case of multi-institutionswe assume that all external events are related to some-
thing which may occur or may be brought about in the environment. In a given speci-
ﬁcation the set EM
env is deﬁned as the set of all exogenous events in component institu-
tions which have a concrete interpretation in the environment.
Certain types of exogenous events in component institutions, such as the observation
of time-outs and real-world agent interactions, will always be derived from the envi-
ronment. For the remainder of the exogenous events in component institutions, the
multi-institution must specify how the occurrence of these events is accounted for, in
terms of events in the multi-institution.
In composed speciﬁcations, we apply a similar mechanism for event generation as we
do for single institutions. However, instead of specifying how institutional events are
generatedwithinaninstitution,weuseeventgenerationtodeﬁnerelationshipsbetween
events in different component institutions.
127In the previous chapter we made the assumption that distinct exogenous events in a
given institution may not occur at the same time. In the case when all events are
brought about by the environment, this assumption holds by default, however when
we consider the speciﬁcation of event generation between institutions, as we do in this
chapter, it is possible that this assumption will be incorrect. If it is the case that any
institutional events in any institution may be associated with the generation of any
exogenous events in another institution, then at a given time instant an event in the
environment may either be speciﬁed to generate multiple events in the same institution
directly, or may generate multipleevents indirectly as the result of events generated by
anotherinstitution. Whilethispossibilityis not inconsistentwith thegeneral semantics
of events and the change in status of ﬂuents in single institutions, it does lead to the
possibly of different behaviours arising from those of single exogenous events.
We deﬁne an event generation relation GM for a multi-institution M that speciﬁes a
generation relation as a mapping from a given event to a set of events conditional on
some expression.
Deﬁnition 21 For a multi-institution M an event generation relation GM is deﬁned,
such that:
GM : X
M × (E
M,∗
inst ∪ E
M
env) → 2
E
M,∗
ex
This relation differs from the event generation function in a single institution as it
allows event generations to be deﬁned from an exogenous event in the multi-institution
M or a generated (institutional event) event in a composed institution to an exogenous
event of a composed institution in M.
In order to maintain the property of a single exogenous event occurring at a given
time in any given institution, we place a restriction on the deﬁnition of the generation
relation in multiple institutions as follows.
We ﬁrst deﬁne a function PRM : 2EM → 2EM which describes when one event in M
may be considered to directly generate another, such that the pair e′ is in PRM(e) if it
is possible that event e generates e′ in M:
128Deﬁnition 22 For a given multi-institutionM, the function PRM is deﬁned such that:
PRM(E)
def
≡ {e
′ ∈ EM, |
∃ φ ∈ X
M,e ∈ E   e
′ ∈ GM(φ,e) or
(D22.1)
∃ Ii ∈ Insts,e ∈ E,φ ∈ Xi   e
′ ∈ Gi(φ,e) or
(D22.2)
∃ Ii ∈ Insts,e ∈ E,e
′′ ∈ Ei   obl(e
′′,e,e
′) ∈ F
i} (D22.3)
In the construction of this function we assume in D22.1 and D22.2 that all cases of
event generation described by relation GM in M and by relation Gi in an institution
in M are possible. Likewise we assume that for every obligation deﬁned in the set of
ﬂuents Fi of institution Ii that it is possible that the obligation may be violated and
that the deadline condition might be generated as a result.
For a given event e ∈ EM the set of all events which may be generated in given
transition of M may be derived as the transitive closure ({e},PRM)∗ of {e} over
PRM. We use this property to deﬁne the following constraint on the contents of the
relation GM:
Deﬁnition 23 A generation relation GM is valid w.r.t the speciﬁcation of M iff it is
not possible for two distinct exogenous events in a given institution to be generated at
the same time.
∀ Ii ∈ Insts, {e,e
′} ⊂ E
i
ex   e
′  ∈ ({e},PRM)
∗
We note the fact that this restriction on the generation of events may also remove
the possibility of some generation relationships which do not lead to the concurrent
generation of two events in the same institution (where for instance, the conditions
of two rules are logically opposite, or the set of states in which they are applicable is
disjoint). We could have included these cases by deﬁning this restriction directly as
a constraint on the model semantics, such that an exceptional case was raised only in
those cases where concurrent event generations do occur, we elect not to do this as it
adds a degree of complication to the interpretation of models of the multi-institution
which we feel is unnecessary. A second alternative we could have chosen is to deﬁne
129the property completely as a speciﬁcation constraint, again we choose not to do this
as the enforcement of this constraint entails that an implementation would necessarily
have to verify the disjunction of all possible generation rules in all reachable states,
an operation which as a validation step for the correctness of the syntax speciﬁcations
seems undesirable.
As we have said, the omissionof concurrency in inter-institutiongeneration is a design
decision, which simpliﬁes the speciﬁcations of individual institutions. We could have
taken the opposite view, and permitted concurrency and we discuss this possibilityand
its implications further in Section 4.4.
As with single institutions the semantics of a multi-institution are deﬁned over a set of
states:
Deﬁnition 24 For a given multi-institution M including composed institutions
InstsM = {I0 ...In} a state SM of M is deﬁned as a set {S0 ...Sn} such that
Sk,0 ≤ k ≤ n is a state of institution Ik.
The set of all states ΣM of M is deﬁned as:
ΣM
def
≡ Σ0 ×     × Σn
such that Σk,0 ≤ k ≤ n contains all states of institution Ik.
Each state of M is a set of the states, consisting of one state for each of the composed
institutions. The set of all states ΣM of multi-institution M is hence deﬁned as the
power set of all possible states of all component institutions.
4.3.2 Semantics
We now go on to deﬁne the semantics of multi-institutions,as above, re-using much of
the terminology deﬁned in Chapter 3.
Generation rules within a multi-institution may be conditional on the states of the
institutions from which the multi-institution is composed; in order to account for this
130we reﬁne the deﬁnition of the binary operator ΣM |= XM for states and expressions in
multi-institutions as follows:
Deﬁnition 25 For a given multi-institution state SM ∈ ΣM and a given expression
φM ∈ XM we deﬁne the operator SM |= φM as follows:
SM |= φM ⇐

    
    
φM = {} (D25.1)
φM = {p},∃ Ik ∈ Insts   p ∈ F
k,p ∈ Sk (D25.2)
φ = {¬p},∃ Ik ∈ Insts   p ∈ F
k,p  ∈ Sk (D25.3)
∀p ∈ φ   SM |= {p} (D25.4)
We now deﬁne conventional generation for events deﬁned between component institu-
tions and the environment in a multi-institution.
Deﬁnition 26 For a given multi-institution we deﬁne an event generation function
GM : 2EM → 2EM for a given state SM ∈ ΣM and a given set of events E ⊂ EM as
follows:
GM(SM,E) =
{e ∈ EM |e ∈ E or (D26.1)
∃ e
′ ∈ E,φM ∈ XM   e ∈ GM(φM,e
′),SM |= φM or (D26.2)
∃ Ik ∈ Insts,Sk ∈ SM,e
′ ∈ E
k
ex   e ∈ OC(Sk,e
′) (D26.3)
}
and a corresponding event occurrence function for a given environment event eM
ex ∈
EM
env
OM(SM,e
M
ex)
def
≡ GM
ω(SM,{e
M
ex}). (D26.4)
Such that, for a set of events E all events which are generated directly by the oc-
currence of E in a given state SM are deﬁned by GM(SM,E). Where an event is
considered to be generated when it is in the set of generated events of a component
institution of M in state SM.
For a given environment event eM
ex in EM
env and multi-institution SM ∈ ΣM, the set
of all occurred events, including those which are generated by component institutions
131in a multi institution, is the deﬁned by the function OM(SM,exM
ex) as the ﬁxpoint of
GM(SM,E) applied to E.
We now use this event generation function to deﬁne a transition function TM(S,eex)
for multi-institutions in terms of the transition function for single institutions as fol-
lows:
Deﬁnition 27 For a multi-institution M, a state SM ∈ ΣM such that
SM =  S1,...Sn  and an exogenous event eex ∈ EM
env the function TM(SM,eex) is
deﬁned as follows:
TM(SM,eex)
def
≡ {S
′
0,...,S
′
n}
such that for each single institution state S′
k : 0 ≤ k ≤ n
S
′
k = {f ∈ F
∗,k|∃ e ∈ E
k
ex   e ∈ OM(SM,eex) , e ∈ E
k
ex , f ∈ TR(Sk,e)}
This function takes a multi-institution state, and an exogenous event and determines a
new state for each institution in the multi-institutionbased on those events which were
generated in the multi-institution using the TR function deﬁned for that institution.
Ordered traces of multi-institutions have the same form as those of single institutions
(Section 3.5.3, page 111), consisting of a sequence of exogenous events. Models of
these traces are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 28 A model of an ordered trace T M
n is deﬁned as a tuple MODEL(T M
n ) =
 MS,ME  such that MS is a sequence of multi-institution states: MS =
 SM
0 ,...,SM
n  ,SM
i ∈ ΣM and ME is a sequence of events ME =  E0,...,En−1 ,
Ei ⊆ EM.
The model MODEL(T M
n ) is computed over events in T M
n =  e0,...,en−1  as follows:
MODEL(T
M
n )i
def
≡

  
  
S
M
i = {∅,...,∅} i = 0 (D28.1)
S
M
i = TM(S
M
i−1,ei−1) 0 < i ≤ n (D28.2)
Ei = GM(S
M
i ,ei) 0 ≤ i < n (D28.3)
The interpretation of an ordered trace of a multi-institution corresponds to that of the
132single institution, however the sequence of states in the model consists of sets of sub-
states of the component institutions and the sequence of events consists of sets of
events in each of those institutions.
4.3.3 Formalising the Contract Enforcement Example
We now return to the loan enforcement example discussed informally in Section 4.2.1,
we ﬁrst formalise this as a multi-institutionspeciﬁcation and then show how this spec-
iﬁcation may be analysed as an answer set program.
In thefollowingformalisationswe assumethat thenamed sets (i.e. Agents, Enforcers,
Sanctions) are deﬁned elsewhere as containing unique identiﬁers (such as agent iden-
tiﬁers) for their respective domains. We use predicate notation in the naming of events
and ﬂuents to indicate that each ﬂuent, and rule in which it used, is applicable to all
valuations over the respective domains of its arguments.
We give the formalisation of the loan contract (shown in Figure 4.4), in this contract
we identify four events that may be related to the interpretation of loan contracts as
exogenous events (Eln
ex ) in the formalisation (4.4.4): the creation of a loan contract
(borcreate), the event of a given agent a borrowing money from another agent b:
(borrowed(a,b)), the event of an agent being reimbursed (payedback(a,b)) and the
expiration of a timeout (loanexpired) before which the loan must have been re paid. It
should be noted that while we give English names to these events such as “borrowed”
with which we associate meaning, such connotations are meaningless as far as the
speciﬁcation is concerned, and these events should be treated as conditions which are
necessary, but not necessarily sufﬁcient to account for a given institutional interpreta-
tion. In order to account for the institutional interpretation of loans, we identify three
corresponding institutional events in (Eln
act) (4.4.5): the event of a loan being created
(newloan(a,b)), the event of the loan being resolved (resolved(a,b)) and the event of
the loan being defaulted on by a given agent (defaulted(a)). Violation events, corre-
sponding to the performance of these events when they are not permitted are deﬁned
by the set Eln
viol in 4.4.6.
We account for the presence of a loan between two parties a and b through the deﬁni-
tion of single domain ﬂuent loan(a,b) in 4.4.9 and deﬁne the sets of ﬂuents relating to
the empowerment (in the case of institutional actions) and permission (in the case of
133Given a set of agents Agents such that a and b are distict agents : {a,b} ⊂ Agents, the
loan institution Iln =  E,F,C,G,∆  is formalised as follows:
E
ln
ex = {borcreate,borrowed(a,b),payedback(a,b),loanexpired} (4.4.4)
E
ln
act = {newloan(a,b),resolved(a,b),defaulted(a)} (4.4.5)
E
ln
viol = {viol(e),e ∈ (E
ln
ex ∪ E
ln
act)} (4.4.6)
E
ln
+ = {borcreate} (4.4.7)
E
ln
× = {resolved(a,b)} (4.4.8)
Dln = {loan(a,b)} (4.4.9)
Wln = {pow(e),e ∈ E
ln
act} (4.4.10)
Pln = {perm(e),e ∈ E
ln
ex ∪ E
ln
act} (4.4.11)
Oln = {obl(resolved(a,b),loanexpired,defaulted(a))} (4.4.12)
∆ln = {pow(newloan(a,b))} ∪ Pln (4.4.13)
C
↑
ln(X,E) :
 ∅,newloan(a,b)  → {pow(resolved(a,b)),pow(defaulted(a)),
obl(resolved(a,b),loanexpired,defaulted(a))
loan(a,b)} (4.4.14)
Gln(X,EM) :
 ∅,borrowed(a,b)  → {newloan(a,b)} (4.4.15)
 ∅,payedback(a,b)  → {resolved(a,b)} (4.4.16)
(4.4.17)
Figure 4.4: Formal model of the loan institution
both exogenous and institutional actions) with the sets Pln 4.4.11 and Wln 4.4.10.
Within the contract we deﬁne a single possible obligation
obl(resolved(a,b),loanexpired,defaulted(a))
in theset Oln 4.4.12 which, when inforce, states thatiftheloanvalueisnot reimbursed
before the speciﬁed deadline expires, then the debtor (a) is considered to be in default.
The initial state of a loan 4.4.13 corresponds to the empowerment of any pair of agents
to bring about loans. The rules of the contract are formalised in (4.4.14 - 4.4.16) and
are summarised as follows:
134• The creation of a loan 4.4.14 initiates the power for that loan to be resolved and
defaulted (i.e. a loan may never be resolved or in default if it was never created).
The rule also creates an obligation for the loan to have been resolved before the
loan expires (lest the loan be considered in default). Finally, the rule records the
fact that the loan is in force through the ﬂuent loan(a,b).
• The event of one agent borrowing money from another agent counts as a loan
4.4.15
• The event of one agent repaying money to another agent counts as the resolution
of a loan.
In the above formalisation of loans we do not specify the amount of the loan, simply
that some event brings it into being, that there is some external event which may occur
causing the loan to expire, and that some event may be brought about to repay the loan.
The formalisation of the enforcement institution (Ienf, shown in Figure 4.5) is as fol-
lows.
We deﬁne four exogenous events in 4.5.18. These account for:
illegalact(a,s): The occurrence of someillegalact . This eventincludes an associated
sanction s and the violating agent a.
applysanction(ea,a,s): The imposition of sanction s on agent a by enforcer ea.
enftimeout(a,s): The expiry of the deadline before which a sanction on a givenagent
must be brought about .
enfcreate: The creation of the enforcement institution .
We deﬁne a single institutional action sanctioned(a,s) which records that a given
agent has been appropriately sanctioned (after their performance of some illegal act).
We specify one violation event explicitly (badgov) for accounting for violations of the
governance rules by enforcers, as well as related violations of non-permitted actions
4.5.20.
The set of ﬂuents in the enforcement institution include the institutional capability
(empowerment) for an agent to be sanctioned 4.5.24 and relevant permissions, as well
as a single type of obligation obl(sanctioned(a,s),enftimeout(a,s),badgov) repre-
senting the necessity for a given agent a be sanctioned (sanctioned(a,s)) before the
prescribed timeout (enftimeout(a,s)), lest a case of bad governance (badgov) be gen-
135Given a set of sanctions Sanctions, a set of agents Agents and a set of enforcers
Enforcers such that Enforcers ⊂ Agents and a ∈ Agents, ea ∈ Enforcers, s ∈
Sanctions the enforcement institution Ienf =  E,F,C,G,∆  is deﬁned as follows:
E
enf
ex = {illegalact(a,s),enftimeout(a,s),
applysanction(ea,a,s),enfcreate} (4.5.18)
E
enf
act = {sanctioned(a,s)} (4.5.19)
E
enf
viol = {badgov} ∪ {viol(e)|e ∈ E
enf
ex ∪ E
enf
act } (4.5.20)
E
enf
+ = {enfcreate} (4.5.21)
E
enf
× = ∅ (4.5.22)
D
enf = ∅ (4.5.23)
W
enf = {pow(sanctioned(a,s))} (4.5.24)
P
enf = {perm(e),e ∈ E
enf
ex ∪ E
enf
act } (4.5.25)
O
enf = {obl(sanctioned(a,s),enftimeout(a,s),badgov)} (4.5.26)
∆
enf = {perm(sanctioned(a,s)),
perm(illegalact(a,s)),perm(enftimeout(a,s))} (4.5.27)
C
↑
enf(X,E) :
 ∅,sanctioned(a,s)  → {pow(sanctioned(a,s)),
perm(applysanction(ea,a,s)), (4.5.28)
obl(sanctioned(a,s),enftimeout(a,s),badgov)}
C
↓
enf(X,E) :
 ∅,applysanction(ea,a,s)  → {pow(sanctioned(a,s)),
perm(applysanction(ea,a,s))} (4.5.29)
 ∅,enftimeout(a,s)  → {pow(sanctioned(a,s)),
perm(applysanction(ea,a,s)), (4.5.30)
obl(sanctioned(a,s),enftimeout(a,s),badgov)}
Genf(X,EM) :
 ∅,applysanction(ea,a,s)  → {sanctioned(a,s)} (4.5.31)
Figure 4.5: Formalisation of the enforcement institution
136erated. The initial state (∆enf) of the enforcement institution indicates that by default
4.5.27, all actions except applying a sanction are permitted.
The rules of the institution are formalised as follows:
• The occurrence of an illegal act by a given agent a with associated sanction s
initiates the power for the enforcement institutionto bring about the event of that
sanction being imposed on the agent. This this also initiates the permission to
perform actions which count-as sanctions (perm(applysanction(ea,a,s))), and
the obligation for a sanction to be imposed before a given timeout occurs 4.5.27.
• The imposition of a sanction on an agent terminates the power to impose further
sanctions on that agent as well as the permission to perform actions which count
as sanctions 4.5.29.
• The occurrence of an enforcement timeout enftimeout(a,s) (where an enforcer
has failed to enforce a sanction before a given timeout) terminates the power for
the violating agent to be further sanctioned and the permission for an enforcer to
impose such a sanction 4.5.30.
• Any action which counts as the imposition of sanction s on agent a
(applysanction(ea,a,s)) generates the event that this sanction has been
imposed (sanctioned(a,s)) according to the institution, assuming that this
event is empowered 4.5.31
It should be noted that the obligation to bring about an event (sanctioned(a,s)) which
countsasthesanctioningofagivenagent(obl(sanctioned(a,s),enftimeout(a,s),badgov))
is not directed toward a particular enforcing agent, it simply states that this must be
achieved in order to avoid a violation of the governance of the institution. As the
performance of applysanction(ea,a,s) by any enforcer generates a sanctioned(a,s)
event, any enforcer may sanction the agent.
It should also be noted that assertions of the form perm(illegalact(a,s)) — “It is
permittedfor an eventwhich counts as an illegalact to occur” whilecounterintuitiveat
ﬁrst glance, represent the subjective view of the institution towards that act, rather than
the objective societal view. The institution does not regulate which acts are illegal, so
the occurrence of an event corresponding to one of these acts is not in itself a violation
of the enforcement institution, simply an external event which may entail some effect
within that institution (in this case obligating all enforcers to bring it about that a
sanction is applied on the violating agent).
137Given a set of agents Agents, and a set of sanctions Sanctions such that a,b ∈
Agents,a  = b and ﬁne,s ∈ Sanctions the multi-institution M eln =  Insts,EM,GM 
is deﬁned as follows:
Insts
eln = {I
ln,I
enf} (D4.32)
E
eln
env = {enftimeout(a,s),loanexpired,enfcreate,borcreate,
applysanction(ea,a,s),borrowed(a,b),
payedback(a,b)} (D4.33)
E
eln = Eenv ∪ {illegalact(a,s),defaulted(a),newloan(a,b),
resolved(a,b),sanctioned(a,s),badgov} (D4.34)
Geln(X,E) :
 ∅,defaulted(a)  → {illegalact(a,ﬁne)} (D4.35)
 {loan(a,b)},sanctioned(a,s)  → {payedback(a,b)} (D4.36)
Figure 4.5: Formal model of the composed loan and enforcement institution
We now go on to formalise the multi-institution Meln deﬁned by the composition of
these two institutions (show in Figure 4.5).
The set Insts
eln deﬁnes which institutions are being composed. This includes both the
original contract institution I ln and the enforcement institution I enf D4.32.
The events which may be derived directly from observations in the environment
(Eeln
env),D4.33 are taken as a subset of the exogenous events deﬁned in each of the
component institutions as follows: timeouts, relating to the expiration of loans
(loanexpired) and the enforcement deadline for sanctions (enftimeout(a,s)); events
accounting for the creation of both loan and contract institutions (borcreate)
and (enfcreate); and ﬁnally events relating to the application of sanctions
applysanction(ea,a,s), borrowing, and reimbursement of money borrowed(a,b)
payedback(a,b). The remainder of the exogenous events in the component
institutions are deﬁned as possible events in the multi-institution in D4.34.
We now deﬁne the relationship between loan contracts and the enforcement institution
as follows:
1. The fact that an occurrence of an agent a defaulting on a loan (defaulted(a)) is
considered to be an illegal act in the society (and hence subject to sanction) with
138an associated sanction of the application of a ﬁne (ﬁne) and is accounted for by
the rule D4.35.
2. When an agent a is party to a loan (loan(a,b)) then the implementation of a ﬁne
as a sanction on agent by some enforcer counts as a necessary condition for the
reimbursement of the loan D4.36.
The second rule represents a somewhat simpliﬁed version of the state of affairs we
might expect to see in a realistic example, as we assume that all ﬁnes are equal and
that any ﬁne is sufﬁcient to constitute the reimbursement of loans. In the case where
the value of loans is recorded in the borrowing institution (as an institution ﬂuent), we
could have qualiﬁed this relationship further to state that only ﬁnes which were greater
or equal to the value of the loan constituted a reimbursement of the loan.
4.4 Discussion
As we stated in Section 4.3.1, we could have deﬁned the syntax of multi-institutions
to mirror those of single institutions, allowing us to deﬁne higher-order compositions
(multi-multi-institution and so on...), while this kind of structure may be appealing it
is not necessary in practice as hierarchies of this sort may be ﬂattened into a single
multi-institution.
The analysis of the composition of speciﬁcations of concurrent software systems
has been studied extensively in the software engineering literature (see for instance,
[Pnu86, AL89, AP91, PJ91, AL95, AH99, HMP01]). In these cases, assume-
guarantee reasoning is typically used. In this process the speciﬁcation of a component
of the system is extracted, and then tested under certain assumptions about the
behaviour of the larger speciﬁcation. In the case where violations of a property are
found in the component of the speciﬁcation their soundness in the context of the
whole speciﬁcation is then checked.
A similarparadigmmay beappliedto multi-institutionreasoning. In thiscase, ourgoal
is, given a multi-institution containing a number of component institutions, to select a
subset of these institutions which may demonstrate the property we wish to check and
to verify that this property holds under an open assumption about the behaviour of the
remainder of the institutions in the multi-institution. We then take any cases where the
139property that we wish to verify does not hold in the subset of institutions, and show
that these cases are not possible in the broader multi-institution, in order to verify the
property over the system as a whole.
In Section 4.3.1 we rejected the idea of concurrent event generation for exogenous
events within single institutions in favour of enforcing at most one exogenous event
per time step, per institution. While we could have adopted either stance, the introduc-
tion of multiple causal events (as opposed to generated events) in a single institution
poses a number of problems, the ﬁrst of which relates to the increased complexity of
checking properties of such systems. In our current model the length of possible traces
is bounded by the number of possible events which may occur at a given time point
raised to the power of the number of time instants, with the observed complexity in
answer set programs in most cases being much lower than this (due to constraints on
which events may occur). In the case where we introduce a non-deterministic set of
causal events at a given time step the number traces for given unit length is raised by
another order of magnitude. A more compelling argument against concurrent event
generation is that in our case at least, permitting it extends the possible interpretations
of single institution.
140Chapter 5
Modelling Institutions Using Answer
Set Programs
5.1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters, we formalised a model for specifying both single insti-
tutions and how these institutions may be related and composed into larger speciﬁca-
tions. The model we chose expresses institutionsin terms of the events that they deﬁne
(institutional events), the external events that have some signiﬁcance to the institution
(exogenous events), the relationship between these two classes of event (event gener-
ation) and the effects of these events on the institutional state (causal effects). As we
have stated, our objective is to reason about (for the purposes of veriﬁcation) and with
(for integration into multi-agent systems) these speciﬁcations.
In order to achieve this goal, we deﬁne a mapping from the formal deﬁnition of either a
singleinstitutionI =  E,F,C,G,∆ oramulti-institutionM =  Insts,EM,GM  into
answer set programs such that the answer set programs described by this translation
model the semantics of the institution or multi-institution in question. By expressing
veriﬁcation problems as queries over these programs, it becomes possibleto determine
the presence or absence of desirable properties of the original institution speciﬁcation,
through the presence or absence of answer sets to queries over the institutional pro-
gram.
141In ourmodel forspecifyingsingleinstitutionsdescribed in Chapter3, we expressedthe
semantics of an institutionin terms of a set of states which change followingthe occur-
rence of a sequence exogenous events, which we called an ordered trace(Section 3.5.3
page 111). Each ordered trace corresponds to a single possible model for the interpre-
tation of the institution. We model these semantics for an institution using an answer
set program (which we refer to as the base program)such that for a given ordered trace
a single answer set which corresponds to the model of that trace is obtained. As well
as single traces we also wish to reason about sets of traces, in this case we deﬁne an
associated program called a trace program (discussed further in Section 5.3.1) which
when combined with the base program for the institution produces all possible models
of the institution for a given time interval as answer sets. Given that we now have a
program that describes all models, we add a third component called a query program
(discussed further in Section 5.4) which constrains the answer sets of the combined
trace and base programs to only those representing models of the institution which are
consistent with the query.
5.2 Translation into Answer Set Programs
In the following section, we deﬁne the fundamental components we use for represent-
ing an institutional speciﬁcation as an answer set program. In order to do this we
deﬁne a set of rules which when combined form the base program Π
base(n)
I for a given
institution I.
Each base program models the semantics of the institution over a sequence of time
instants of length n such that ti : 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Time instants represent snapshots
of the world such that each time instant corresponds to a single possible state of the
institution at a given time. Events are considered to occur between these snapshots, for
simplicity we do not deﬁne the intervals at which events occur explicitly, and instead
refer to the time instant at the start of the interval at which an event is considered to
occur. An event occurrence or consequence at time ti should be considered to occur
in the real world after time instant ti and before ti+1.
1425.2.1 Fluents
Weexpressﬂuents inouranswerset programsas termssuchthat foreach ﬂuent f ∈ F,
the ASP constant f represents the ﬂuent f in the translated program. Fluents may be
true or false at any instant of time, we use atoms the form holdsat(f,ti) to indicate
that ﬂuent f holds at time instant ti.
In order to represent changes in the state of ﬂuents over time, we use atoms of the form
initiated(f,ti) and terminated(f,ti) to denote the fact that ﬂuent f was initiated
or terminated respectively between time instants i and i + 1.
We now add rules to the program Π
base(n)
I that account for the common-sense inertia of
ﬂuent. For each ﬂuent f ∈ F and each time point ti : 0 ≤ i < n the program Π
base(n)
I
contains the following rules to model the inertia of ﬂuents:
holdsat(f,ti+1) ← initiated(f,ti). (D5.1)
holdsat(f,ti+1) ← holdsat(f,ti),not terminated(f,ti). (D5.2)
By D5.1 ﬂuent f holds at time instant ti+1 if it was initiated between time instants ti
and ti+1. By D5.2 ﬂuent f holds at time instant ti+1 if it holds at time instant ti and it
was not terminated between ti and ti+1. Together these two rules ensure that ﬂuents
will only hold at a given point in time if they have previously been initiated and have
not been terminated at an intervening point in time.
5.2.2 Expressions
In order to translate rules in the relations G and C of the institution we must ﬁrst deﬁne
a translation for expressions that may appear in these rules.
The valuation of a given expression taken from the set X depends on which ﬂuents
may be held to be true or false in the current state (at a give time instant). We translate
expressions into the bodies of ASP rules, as conjunctions of extended literals using
negation as failure for negated expressions.
For a given expression φ ∈ X, used at in a given time instant ti we use the term
143EX(φ,ti) to denote the translation of φ into a set of ASP atoms as follows:
EX(x1 ∧ x2 ∧ ...xn,ti)
def
≡ EX(x1,ti),EX(x2,ti),...EX(xn,ti) (D5.3)
EX(¬f,ti)
def
≡ not EX(f,ti) (D5.4)
EX(f,ti)
def
≡ holdsat(f,ti) (D5.5)
For example, the expression {a,b,¬c} used at time instant ti would be translated into
a sequence of extended literals in ASP of the form
holdsat(a,ti),holdsat(b,ti),not holdsat(c,ti).
5.2.3 Events
Each event in a speciﬁcation e ∈ E is represented using a corresponding term e in the
ASP translation, this term is applied to a number of atoms which indicate the type of
event and its occurence in a model. Each event in the model is assumed to be unique,
however in our syntax we allowed the syntax of events to include parameters. Where
an event has parameters (such as those referring to particular agents), the event is
represented using a function symbol e(...) with parameters (constants) corresponding
to the parameters of the original event.
For each event we deﬁne a rule corresponding to the deﬁnition of that event:
event(e). (D5.6)
For each event e ∈ E we deﬁne domain facts of the form: evtype(e,t). where t
denotes to which set(s) of events e belongs such that:
e ∈ Eex → evtype(e,ex) (D5.7)
e ∈ E+ → evtype(e,cr) (D5.8)
e ∈ Eact → evtype(e,act) (D5.9)
e ∈ Eviol → evtype(e,viol) (D5.10)
e ∈ E× → evtype(e,di) (D5.11)
Note that for each creation and dissolutionevent two such rules will be deﬁned, stating
144that the event is both an exogenous event and a creation event in the case of creation
events or a dissolutionevent and an institutionalevent in the case of dissolutionevents.
We use atoms of the form occurred(e,ti) to indicate that event e ∈ E is considered
to have occurred between instant ti and ti+1. These atoms denote events which occur
in an external context or are generated by the institution. For exogenous events we
additionally use atoms of the form observed(e,ti) to denote the fact that e has been
observed.
We treat the occurrence of exogenous events differently depending on whether or not
they create the institution. For exogenous events which do not create the institution
eex ∈ Eex − E+, for each time point ti : 0 ≤ i < n we deﬁne a rule of the form:
occurred(eex,ti) ← observed(eex,ti),
holdsat(live,ti). (D5.12)
This states that the event may only be considered to have occurred if it is observed
and the institution is active (indicated by the presence of ﬂuent live in the state at ti).
Note that these rules are only deﬁned for time instants up to, but not including tn.
For each time instant ti : 0 ≤ i < n and for each creation event ecr ∈ E+ we deﬁne a
rule of the form:
occurred(ecr,ti) ← observed(ecr,ti). (D5.13)
Which statesthat creation eventsare considered to haveoccurred, ifthey are observed,
regardless of the status of the institution.
5.2.4 Event Generation
As we have said in Section 5.2.3 page 144, we use atoms of the form occurred(e,ti)
in our program to indicate that an event e occurs at instant ti. We also consider events
that are generated by institutions in this way and we translate the generation function
G as follows:
For each time instant ti : 0 ≤ i ≤ n and for each event and expression e1 ∈ E,φ ∈ X
such that e2 ∈ G(φ,e1) and e2 ∈ Eact we deﬁne a rule of the form:
145occurred(e2,ti) ← occurred(e1,ti),EX(φ,ti),
holdsat(pow(e2),ti). (D5.14)
Each generated event is said to have occurred at a given instant if the event which
causes it to be generated has occurred in that instant, the conditions for the generate
are satisﬁed in the preceding state are satisﬁed and the generated event is empowered
in the preceding state.
Generated violation events are not subject to the constraints of institutional power, and
so have a similar rule omitting the condition on the event being empowered, such that
for e2 ∈ G(φ,e1) and e2 ∈ Eviol:
occurred(e2,ti) ← occurred(e1,ti),EX(φ,ti). (D5.15)
As well as events generated explicitly by the G relation in the institution some events
may be generated implicitly through the occurrence of non-permitted actions or the
failure to fulﬁl obligations as follows.
For violation events due to non-permitted actions we deﬁne the following rules for
each instant ti : 0 ≤ i < n and for each event which is not itself a violation event, and
does not create, or destroy the institution: e ∈ (Eact − E×) ∪ (Eex − E+):
occurred(viol(e),ti) ← occurred(e,ti),
not holdsat(perm(e),ti). (D5.16)
which states that violationviol(e) occurs ife occurs at instanti and e isnot permitted
at that time.
For violation events due to unfulﬁlled obligationswe deﬁne the followingrule for each
instant ti : 0 ≤ i < n and for each obligation obl(e,d,v) ∈ O:
occurred(v,ti) ← holdsat(obl(e,d,v),ti),
occurred(d,ti). (D5.17)
which states that the event v occurs between time instant ti and ti+1 if the obligation
obl(e,d,v) holds in the state at ti and the event d occurs between time instants ti and
ti+1.
1465.2.5 Event Effects
Effects of events are represented as changes in value of one or more ﬂuents from one
state to the next. As we have said in Section 5.2.1 page 144, the state of a ﬂuent f at
time instant ti is represented in the program by atoms of the form holdsat(f,ti).
Changes in these ﬂuents are brought about by the assertion of atoms of the form
initiated(f,ti) and terminated(f,ti). The assertion of these atoms and subse-
quent changes in institutional state are brought about by rules which deﬁne the cre-
ation and dissolution of the institution, causal rules described in the relation C and
rules deﬁning the termination of satisﬁed or violated obligations.
For each ﬂuent in f ∈ ∆∪live, each creation event ecr ∈ E+ and each instant ti : 0 ≤
i < n we deﬁne a rule in the program of the form:
initiated(f,ti) ← occurred(ecr,ti),not holdsat(live,ti),(D5.18)
not dissolved(inst,ti).
Which states that if a creation event occurs when institution is not active and the
institution is not dissolved at time instant ti then each ﬂuent in the initial state of the
institution is initiated.
For each time instant ti : 0 ≤ i ≤ n and for each event and expression e ∈ E,φ ∈ X
such that f ∈ C↑(φ,e) and for all dissolution events {ed1..dmax} = E× we deﬁne rules
of the form:
initiated(f,ti) ← occurred(e,ti),EX(x,i), (D5.19)
not dissolved(inst,ti)
Which states that ﬂuent f is initiated at time i if an event which causally initiates f
occurs in a state matching the conditions for that initiation, and no dissolution event
is generated. The last condition ensures that when the institution is dissolved, no
institutional ﬂuents are initiated by events generated in parallel with the dissolution
event (see D5.24 below).
For each time instant ti : 0 ≤ i < n and for each event and expression e ∈ E,φ ∈ X
such that f ∈ C↓(φ,e) we deﬁne rules of the form:
terminated(f,ti) ← occurred(e,ti),EX(x,I). (D5.20)
147Which state that ﬂuent f is terminated at time ti if an event which causally terminates
that ﬂuent occurs.
We must also consider obligations, which are terminated by either their satisfaction, or
violation. For each instant ti : 0 ≤ i < n and for each obligation obl(e,d,v) ∈ O we
deﬁne the rules:
terminated(obl(e,d,v),ti) ← occurred(e,ti). (D5.21)
terminated(obl(e,d,v),ti) ← occurred(d,ti). (D5.22)
We then consider the dissolution of the institution: For each instant 0 ≤ i < n and for
each ﬂuent f ∈ F∗ we deﬁne a rule of the form:
terminated(f,ti) ← dissolved(inst,ti). (D5.23)
and for each dissolution event e ∈ E× we deﬁne a rule of the form:
dissolved(inst,ti) ← occurred(e,ti). (D5.24)
These two rules ensure that upon the occurrence of a dissolution event, all ﬂuents
in the institution are terminated. We use the literal dissolved(inst,ti) to denote
any case where the institution is terminating, the term inst in this literal refers to the
unique name of the institution, we add this term to permit these translations to be used
in the context of multi-institutions which we discuss in Section 5.6.
5.2.6 Summary of Translation
For a given institution speciﬁcation I =  E,F,C,G,∆ , we use the translation de-
scribed above (summarised in Figure 5.1) to deﬁne an answer set program Π
base(n)
I as
the translation of the institution.
It shouldbenotedthatthetranslationdescribed aboveisdeﬁned foraparticular, known
number of instants and all rules are expanded over those instants, in many cases we
wish to reason with the same institution, but over different interval ranges. Rather than
translating the program repeatedly for each duration, we can use variables in ASP to
148For each event in the set of institution events E:
e ∈ E event(e). D5.6
e ∈ Eex evtype(e,ex) D5.7
e ∈ E+ evtype(e,cr) D5.8
e ∈ Eact evtype(e,act) D5.9
e ∈ Eviol evtype(e,viol) D5.10
e ∈ E× evtype(e,di) D5.11
For all time instants 0 ≤ i < n:
f ∈ F∗ holdsat(f,ti+1) ← initiated(f,ti). D5.1
f ∈ F∗ holdsat(f,ti+1) ← holdsat(f,ti),not terminated(f,ti). D5.2
eex ∈ Eex − E+ occurred(eex,ti) ← observed(eex,ti),holdsat(live,ti). D5.12
ecr ∈ E+ occurred(ecr,ti) ← observed(ecr,ti). D5.13
e1 ∈ E,φ ∈ X,e2 ∈ G(φ,e1),e2 ∈ Eact occurred(e2,ti) ← occurred(e1,ti),EX(φ,ti),
holdsat(pow(e2),ti). D5.14
e1 ∈ E,φ ∈ X,e2 ∈ G(φ,e1),e2 ∈ Eviol occurred(e2,ti) ← occurred(e1,ti),EX(φ,ti). D5.15
e ∈ (Eact − E×) ∪ (Eex − E+) occurred(viol(e),ti)← occurred(e,ti),not holdsat(perm(e),ti). D5.16
obl(e,d,v) ∈ O occurred(v,ti) ← holdsat(obl(e,d,v),ti),occurred(d,ti). D5.17
f ∈ ∆ ∪ live,ecr ∈ E+ initiated(f,ti) ← occurred(ecr,ti),not holdsat(live,ti).
not dissolved(inst,ti). D5.18
e ∈ E,φ ∈ X,f ∈ C↑(φ,e) initiated(f,ti) ← occurred(e,ti),EX(x,ti),
not dissolved(inst,ti). D5.19
e ∈ E,φ ∈ X,f ∈ C↓(φ,e) terminated(f,ti) ← occurred(e,ti),EX(x,ti). D5.20
obl(e,d,v) ∈ O terminated(obl(e,d,v),ti)← occurred(e,ti). D5.21
obl(e,d,v) ∈ O terminated(obl(e,d,v),ti)← occurred(d,ti). D5.22
f ∈ F∗ terminated(f,ti) ← dissolved(inst,ti). D5.23
e ∈ E× dissolved(inst,ti) ← occurred(e,ti). D5.24
Figure 5.1: Summary of translation of institution I =  E,F,C,G,∆  into program Π
base(n)
I
1
4
9quantify rules over time. We do this by deﬁning a program Π
base(T)
I which may be
used for any number of time instants as follows:
In all rules D5.2–D5.23, instead of using the instant terms ti, we use a variable T
and append the conditions instant(T) to the body of the translated rule. In rules
D5.2 and D5.1 we replace the term ti+1 with a variable TN, and append the condi-
tion next(T,TN) to the body of the translated rule, yielding an unground program.
Figure 5.2.6 shows the unground versions of all of the rules deﬁned by the translation.
In order to ground the program Π
base(T)
I we then deﬁne a separate program Πtime(n) as
follows:
For each time instant ti : 0 ≤ i ≤ n we deﬁne a rule:
instant(ti). (D5.25)
denoting each ground instant of time. To account for ordering of these time instants,
for each time instant ti : 0 ≤ i < n we deﬁne a rule:
next(ti,ti+1) (D5.26)
ﬁnally we deﬁne a rule:
final(tn) (D5.27)
which denotes the ﬁnal state. It should be noted that this rule is added to assist the def-
inition of query programs and is not used in the body of any of the translated unground
rules.
It should be clear that the program Π
base(T)
I ∪ Πtime(n) has the same semantics as the
correspondingprogram Π
base(n)
I , as groundingwill havetheeffect ofgroundingto each
applicable instant in I, producing a program equivalent in semantics to Π
base(n)
I .
5.3 Properties of Institutional Programs
In this section we investigate the properties of institution programs and prove among
otherthingstheirsoundnessandcompletenesswithrespecttotheformalmodeldeﬁned
150For each event in the set of institution events E:
e ∈ E event(e). D5.6
e ∈ Eex evtype(e,ex) D5.7
e ∈ E+ evtype(e,cr) D5.8
e ∈ Eact evtype(e,act) D5.9
e ∈ Eviol evtype(e,viol) D5.10
e ∈ E× evtype(e,di) D5.11
f ∈ F∗ holdsat(f,T1) ← initiated(f,T),instant(T),instant(T1),next(T,T1). D5.1
f ∈ F∗ holdsat(f,T1) ← holdsat(f,T),not terminated(f,T),
instant(T),instant(T1),next(T,T1). D5.2
eex ∈ Eex − E+ occurred(eex,T) ← observed(eex,T),holdsat(live,T),
instant(T),instant(T1),next(T,T1). D5.12
ecr ∈ E+ occurred(ecr,T) ← observed(ecr,T),instant(T). D5.13
e1 ∈ E,φ ∈ X,e2 ∈ G(φ,e1),e2 ∈ Eact occurred(e2,T) ← occurred(e1,T),EX(φ,T),
holdsat(pow(e2),T),instant(T). D5.14
e1 ∈ E,φ ∈ X,e2 ∈ G(φ,e1),e2 ∈ Eviol occurred(e2,T) ← occurred(e1,T),EX(φ,T),instant(T). D5.15
e ∈ (Eact − E×) ∪ (Eex − E+) occurred(viol(e),T)← occurred(e,T),not holdsat(perm(e),T),instant(T). D5.16
obl(e,d,v) ∈ O occurred(v,T) ← holdsat(obl(e,d,v),T),occurred(d,T),instant(T). D5.17
f ∈ ∆ ∪ live,ecr ∈ E+ initiated(f,T) ← occurred(ecr,T),not holdsat(live,T).
not dissolved(inst,T),instant(T). D5.18
e ∈ E,φ ∈ X,f ∈ C↑(φ,e) initiated(f,T) ← occurred(e,T),EX(x,T),
not dissolved(inst,T). D5.19
e ∈ E,φ ∈ X,f ∈ C↓(φ,e) terminated(f,T) ← occurred(e,T),EX(x,T),instant(T). D5.20
obl(e,d,v) ∈ O terminated(obl(e,d,v),T)← occurred(e,T),instant(T). D5.21
obl(e,d,v) ∈ O terminated(obl(e,d,v),T)← occurred(d,T),instant(T). D5.22
f ∈ F∗ terminated(f,T) ← dissolved(inst,T),instant(T). D5.23
e ∈ E× dissolved(inst,T) ← occurred(e,T),instant(T). D5.24
Figure 5.2: Summary of unground translation of institution I =  E,F,C,G,∆  into program Π
base(T)
I
1
5
1in Chapter 3.
5.3.1 Trace Programs
Π
base(n)
I in itself is doing very little; its single answer set contains only the event facts
provided in the program:
Theorem 2 Let Π
base(n)
I be the program obtained from translating institution I =
 E,F,C,G,∆  using the rules described in Figure 5.1 on page 149. This program has
exactly one answer set M with M = {event(e) | e ∈ E} ∪ {evtype(e,ex) | e ∈
Eex}∪{evtype(e,cr) | e ∈ E+}∪{evtype(e,act) | e ∈ Eact}∪{evtype(e,viol) |
e ∈ Eviol} ∪ {evtype(e,di) | e ∈ E×}
Proof: Thewell-foundedmodel[GRS88]forthisprogramisthesetM∪not BΠ
base(T)
I
.
This well-founded model is total; each atom has been assigned either true or false.
This implies M is the unique answer set for this program. 
To obtain more useful results, including transitions, we need to add information on
occurrences of exogenous events and to provide a time line for the institution. We do
this by deﬁning a trace program that provides one or more sequences of exogenous
events (corresponding to an ordered trace in the model) which are in turn interpreted
by the base program to give a model. We consider two types of trace program, those
accounting for single traces of events, and those accounting for all possible traces of
events up-to length n. The properties of these programs are discussed below.
Single Traces
Deﬁnition 29 A single trace program Π
one(n)
I of length n for an institution
I =  E,F,C,G,∆  is an ASP program consisting of the rules of the form:
observed(ei,ti) 0 ≤ i < n,ei ∈ Eex
such that exactly one rule is deﬁned for each time instant ti : 0 ≤ i < n.
152Theorem 3 Let I =  E,F,C,G,∆  be an institution and Π
one(n)
I be a single trace
program. Then, the answer set {observed(ej,j),instant(i),next(j,j + 1) | 0 ≤ i ≤
n,0 ≤ j < n} corresponds to the trace  e0,...,en−1 .
Proof: Follows immediately from the deﬁnition of traces 16 and the structure of
trace programs 29. 
Theorem 4 Let I =  E,F,C,G,∆  be an institution and let tr =  e0,...,en−1  be
an ordered trace for I. Then, there exists a single trace program Π
one(n)
I,tr containing
the facts observed(ei,i) with 0 ≤ i < n such that its answer set corresponds to tr.
Proof: Follows immediately from 29 and Theorem 3. 
We will use the notation Π
one(n)
I,tr to denote the single trace program that corresponds to
an ordered trace tr.
Ifwecombinethetraceinformationfromthesingletraceprogramwiththeinformation
for state transitions encoded in Π
base(n)
I we can obtain a model of an institution, as we
show in the next section. Before we do this, we demonstrate that the union of a single
program trace and Π
base(n)
I results in a stratiﬁed program.
Withinourprograms, foragiveninstantithereare threedistinctstrata, theﬁrst relating
to the ﬂuents that are true at that instant, the second relating to the events that occur
(and are generated) between i and i + 1 and the third relating to the effects of those
events.
Theorem 5 Given an institutional program Π
base(n)
I and a singular trace program
Π
one(n)
I , the program Π∗ = ground(Π
base(n)
I ∪ Π
one(n)
I ) can be stratiﬁed into 3n + 1
strata: π0,...π3n based on the time instants ti : 0 ≤ i ≤ n, such that each type of
153atom appearing in the head or body of a rule in Π∗ is stratiﬁed as follows:
initiated(f,ti) : π3i+2
terminated(f,ti) : π3i+2
holdsat(f,ti) : π3i
occurred(e,ti) : π3i+1
observed(e,ti) : πi
dissolved(inst,ti) : π3i+1
ifluent(f) : π0
event(e) : π0
evtype(e,{ex,cr,act,viol,di}) : π0
Proof: The translation EX(φ,ti) of any expression φ : f1,...,fm,¬fm+1,...¬fk
with respect to instant i, is stratiﬁed as follows:
holdsat(f1,ti) : π3i,...,holdsat(fm,ti) : π3i,
not holdsat(fm1,ti) : π3i,...not holdsat(fk,ti) : π3i
such that the expression EX(φ,i) is stratiﬁed at level π3i (taking into account that this
translation may include negated atoms).
All the facts in the program (instant(ti), next(ti,ti+1), final(tn), event(e) and
the evtype(e, )) are automatically satisﬁed by the absence of body elements.
Figure 5.3.1 shows that the stratiﬁcation conditions (Theorem 5 on page 153) are also
met for the remaining rules.
As can be seen in Figure 5.3.1 which shows the stratiﬁcation conditions for
all remaining rules in Π
base(n)
I n, all rules have acceptable stratiﬁcations ac-
cording to Theorem 5. To keep the ﬁgure readable, we have replaced
instant(ti) : π0,instant(ti+1) : π0,next(ti,ti+1) : π0 and instant(ti) : π0
with time : π0. 
154D5.1 holdsat(f,ti+1) : π3(i+1) ← initiated(f,ti) : π3i+2,time : π0.
D5.2 holdsat(f,ti+1) : π3(i+1) ← holdsat(f,ti) : π3i,not terminated(f,ti) : π3i+2,,time : π0.
D5.12 occurred(eex,ti) : π3i+1← observed(eex,ti) : π3i,holdsat(live,ti) : π3i,time : π0.
D5.13 occurred(ecr,ti) : π3i+1← observed(ecr,ti) : π3i,,time : π0.
D5.14 occurred(e2,ti) : π3i+1 ← occurred(e1,ti) : π3i+1,EX(φ,i) : π3i
holdsat(pow(e2),ti) : π3i,time : π0.
D5.15 occurred(e2,ti) : π3i+1 ← occurred(e1,ti) : π3i+1,EX(φ,ti) : π3i,time : π0.
D5.16 occurred(viol(e),ti) : π3i+1← occurred(e,ti) : π3i+1,not holdsat(perm(e),ti) : π3i,time : π0.
D5.17 occurred(v,ti) : π3i+1 ← holdsat(obl(e,d,v),ti) : π3i,occurred(d,ti) : π3i+1,time : π0.
D5.18 initiated(f,ti) : π3i+2 ← occurred(ecr,ti) : π3i+1,not holdsat(live,ti) : π3i,
not dissolved(e,ti) : π3i+1,time : π0.
D5.19 initiated(f,ti) : π3i+2 ← occurred(e,ti) : π3i+1,EX(x,i) : π3i,
not dissolved(e,ti) : π3i+1,time : π0.
D5.20 terminated(f,ti) : π3i+2 ←occurred(e,ti) : π3i+1,EX(x,I) : π3i,time : π0.
D5.21 terminated(obl(e,d,v),ti) : π3i+2← occurred(e,ti) : π3i+1,time : π0.
D5.22 terminated(obl(e,d,v),ti) : π3i+2← occurred(d,ti) : π3i+1,time : π0.
D5.23 terminated(f,ti) : π3i+2 ← dissolved(inst,ti) : π3i+1,time : π0.
D5.24 dissolved(ints,ti) : π3i+1 ← occurred(e,ti) : π3i+1,time : π0.
Figure 5.3: Stratiﬁcation conditions of rules in program Π
base(n)
I
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5Theorem 6 Given aninstitutionalprogramΠ
base(n)
I anda singulartraceprogrampro-
gram Π
one(n)
⊔ , the program Π∗ = Π
base(n)
I ∪ Π
one(n)
⊔ has exactly one answer set.
Proof: If we combine the results of Theorem 5 showing that Π∗ is a stratiﬁed logic
program with the theorem in [GL88, p8] stating that a stratiﬁed program has a unique
answer set, we obtain that Π∗ has a single answer set. 
All Traces
As well as single traces, we also deﬁne a trace program that is capable of producing
all traces of length n for a given institution.
Deﬁnition 30 A trace program Π
all(n)
I of length n for an institution I =
 E,F,C,G,∆  is an ASP program consisting of the rules:
{observed(eex,ti)}. 0 ≤ i < n,eex ∈ Eex
ev(ti) ← observed(eex,ti) 0 ≤ i < n,eex ∈ Eex
← not ev(ti) 0 ≤ i < n
By the ﬁrst set of rules, any exogenous event eex may be non-deterministically chosen
as observed at any time instant. The second and third set of rules deﬁne that at each
instant an exogenous event must be observed, at all instants at least one event must be
observed.
A trace program Π
all(n)
I generates all possible combinations of n exogenous events as
its answer sets together with the time and ev facts provided. Given these events are
bounded by time, they provide traces.
Theorem 7 Let I =  E,F,C,G,∆  be an institution and Π
all(n)
I be a trace
program for that institution. Then  e0,...,en−1  with ei ∈ Eex is a trace iff
{observed(ej,j),ev(j),| 1 ≤ j < n} is an answer set for Π
all(n)
I .
156Proof: Follows immediately from the deﬁnition of traces 16 and the structure of
trace programs 30. 
The following theorem demonstrates a different way of obtaining the answer set pro-
grams for a given trace program.
Theorem 8 Given an institutional program Π
base(n)
I and its trace program Π
all(n)
I .
Then AΠ
base(n)
I ∪Π
all(n)
I
= {AΠ
base(n)
I ∪Π
one(n)
I
} ∪ {evti | 1 ≤ i < n}
Proof: Theorems 3 and 7 show that answer sets of both the trace as any of
the single trace programs correspond with traces of the institutions. Combining
Theorem 7 with Deﬁnition 29, it is easy to see that if we ignore the ev(ti), we can
construct a single trace program by using elements of an answer set as the facts,
that produces the same answer set without the ev(ti) atoms. Given that neither trace
program uses any head atom of Π
base(n)
I , we know that combining both programs
will result in extending or ignoring the answer sets of the trace program. From
Theorem 6 it is clear that in the case of the single trace problem, the latter can
certainly be not the case, as Π
one(n)
I on its own only produces a single answer set
(Theorem 6). If we combine all the above information, we have everything to
conclude AΠ
base(n)
I ∪Π
all(n)
I
= {AΠ
base(n)
I ∪Π
one(n)
I
} ∪ {evti | 1 ≤ i < n} 
5.3.2 Soundness and Completeness
We now show soundness and completeness of the translation of an institution I with
respect to the formal deﬁnition of that institution described in Chapter 3.
We start by proving the soundness of the translation.Given an institution in the formal
syntax (described in Chapter 3), and it’s corresponding ASP translation (according to
therules deﬁned above), we showthateach atom containedin an answerset oftheASP
translation (when combined with the translation of of an ordered trace) is supported
by a corresponding ﬂuent status or event occurence the model of the formal institution
for that ordered trace.
157We then go on to prove the completeness of the translation. Given a model produced
by an ordered trace of events in an institution, we show that the set of ASP atoms
which correspond to the events an ﬂuents in the model are all supported by rules in the
translation. As a corollary we also show that this set of atoms is a model (in the ASP
sense) of the translated programmed that this model is minimal and hence an answer
set of the translated program.
Theorem 9 (Soundness) Given an institution I =  E,F,C,G,∆  with Π
base(n)
I as its
base ASP program. Let tr =  e0 ...en−1  be an ordered trace for I. Let MP be the
unique answer set of the program P ∗ = ground(Π
base(n)
I ∪ Π
one(n)
I,tr ). Then, the tuple
M =  MS,ME  with MS =  S0,...,Sn ,ME =  E0,...,En−1  with Si ∈ Σ,
0 ≤ i < n, and Ej ⊆ E with ej ∈ Ej such that
∀i,0 ≤ i ≤ n   MP |= holdsat(f,ti) ⇒ f ∈ Si (D5.1)
∀i,0 ≤ i < n   MP |= occurred(e,ti) ⇒ e ∈ Ei (D5.2)
is a model of I w.r.t the trace tr.
Proof: Under the assumption that MP is an answer set, we need to prove that M
is a model for I w.r.t the trace tr. Following Deﬁnition 17 on page 111 we need to
demonstrate:
1. S0 = ∅
2. Si = TR(MSi−1,ei) ∀0 < i ≤ n
3. Ei = OC(MSi,ei) ∀0 ≤ i < n
We will look at each of these conditions separately:
1. S0 = ∅: From the creation of MP we know that all states Si are made up from
the holdsat(f,ti) atoms. The mapping from an institution to its base program
does not create any rules with holdsat(p,t0) in the head. Since MP is an
answer set we know that ∀MP |= s   ∃ r ∈ P ∗   s ∈ Hr and r is applied. This
implies that MP  |= holdsat(p) for any ﬂuent p. So we have to conclude that
has to be empty.
1582. Ei ⊆ OC(MSi,ei): SinceMP isan answerweknowthateveryatominitwillbe
produced by at least one applied rule. This is also true for the occurred(e,ti)
atoms for e ∈ Ei. This means that for such an atom one of the rules D5.12 to
D5.14 has to be applied. Rules D5.12 and D5.13 can only have been applied
if e = ei has only then observed(e,ti) would have been created by the single
trace program. The ﬁrst condition of Deﬁnition 10 on page 106 is automatically
satisﬁed: e ∈ GR
ω(Si,{ei}). It is very easy to see, combining the way M and
Π
base(n)
I were created, that satisfying either rule D5.14 to D5.17 will satisfy e ∈
GR
ω(Si,{ei}). All of these four rules depend recursively on occurred(f′,ti).
The onlyway to get out of this recursion is through rules D5.12 and D5.13. They
state that either the institution is alive, live ∈ Si or that ei ∈ E+. This means,
with Deﬁnition 11 on page 107, that e ∈ OC(MSi,ei).
3. Ei ⊇ OC(MSi,ei): Let e / ∈ Ei. By construction of M this means
occurred(e,ti) / ∈ MP. Since MP is an answer set, this implies that none
of the rules with occurred(e,ti) in the head cannot be applicable. From the
construction of PM and Deﬁnition 10 on page 106, it is obvious that e cannot
be an observable events, so e  = ei, and that none of the conditions for event
generation are satisﬁed, e / ∈ GR
ω(Si,{ei}). This automatically implies that
ei / ∈ OC(MSi,ei).
4. Si = TR(MSi−1,ei): This means we have to show, according to Deﬁnition 15
on page 110 that Si = (Si−1\TERM(Si−1,ei−1))∪INIT(Si−1,ei−1)). In order
to demonstrate this equation we need to be able to express TERM(Si−1,ei−1)
and INIT(Si−1,ei−1)
(a) f ∈ TERM(Si,ei,) iff terminated(f,ti) ∈ MP: Because MP is an
answer set of P ∗, we know that MP |= terminated(f,ti) iff an applied
rule exists with this atom in the head. This means that one of the rules of
type D5.20 to D5.23 of P ∗ will have ﬁred. From above we already know
that occurred(e,ti) ∈ MP iff e ∈ OC(Si,{ei}). We also have that, due
to rule D5.24, that MP |= dissolved(inst,ti) iff ed ∈ OC(Si,{ei})
with ed ∈ E×. If we combine this with the construction of PM and M, we
have that such a rule could have only been applied iff f ∈ TERM(Si,ei,),
as each of the rules match the termination conditions of Deﬁnition 14 on
page 109.
(b) f ∈ INIT(Si,ei,) iff initiated(f,ti) ∈ MP: Since MP is an answer of
P ∗, we have that MP |= initiated(f,ti) iff an applied rule exists with
this atom in the head. This means that either the rule of type D5.18 or
159type D5.19 must have been satisﬁed. From above we already know that
MP |= occurred(e,ti) iff e ∈ OC(Si,{ei}). We also have that, due to
rule D5.24, that MP |= dissolved(inst,ti) iff ed ∈ OC(Si,{ei}) with
ed ∈ E×. Furthermore, we know that S  |= live when OC(Si,{ei})  = ∅ iff
a creation event occurred. If we combine all this information together with
the way M and PM are constructed, then it is easy to see that those two
rules could only be applied iff f ∈ INIT(Si,ei,), as each rule matches one
of the initiation conditions of Deﬁnition 13 on page 109.
Because MP is answer set we have, with rules of type D5.1 and D5.2, MP |=
holdsat(f,ti) iff initiated(f,ti−1) ∈ MP or MP |= holdsat(f,ti−1) and
MP  |= terminated(f,ti−1). Given the creation of M and the above items be
obtain: Si = (Si−1 \ TERM(Si−1,ei−1)) ∪ INIT(Si−1,ei−1)).

Theorem 10 (Completeness) Given an institution I =  E,F,C,G,∆  with Π
base(T)
I
as its base ASP program. Let tr =  e0 ...en−1  be an ordered trace for I. Let M =
 MS,ME  with MS =  S0,...,Sn ,ME =  E0,...,En−1  with Si ∈ Σ with 0 ≤
i < n and Ej ⊆ E with ej ∈ Ej be a model for I w.r.t. the trace tr. Let MP be the set
160of atoms:
∀i,0 ≤ i ≤ n   f ∈ Si ⇒ MP |= holdsat(f,ti) (D5.3)
∀i,0 ≤ i < n   e ∈ Ei,live ∈ Si ⇒ MP |= occurred(e,ti) (D5.4)
∀i,0 ≤ i < n   e ∈ Ei,e ∈ E+ ⇒ MP |= occurred(e,ti) (D5.5)
∀i,1 ≤ i ≤ n   f ∈ (Si \ Si−1) ⇒ MP |= initiated(f,ti−1) (D5.6)
∀i,0 ≤ i < n   f ∈ (Si \ Si+1) ⇒ MP |= terminated(f,ti) (D5.7)
∀i,0 ≤ i < n   e ∈ (Ei ∩ Eex) ⇒ MP |= dissolved(e,ti) (D5.8)
∀i,0 ≤ i < n   ei ∈ tr ⇒ MP |= observed(e,ti) (D5.9)
MP |= final(n) (D5.10)
∀e ∈ E   MP |= event(e) (D5.11)
∀e ∈ Eex   MP |= evtype(e,ex) (D5.12)
∀e ∈ E+   MP |= evtype(e,cr) (D5.13)
∀e ∈ Eact   MP |= evtype(e,act) (D5.14)
∀e ∈ Eviol   MP |= evtype(e,viol)∀e ∈ E×   MP |= evtype(e,di) (D5.15)
Then, MP is the unique answer set MP of P ∗ = Π
base(n)
I ∪ Π
one(n)
I,tr
Proof: Theorem 6 guarantees the uniqueness of the answer set.
Given that M is a model for I we need to prove that MP is an answer set for P ∗. In
order to do so, we need to demonstrate that MP is a minimal model for P ∗,MP
We start by proving that MP is a model of Π
base(n)
I ∪ Π
one(n)
I,tr . Let r ∈ P ∗,MP be an
applicable rule. In order for MP to be a model we need to show that MP |= Head(r)
(that the rule is applied). We will go through each type of rule in the same order as
they are mentioned in Figure 5.2.6 page 151
• r is a fact: automatically true due to the construction of MP.
• r is of type D5.1: initiated(f,ti) is included because f / ∈ Si while f ∈ Si+1.
With D5.3, the latter implies that MP |= holdsat(f,ti+1).
• r is of type D5.2: we know because of the Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation that
terminated(f,ti) is false. If we combine D5.7 and D5.3 for f at ti, we obtain
161MP |= holdsat(f,ti+1).
• r is of type D5.12: Since observed atoms originate from the trace events and
because MP is a model and holdsat(live,ti) is true, we know that eex ∈ Ei.
With D5.4 this means that MP |= occurred(eex,ti).
• r is of type D5.13: a similar reasoning as above without taking into account the
life predicate.
• r is of type D5.14: from the body elements and the way the atoms are created
we can infer that ei ∈ Ei, Si |= φ and pow(e2) ∈ Si. Because r is of this
particular type, we have that e2 ∈ G(φ,e1). If we combine all of this with M
being a model and the deﬁnition of event generation (Deﬁnition 10 rule D10.2
on page 106) then we obtain that e2 ∈ Ei. With D5.4, we obtain that MP |=
occurred(e2,ti).
• r is of type D5.15: we can apply the same reasoning as above using rule D10.3
for event generation.
• r is of type D5.16: again we can use the same reasoning. This time we use
rule D10.4 in the event generation. We can do this as the body states that no
permission was given.
• r is of type D5.17: for this we use the last rule of event generation D10.5.
• r is of type D5.18: The body of this rule implies, thanks to the creation of MP,
that Si |= ¬live and that Ei contains ecr ∈ E+ and does not contain a dissolution
event. Because M is a model and the deﬁnition of an initiation function of
Deﬁnition13 ruleD13.2 onpage 109, we obtainthat f ∈ Si+1. Withthecreation
of MP, this implies that MP |= initiated(f,ti).
• r is of type D5.19: We can apply the reasoning from above using the rule D13.1
of the initiation deﬁnition.
• r is of type D5.20: From the creation of MP we know that e ∈ Ei. Combining
this with the type of rule and the termination deﬁnition (Deﬁnition 14 rule D14.2
on page 109), we obtain that f ∈ Si but f / ∈ Si+1. With the creation of MP this
gives MP |= terminated(f,ti).
• r is of type D5.21: Here we can follow the same reasoning as above, we only
need condition D14.3 of the termination function instead.
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termination condition D14.4.
• r is of type D5.23: From the creation of MP we know that in order to have the
body true, we must have eex ∈ Ei for some eex ∈ E×. With this we can apply
condition D14.4 from the termination function in order to prove the head to be
true, just as we did above.
• r is of typeD5.24: Given thetype of rule and thecreation of MP condition D5.8,
we obtain that the head must be true.
By demonstrating that every rule is applied, we have shown that MP is indeed a model
for P ∗,MP. We must now show that that MP is minimal. In order to do this, we must
show that there does not exist another model of P ∗,MP which is a strict subset of MP.
Let Z be an interpretation such that Z ⊂ MP. Let i be the lowest strata in which Z
and MP differ in terms of atoms. Let S be the set of atoms s ∈ S such that s : πi
and s ∈ (MP \ Z). If s is an atom that is used as a fact, we immediately know that Z
is not a model. We proceed with the different atoms that do not appear as facts in the
program.
• s = holdsat(f,tj): MP |= s implies that s ∈ Sj. Because MP is a
model we know that either s was true in state Sj−1 and either it was not
terminated in that state or that it was initiated in the preceding state Sj−1. The
construction of MP guarantees that MP |= holdsat(f,tj−1) for the former
or MP |= initiated(f,tj−1) for the later. Both atoms are in lower strata
(Theorem 5), which means that either one of them is included in Z, while
Z  |= holdsat(f,tj). This means that the either rule D5.1 or rule D5.2 is
applicable but not applied. So Z cannot be a model.
• s = occurred(e,tj): MP |= simpliesthate ∈ Ej andthate ∈ E+ orlive ∈ Sj.
We now have to make a distinction between the different types of events.
– e ∈ E+: The construction of P ∗ guarantees the existence of a fact
observed(e,tj). If Z is a model, it must contain this fact. We assume
Z |= observed(e,tj). But doing so, this makes the rule of type D5.13 in
P ∗,MP applicable but not applied. So Z cannot be a model.
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that MP |= holdsat(live,tj). Given that holdsat(live,tj) belongs
to a lower strata than e (Theorem 5), we have to conclude that Z |=
holdsat(live,tj). Just as before, we know with the that this implied
that Z |= observed(e,tj). This however, leaves the rule D5.12 applicable
but not applied. Therefore, Z cannot be a model.
– e ∈ Eact: Due to the construction of MP, we know that e ∈ Ej. Because
MP is model for I we know that e must have been generated from a certain
exogenous event occurring in the state Sj (using Deﬁnition 10 page 106).
Since e is an institutional action we know that the condition D10.2 must
have been applied. This means with the construction of P ∗ that a rule r of
type D5.14 must have been created with Ej |= φ, pow(e) ∈ Sj and e1 ∈
Ej. The creation of MP makes sure that ∀f ∈ φ   MP |= holdsat(f,tj),
MP |= holdsat(pow(e),tj) and MP |= occurred(e1,tj). Given that all
atoms belong to a lower strata, this implies that all of them are elements of
Z. This means that r is applicable but not applied, so Z cannot be a model.
– e ∈ Eviol: The construction of MP implies that e ∈ Ej. Given that M is a
model, we know that e had to be generated using Deﬁnition 10. Because e
is a violation event we can be certain that either of the following three rules
have been used:
∗ Rule D10.3: This implies e1 ∈ Ej, Sj |= φ. Using the same reasoning
as before, we obtain MP |= occurred(e1,tj), ∀f ∈ φ : MP |=
holdsat(f,tj). With the construction of P ∗ we have a rule of type
D5.15 which is applicable w.r.t. MP. Since all body elements are
belonging to a lower strata, they are also elements of Z. This means
that the rule is applicable but not applied w.r.t. Z, indicating that Z
cannot be a model.
∗ Rule D10.4: This implies that e1 ∈ Ej with e = viol(e1) and
perm(e1) / ∈ Sj. The construction of MP assures in this case
MP |= occurred(e1,tj) and MP  |= holdsat(perm(e1),tj). The
mapping to P ∗ guarantees a rule of type D5.16, which also appears
in P ∗,MP since the negative part of the body is satisﬁed w.r.t. MP.
Because the remaining body element belongs to a lower strata, we
know that the body is applicable w.r.t. Z. This it the case that Z
cannot satisfy this rule and therefore cannot be a model.
∗ Rule D10.5: The application of this rule implies that obl(e,d,v) ∈ Sj
and that d ∈ Ej. Given the creation of MP, this means that MP |=
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event generation function and the construction of P ∗ guarantees a rule
of the form D5.17. Since all body elements are modelled by MP and
belong to a lower strata, they also are elements of Z. This means Z
cannot satisfy this rule. So, Z is not a model.
• s = initiated(f,tj): From the creation of MP we know that
MP |= initiated(f,tj) iff f / ∈ Sj and S ∈ Sj+1. Because M is a
model, we know that ﬂuents come into existence via the initiation function
(Deﬁnition 13 on page 109). There are two possibilities:
– Rule D13.1: If this rule is used we have that φ ∈ X such that Sj |= φ such
that there exists a generated event e1 ∈ Ej and a f ∈ C↑(φ,e1). We also
know that in thistimeinstanceno dissolutionoccurs, or in otherwords Ei∩
E× = ∅. The creation of MP is such that ∀p ∈ φ : MP |= holdsat(p,tj),
MP |= occurred(e1,tj), and MP  |= dissolved(inst,tj. Given the
way P M is constructed we have a rule r of type D5.19 which survives the
Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation. Because the remaining body atoms are
from a lower strata we have that, apart from elements of MP, they are also
included in Z. This means that Z cannot satisfy this rule and fails to be a
model.
– Rule D13.2: If this rule is used, we know that the institution is not yet
”live”, that no dissolution event has happened, and that f ∈ ∆ ∪ live
or that f ∈ C↑(∅,e1). In the latter case, we have the same argu-
ment as above. In the former case, we have with the creation of
MP that MP  |= holdsat(live,tj), MP |= holdsat(f,tj) and
MP  |= dissolved(int,tj). If we combine all the information we have
obtained with how P M is created we have a rule of the form of D5.18 that
is sustained after the Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation. Because of the
lower strata of holdsat(f,tj), we have that holdsat(f,tj) ∈ Z, making
it impossible for Z to be a model.
• s = terminated(f,tj): Giventheway thatMP is created, weknowthatf ∈ Sj
while f / ∈ Sj+1. Given that M is a model, we know that the termination function
function(Deﬁnition14on page109)is responsibleforthis. Thisimpliesthatone
of its four conditions must have ﬁred.
– Condition D14.1: When this conditions is triggered we have that there
exists φ ∈ X such that Sj |= φ and an event e ∈ Ej such that f ∈
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holdsat(p,tj) ∈ MP and MP |= occurred(e,tj). Thanks to the cre-
ation of P ∗ we have a rule of type D5.20 with these atoms in head and
body. Given that the atoms in the body are in lower strata, we have that the
body is also satisﬁed by Z, disqualifying Z as a model.
– Condition D14.2: If this condition is executed we have that ∃e ∈ Ej such
that f = obl(e,d,b) ∈ Sj. Given the way that MP is created this means
that occurred(e,tj) ∈ MP. Due to the creation of P ∗ we also have a
rule of type D5.21. Given that the body element comes from a lower strata
than the head which is in strata i, we have that the rule is applicable but not
applied w.r.t. Z; making it impossible for Z to be a model.
– Condition D14.3: We can use the same reasoning as above, except that this
time the deadline event occurs and not the actual event. This means that a
rule of type D5.22 is created instead.
– Condition D14.4: When this condition ﬁres, we have that a dissolution
event d occurred at time tj and that all ﬂuents f ∈ Sj will be termi-
nated. The occurrence of a dissolution event at time tj is marked in MP by
dissolved(inst,tj) and with a rule of P ∗ of type D5.23. Also here we
can use stratiﬁcation argument, to show that Z is not a model.
• s = dissolved(inst,tj): The creation of MP makes sure that
dissolved(inst,tj) ∈ Sj iff a dissolution event happens at time instant tj.
This also means that MP |= occurred(e,tj) for some e ∈ E×. Previously we
have demonstrated that Z must contain the same occurred(e,tj) in strata i as
MP if Z is to be a model. From Theorem 5 we know that both atoms belong
to the same strata i. Therefore occurred(e,tj) ∈ Z. Unfortunately for Z this
means that it cannot satisfy the rule of type D5.24, so also in this case Z cannot
be a model.
When combined this implies that Z cannot be a model if it differs from MP on strata
i. So we can conclude that MP is indeed a minimal model for P ∗,MP and therefore an
answer set for P ∗. 
Theorem 11 Let I =  E,F,C,G,∆  be an institution with Π
base(T)
I its base ASP
program. Let tr =  e0 ...en−1  be an ordered trace for I. Then, the single model of I
w.r.t. tr corresponds to the unique answer set of P ∗ = ground(Π
base(n)
I ∪ Π
one(n)
I,tr ).
166Proof: Follows immediately from Theorem 9 and Theorem 10. 
Theorem 12 Given an institution I =  E,F,C,G,∆  and its corresponding program
Π
base(T)
I and a trace program Π
all(n)
I , then there is a one to one correspondence be-
tween the models of I and the answer sets of Π
base(T)
I ∪ Π
all(n)
I .
Proof: The result follows immediately from Theorem 11 and Theorem 8. 
5.4 Reasoning About Speciﬁcations In ASP
In the previous section we introduced the concept of a trace program which allows us
to model (as answer sets) of one or all possibletraces of the institutionwhen combined
with an institution program Π
base(n)
I .
Using the deﬁnition of trace programs given above we may produce:
Single Traces when we simply wish to determine the model of I over a single ﬁnite
trace of a known length. These types of traces may be used in the case when, for
instance we know exactly which events have occurred and their ordering; and
we wish to ﬁnd the sequence of institutional events and states which over that
trace.
All possible traces when we wish to investigateall models of I for a given number of
time instants. These types of trace are of particular interest in the case of general
analysis and veriﬁcation.
In the case where we only wish to reason about single traces, we simply take simple
trace program Π
one(n)
I . As Π
one(n)
I only has one answer set (the set of facts in the pro-
gram) from Theorem 6 Π
one(n)
I ∪Π
base(n)
I will then yield a single answer set containing
a model of the ordered trace T I
n.
Being able to generate all traces is necessary for all reasoning problems as it deﬁnes
each of the possible world that an institution may be in for a given period of time. In
167most cases however, we wish to either ﬁnd the subset of these traces which represent
the answers to a particular question or determine that there are no answer sets for a
particular question. In order to do this we introduce a query program which constrains
the traces generated by the combination of a trace program and a base program as
follows:
Deﬁnition 31 (query program) A program Π
qry(n)
I is a query program of for a given
trace program Π
all(n)
I and a given base program Π
base(n)
I of an institution I iff:
Head(Π
qry(n)
I ) ∪ Lit(Π
base(n)
I ) = ∅ (D31.1)
Head(Π
qry(n)
I ) ∪ Lit(Π
all(n)
I ) = ∅ (D31.2)
I.e. all atoms which may be obtained from rules in a a query program Π
qry(n)
I (those
appearing in the head of rules of Π
qry(n)
I ) are disjoint with all atoms (those appearing
the body of rules) of both the trace program and base program.
Theorem 13 Let I =  E,F,C,G,∆  be an institution with Π
base(T)
I as its base ASP
program and let Π
all(n)
I be its trace program. Let Π
qry(n)
I be a query program. Then,
the answer sets of Π
base(n)
I ∪ Π
all(n)
I ∪ Π
qry(n)
I correspond to a model of I based on a
trace of length n.
Proof: From Theorem 12 we know that Π
base(n)
I ∪ Π
all(n)
I generates all models of
I with traces of length n as the answer sets of the program. From Deﬁnition 31,
we know that the head atoms of the query program are not related to the program
Π
base(n)
I ∪ Π
all(n)
I . This means that the answer sets of the program Π
base(n)
I ∪ Π
all(n)
I
can only be extended or contradicted when one adds Π
qry(n)
I to the program, which
exactly proves the point. 
Query programs may be of any form so long as they follow Deﬁnition 31. When we
combinea trace program Π
all(n)
I with thebase program for theinstitutionI and a query
program Π
qry(n)
I the answer sets obtained from Π
all(n)
∪ Π
base(n)
I ∪ Π
qry(n)
I represent all
possibletraces and models of institutionI which are consisted with the query program
Π
qry(n)
I .
168We now go on to consider some useful general types of query program which may be
used to form the basis of more complex queries.
5.4.1 Effective Traces
Using the trace program Π
all(n)
I we obtain all traces regardless of whether they cause
a change in institutional state or not. While this is useful in general, in many cases we
are only interested in traces where each event has some causal effect on the state of the
institution. We call traces of this kind effective traces.
In order to reﬁne the set of all traces to only those in which at least one causal effect is
observed in each transition we deﬁne a query program as follows (this and remaining
programs use the unground deﬁnition of the translation provided in Figure 5.2.6):
We start by deﬁning at which instants an effective transition has occurred:
changed(T) ← initiated(F,T),not holdsat(F,T),
ifluent(F),instant(T).
changed(T) ← terminated(F,T),holdsat(F,T),
ifluent(F),instant(T).
TheﬁrstrulestatesthatsomethingchangesattimeinstantT(indicatedbychanged(T))
if there is a ﬂuent F which does not hold at time instant T which is initiated at time
instant T. The second states the converse for ﬂuents that hold at time instant T and are
terminated.
We then deﬁne the following rules:
valid(I) ← changed(I),instant(I).
valid(I) ← final(I),instant(I).
⊥ ← not valid(I),instant(I).
These rules state that any state in which something has changed is valid, the ﬁnal state
is valid (as nothing may be initiated or terminated in this state), and that any answer
set which has a time instant which is not valid is removed.
169Traces up to Length n
The trace program Π
all(n)
I produces traces of exactly length n. We can also use this
program to reason about traces of up to and including length n. In order to do this we
deﬁne a query program Π
ex(≤n)
I and add a single event indicating an empty transition
to the base program that is used to deﬁne a sufﬁx to the traces produced by theprogram
in which no changes of state occur.
In order to account for transitions in the sufﬁx that are ignored we deﬁne a special
event epsilon which must be disjoint from the set of events in the original insti-
tutional program. It should be noted that because the epsilon event and the atoms
corresponding to its occurrence are disjoint from the institutional program, they will
have no inﬂuence on the semantics of the translated institution (by D5.2 and D5.1). In
a given institutional model, state following an epsilon event will be the same as the
state preceding the event. Likewise as the epsilon event is disjoint from the set of
institutional events, no institutional events may be generated in such a transition. We
deﬁne this event in the program Πeps as follows:
event(epsilon).
evtype(epsilon,ex).
This program is then used to extend the institution program Π
base(n)
I such that
Π
base(n),eps
I = Πeps ∪ Π
base(n)
I .
We then deﬁne a query Π
qry(n)
I program over Π
base(n),eps
I which constrains the occur-
rence of epsilon events to sufﬁxes of traces.
The constraint and associated rules are deﬁned as follows:
etrans(I,J) ← observed(epsilon,I),next(I,J).
valid(I,J) ← observed(E,I),E! = epsilon,evtype(E,obs),next(I,J).
valid(I,J) ← etrans(I,J),final(J),next(I,J).
valid(I,J) ← etrans(I,J),next(I,J),etrans(J,K),next(J,K).
⊥ ← not valid(I,J),next(I,J).
170The ﬁrst rule deﬁnes when an epsilon transition takes place, the second rule states that,
all transitions in which an observable event occurs, which are not epsilon transitions
are valid. The third and fourth rules state that an epsilon transition is only valid, if
it occurs in the transition prior to the ﬁnal state, or if it occurs in a transition prior to
anotherepsilon transition. Finally, the constraintruleeliminatesany answer sets where
either of these two cases do not occur.
The combination of Π
qry(n)
∪ Π
base(n),eps
I ∪ Π
all(n)
I′ will yield all traces of the original
program Π
all(n)
I ∪Π
base(n)
I as well as each of those traces sufﬁxed with up to n epsilon
events. In order to obtain traces of the institution I we simply remove the epsilon
events from the traces and their corresponding states.
Query programs of this kind are particularly useful when combined with the effective
trace query program deﬁned above. When using that query program, any traces in
which the institution cannot proceed with an event that changes the state, which are
not of length n will not be included as answer sets. In this case, if we are unsure of the
length of traces for which the query will be satisﬁed we must repeatedly solve for each
trace length up to n. When we combine the above query with the query for effective
traces these traces will also be included as answer sets. It should be noted that all
sufﬁxes of traces are generated by Π
qry(n)
I and in some cases we are only interested
in either the longest or shortest trace in this case, we simply remove either shorter or
longer traces with a common preﬁx.
5.4.2 Partially Ordered Traces
Another class of problem we wish to use our translated programs to reason about is
when we have some partial information about the occurrence of events in a trace. In
thiscase wewishto limitanswersets toonlythosewhichare consistentwith thepartial
ordering of these events.
In this example we assume that we know exactly which events have occurred and that
no two events with the same signature have occurred twice.
Given a set of exogenous events E ⊆ EI
ex and a partial ordering R ⊆ E × E of these
events such that ei ≺ ej ∈ R,ei  = ej and n = |E|, we deﬁne the query program:
Π
 (n)
I as follows:
171We deﬁne two rules in Π
 (n)
I :
before(I1,I2) ← next(I1,I2),instant(I1),instant(I2).
before(I1,I3) ← before(I1,I2),before(I2,I3),
instant(I1),instant(I2),instant(I3).
These rules deﬁne a transitive ordering over instants such that for each pair of instants
ti,tj where 0 ≤ i < j < n an atom before(ti,tj) is applied.
Then, for each event ordering ei ≺ ej ∈ R we deﬁne a constraint rule in Π
 (n)
I of the
form:
← observed(ei,I1),observed(ej,I2),before(I2,I1),instant(I1),instant(I2).
This constraint limits the answer sets of the program Π
 (n)
I to those where event ei
occurs before ej.
We then say that all events in E must occur exactly once in each answer set. For each
event in e ∈ E we deﬁne the rules:
obs(e) ← observed(e,I)
← not obs(e)
The answer sets of Π
 (n)
I ∪Π
all(n)
I ∪Π
base(n)
I will then only include models of traces, in
whichtheordered relationspeciﬁedbyRholds. Thesetypesoftracemaybeapplicable
in the case of agent reasoning, where an agent has partial knowledge about the events
that have occurred or their ordering in the world.
5.4.3 Visualising Answer Sets
Theanswersetsproduced from theoutputofthe SMODELS solverforatranslatedinsti-
tution program and query are expressed as a set of unordered atoms. When examined
in their original form, it is difﬁcult to see exactly what the trace and corresponding
model described by the answer set means, this is especially true in the case that many
ﬂuent values or generated events are used. In order to assist a designer in understand-
ing the output of the answer set solver we have developed two simple tools that allow
172the answer sets to be parsed and then displayed in a human readable format.
The ﬁrst of these tools is the trace visualiser (InstViz), this takes a set of answer sets
written in the output format of SMODELS and produces a graphical visualisation of the
traces and models described by those answer sets. For each answer set speciﬁed in the
input, the visualiser extracts the sequence of exogenous events that represent the trace
(represented by observed(E,T) atoms in the answer set), the set of generated events
that are derived for this trace (represented by atoms of the form occurred(E,T)) and
the corresponding ﬂuent values for each state in the trace. These are then displayed as
a sequence allowing a designer to see what has happened in a given trace. A screen
shot of this tool in action is show in Figure 5.4
Figure 5.4: Graphical Output produced by the InstViz tool
In addition to visualising individual traces, we sometimes also wish to show the rela-
tionship between all answer sets produced for a particular query. In order to do this we
have developed a tool for producing a graph visualisation of the states and transitions
represented in all of the answer sets for a given program. This tool takes a set of an-
swer sets speciﬁed in the output format of SMODELS and computes a graph consisting
of a set of states and a set of transitions. This graph is computed by taking each pair
of states (consisting of the ﬂuents true in those states) in each of the input answer sets,
and the associated transition between those states (consisting of a set of events). This
173graph generator tool then uses thistransitionsystem to producean outputﬁle writtenin
the GraphViz language [ATT]. This output ﬁle can then be automatically laid out and
rendered by one of the GraphViz tools. Examples of the output of this program may
be found in Figures 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 in this chapter and other ﬁgures elsewhere in
this dissertation.
The graph which is displayed by this process shows each reachable state which occurs
in any of the traces, and all transitions in those traces relative to each state.
5.5 Revisiting The War Example
We now return to the simple war example we discussed in Chapter 3 page 112.
The translation of this example is shown in Figure 5.5. Each line of the ﬁgure shows a
corresponding rule in the program (with rules for inertia, and the generation of viola-
tions omitted for brevity).
Using the process described in Section 5.4.3 we may compute the reachable states for
this institution, which are shown in Figure 5.6. As we can see from the ﬁgure, the
institution has four distinct states corresponding to (from left to right):
i) The initial (empty) state.
ii) The initial state of the institution following its creation, this is also the state
achieved following a successful declaration of truce from a state of war.
iii) The state following a provocation in which the country is obliged to start a war.
iv) The state following the declaration of war in which the country is empowered to
conscript its citizens.
v) The state following the introduction of conscription, in which the citizens of the
country are permitted to shoot at their enemy.
The transitions shown in Figure 5.6 show only those in which an event that brings
about a change of state occurs, for all other events the same state is achieved after the
execution of the event.
174ifluent(obl(startwar,shoot,murder)).
ifluent(live(murder)).
ifluent(atwar).
ifluent(perm(callup)).
ifluent(perm(conscript)).
ifluent(perm(shoot)).
ifluent(perm(startwar)).
ifluent(pow(conscript)).
ifluent(perm(murder)).
ifluent(perm(provoke)).
event(create).
event(startwar).
event(shoot).
event(provoke).
event(callup).
event(conscript).
event(declaretruce).
event(viol(startwar)).
event(viol(create)).
event(viol(shoot)).
event(viol(provoke)).
event(viol(callup)).
event(viol(conscript)).
event(viol(declaretruce)).
evtype(create,ex).
evtype(shoot,ex).
evtype(provoke,ex).
evtype(callup,ex).
evtype(declaretruce,ex).
evtype(startwar,ex).
evtype(conscript,inst).
evtype(viol(startwar),viol).
evtype(viol(murdercr),viol).
evtype(viol(shoot),viol).
evtype(viol(provoke),viol).
evtype(viol(callup),viol).
evtype(viol(conscript),viol).
evtype(viol(declaretruce),viol).
occurred(murder,I) ← holdsat(obl(startwar,shoot,murder),I),
occurred(shoot,I),instant(I).
terminated(obl(startwar,shoot,murder),I) ← holdsat(obl(startwar,shoot,murder),I),
occurred(shoot,I),instant(I).
terminated(obl(startwar,shoot,murder),I) ← holdsat(obl(startwar,shoot,murder),I),
occurred(startwar,I),instant(I).
initiated(atwar,I) ← occurred(startwar,I),not holdsat(atwar,I),
holdsat(live(murder),I),instant(I).
initiated(pow(conscript),I) ← occurred(startwar,I),not holdsat(atwar,I),
holdsat(live(murder),I),instant(I).
initiated(perm(shoot),I) ← occurred(conscript,I),holdsat(live(murder),I),
instant(I).
initiated(obl(startwar,shoot,murder),I) ← occurred(provoke,I),not holdsat(atwar,I),
holdsat(live(murder),I),instant(I).
terminated(atwar,I) ← occurred(declaretruce,I),holdsat(atwar,I),
holdsat(live(murder),I),instant(I).
terminated(perm(shoot),I) ← occurred(declaretruce,I),holdsat(atwar,I),
holdsat(live(murder),I),instant(I).
terminated(pow(conscript),I) ← occurred(declaretruce,I),holdsat(atwar,I),
holdsat(live(murder),I),instant(I).
occurred(conscript,I) ← occurred(callup,I),holdsat(pow(conscript),I),instant(I).
occurred(murder,I) ← occurred(viol(shoot),I),holdsat(pow(murder),I),instant(I).
intiated(live(murder),I) ← occurred(create,I),not holdsat(live(murder),I),instant(I).
intiated(perm(callup),I) ← occurred(create,I),not holdsat(live(murder),I),instant(I).
intiated(perm(startwar),I) ← occurred(create,I),not holdsat(live(murder),I),instant(I).
intiated(perm(conscript),I) ← occurred(create,I),not holdsat(live(murder),I),instant(I).
intiated(perm(provoke),I) ← occurred(create,I),not holdsat(live(murder),I),instant(I).
intiated(perm(murder),I) ← occurred(create,I),not holdsat(live(murder),I),instant(I).
intiated(pow(murder),I) ← occurred(create,I),not holdsat(live(murder),I),instant(I).
Figure 5.5: ASP translation of war institution
175live(war)
perm(callup)
perm(conscript)
perm(declaretruce)
perm(provoke)
perm(startwar)
docreate(war)
[created(war)]
atwar
live(war)
perm(callup)
perm(conscript)
perm(declaretruce)
perm(provoke)
perm(shoot)
perm(startwar)
pow(war,conscript)
declaretruce
atwar
live(war)
perm(callup)
perm(conscript)
perm(declaretruce)
perm(provoke)
perm(startwar)
pow(war,conscript)
callup
[conscript]
declaretruce
live(war)
obl(startwar,shoot,murder)
perm(callup)
perm(conscript)
perm(declaretruce)
perm(provoke)
perm(startwar)
startwar
shoot
[murder]
[viol(shoot)]
startwar
provoke
Figure 5.6: All reachable states for the translated war institution
5.6 Translating Multi-Institutions to Answer Set Pro-
grams
We now turn to the problem of representing multi-institutions using answer set pro-
grams. In Section 4.3.1, we deﬁned a multi-institution as the composition of one or
more single institutions of the form described above, a set of multi-generation rules
and a set of environment events using the tuple:
M
def
≡  Insts,EM,GM 
The semantics of the transition function OM described in Deﬁnition 26 page 131 for
a multi-institution M, are expressed in terms of the transition functions of the com-
ponent institutions of that multi-institution. Given that this is the case, the semantics
of each of the component institutions is preserved in the context of a multi-institution.
This property allows us to re-use the translation of the single institutions to answer
set programs in the context of multi-institutions, leaving only the translation of the
multi-generation relation and accounting for the deﬁnition of environment events.
The translation of a multi-intuition M consists of the translations of each component
institution and an additional program Π
mbase(n)
M which accounts for the generation re-
lation GM of a multi-institution M. This translation is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 32 Given a multi-institutionM with the generation relation GM,the events
e1,e2 ∈ EM, an expression φ ∈ XM such that: e2 ∈ GM(φ,e1)
The program Π
multi(n)
M contains a rule of the form:
176occurred(e2,T) ← occurred(e1,T),EX(φ,T), (D32.1)
For each environment event eenv ∈ EM
env of the multi-institution, we add a rule of the
form:
evtype(eenv,env). (D32.2)
With D32.1 we deﬁne the translation of the generation relation in the multi-institution,
this translation is identical to the translation of event generation in single institutions
however, in this case the generated events correspond to exogenous events in the com-
ponent institution rather than institutional events within those institutions.
With D32.2 we account for the deﬁnition of the environment events of the multi-
institution, we do this using atoms evtype(E,env) in the same way as we do for
exogenous, institutional and violation events in single institutions.
We then use this program to deﬁne the translation of a multi-institution Π
mbase(n)
M in-
cluding component institutions as follows:
Deﬁnition 33 For a given multi-institution M and for a given number of instants n,
the program Π
multi(n)
M as is deﬁned such that:
Π
multi(n)
M
def
≡ Π
mbase(n)
M
 
Ii∈InstsM
Π
base(n)
Ii
Where Π
base(n)
Ii are translations of the component institutions of M and Π
mbase(n)
M is
the translation of the mapping rules described in M.
We deﬁne trace programs for multi-institutions in a similar way same way as we do
for single institutions such that a program Π
all(n)
M is a program that produces answer
sets deﬁning ordered traces of the environment events of the multi-institution M.
Thepropertiesofa multi-institutionprogram areclosely tiedto thedeﬁnitionsofsingle
institution programs:
177Theorem 14 (soundness and completeness) Given the translation of a multi-
institution Π
mbase(n)
M and a singular trace program Π
one(n)
M containing a trace T M
n ,
the program Π
mbase(n)
M ∪ Π
one(n)
M has exactly one answer set and this answer set
Π
mbase(n)
M M ∪ Π
all(n)
M contains an interpretation MODEL(T M
n ) of the trace T M
n .
Given the translationof a multi-institutionΠ
mbase(n)
M M and any trace programΠ
all(n)
M ,
every answer set Π
mbase(n)
M M ∪ Π
all(n)
M represents an interpretation MODEL(T M
n ) of
a trace T M
n in the multi-institution..
The validity of these theorems follows from proofs of the Theories of soundness (9)
and completeness (10) for single institutions.
5.7 Analysing Speciﬁcations of Multi-Institutions
By translating a speciﬁcation of a multi-institutioninto an answer set program, we can
analyse this speciﬁcation in much the same way as we can single institutions.
Given an answer set program deﬁned by a multi-institution speciﬁcation and its com-
ponent institutionsΠ
multi(n)
M and a trace program describing a set of ordered traces over
the environmenteventsin that multi-institutionΠ
all(n)
M , we can use an answerset solver
to query the model for the presence or absence of particular desirable or undesirable
properties in the multi-institution as a whole. In this case, we are evaluating the com-
position of all reachable states of each of the component institutions over the event
bindings deﬁned within the multi-institution.
5.7.1 Analysis of the Enforcement Example
We now consider the speciﬁcations described above may be analysed as answer set
programs. We ﬁrst deﬁne the base programs Π
base(T)
Ienf and Π
base(T)
Ibor for the institutions
of borrowing Ibor and enforcement Ienf using the same schema as described in Chap-
ter 5. Independently of this, we translate the generation relation speciﬁed in Meln as
program Π
base(T)
Meln . For the above institution, given two agents with identiﬁers a and b
this will lead to a program of the form:
178occurred(illegalact(b,fine),I) ← occurred(defaulted(b),I),instant(I).
occurred(illegalact(a,fine),I) ← occurred(defaulted(a),I),instant(I).
occurred(payback(a,b),I) ← occurred(sanctioned(a,fine),I),
holdsat(loan(a,b),I),instant(I).
occurred(payback(b,a),I) ← occurred(sanctioned(b,fine),I),
holdsat(loan(b,a),I),instant(I).
The program for the whole multi-institution Π
multi(T)
Meln is then deﬁned as the union of
Π
base(T)
Ienf , Π
base(T)
Ibor , and Π
base(T)
Meln .
We consider an example with this speciﬁcation where two agents may be party to loan
agreements.
Weﬁrst considertheloan institutionalonefortwo agentsa and b. We usethetechnique
described in Section 5.4.3 to compute all reachable states for this problem instance
which are shown in Figure 5.7 (with ﬂuents relating to permissions, and transitions
that do not change the state of the institution omitted from the diagram).
As can be seen, both agents may enter into loans with each other that must eventually
be payed back in order for the loan to be satisﬁed. Additionally, if the debtor of a loan
does not fulﬁl their obligation to repay, leading to their defaulting on the loan then the
contract will remain active, even after the loan duration has expired.
We may also do the same for an instance of the enforcement institution, this time with
an agent a and an enforcer e. In this case we assume that the enforcer (who is also an
agent) does not perform illegal acts by imposing the following constraint in the query
program :
: −occurred(illegalact(b,fine),I),instant(I).
this constrains the answer sets of the program to those in which no illegal act by agent
b is considered to have occurred.
The reachable states of this instance of the enforcement institution are shown in Fig-
ure 5.8.
As can be seen from Figure 5.8, if agent a commits an illegal act then the it becomes
179live(borrowing)
pow(borrowing,loaned(a,b))
pow(borrowing,loaned(b,a))
docreate(borrowing)
live(borrowing)
loan(a,b)
pow(borrowing,defaulted(a))
pow(borrowing,reimbursed(a,b))
payback(a,b)
[reimbursed(a,b)]
live(borrowing)
loan(a,b)
obl(reimbursed(a,b),expireloan,defaulted(a))
pow(borrowing,defaulted(a))
pow(borrowing,reimbursed(a,b))
payback(a,b)
[reimbursed(a,b)]
expireloan
[defaulted(a)]
live(borrowing)
loan(b,a)
pow(borrowing,defaulted(b))
pow(borrowing,reimbursed(b,a))
payback(b,a)
[reimbursed(b,a)]
live(borrowing)
loan(b,a)
obl(reimbursed(b,a),expireloan,defaulted(b))
pow(borrowing,defaulted(b))
pow(borrowing,reimbursed(b,a))
payback(b,a)
[reimbursed(b,a)]
expireloan
[defaulted(b)]
borrow(a,b)
[loaned(a,b)]
borrow(b,a)
[loaned(b,a)]
Figure 5.7: Reachable states of the loan institution for two agents a and b
live(enf)
perm(enftimeout(a,fine))
perm(enftimeout(b,fine))
perm(illegalact(a,fine))
perm(illegalact(b,fine))
perm(sanctioned(a,fine))
perm(sanctioned(b,fine))
docreate(enf)
live(enf)
obl(sanctioned(a,fine),enftimeout(a,fine),badgov)
perm(applysanction(c,a,fine))
perm(enftimeout(a,fine))
perm(enftimeout(b,fine))
perm(illegalact(a,fine))
perm(illegalact(b,fine))
perm(sanctioned(a,fine))
perm(sanctioned(b,fine))
pow(enf,sanctioned(a,fine))
enftimeout(a,fine)
[badgov]
applysanction(c,a,fine)
[sanctioned(a,fine)] illegalact(a,fine)
Figure 5.8: Reachable states of the enforcement institution for an agent a and an en-
forcer c
obliged for an enforcer agent to bring about the sanction associated with this act (in
this case a ﬁne), if this sanction is not brought about before the deadline then a case of
bad governance (badgov) is considered to have occurred.
We now consider how the composition of these institutions in Meln and the corre-
sponding program Π
multi(T)
Meln . We consider the case where two agents a and b may
180start
s1)live(enf)
live(loan_contract)
mcreate
[borcreate]
[enfcreate]
s5)live(enf)
live(loan_contract)
loan(a,b)
s6)live(enf)
live(loan_contract)
loan(b,a)
obl(sanctioned(b,fine),enftimeout(b,fine),badgov)
applysanction(c,b,fine)
[sanctioned(b,fine)]
[payedback(b,a)]
[resolved(b,a)]
s7)live(enf)
live(loan_contract)
loan(b,a)
enftimeout(b,fine)
[badgov]
s4)live(enf)
live(loan_contract)
loan(a,b)
obl(sanctioned(a,fine),enftimeout(a,fine),badgov)
applysanction(c,a,fine)
[sanctioned(a,fine)]]
[payedback(a,a)]
[resolved(a,b)]
enftimeout(a,fine)
[badgov]
s3)live(enf)
live(loan_contract)
loan(a,b)
obl(resolved(a,b),loanexpired,defaulted(a))
payedback(a,b)
[resolved(a,b)]
loanexpired
[defaulted(a)]
[illegalact(a,fine)]
borrowed(a,b)
[newloan(a,b)]
s2)live(enf)
live(loan_contract)
loan(b,a)
obl(resolved(b,a),loanexpired,defaulted(b))
borrowed(b,a)
[newloan(b,a)]
payedback(b,a)
[resolved(b,a)]
loanexpired
[defaulted(b)]
[illegalact(b,fine)]
Figure 5.9: Reachable states of the combined enforced loan institution for an agent a
and an enforcer c
participate in loans and where a single enforcer c is responsible for enforcing them. In
this case, the reachable states of the combined protocol for these agents are show in
Figure 5.9. In this ﬁgure ﬂuents relating to power an permission are not shown.
We now demonstrate the how the translated answer set program of a speciﬁcation may
be used reason about possible scenarios which may occur in the multi-institution. We
do this by posingthe question : “is it the case that if a neverrepays a loan, and enforcer
c always enforces violations, that whenever a loan from b to a is defaulted the loan will
be resolved?”.
In order to verify that this query holds we construct a query program which ﬁlters
answer sets of the model to those in which the assumptions of the query hold and the
property we wish to test is false. In this case the assumptions are that “a never repays
the loan” , that “c always enforces violations” and that “a loan has been defaulted”.
The property we wish to check is that that “the defaulted loan resolved”. This query
program may then be applied to thetranslated institutionprogram such that any answer
181sets of the resultant program represent cases in which the query does not hold. We
break the construction of the query down as follows:
For the phrase “a never repays the loan” we assume that the loan can only be repayed
if the loan is in force and that in this case a performing a payback event satisﬁes this
condition. We ﬁrst specify a rule which identiﬁes answer sets which contain agent a’s
repayment of the loan, and then eliminate them using a constraint as follows.
repayed ← holdsat(loan(a,b),I),occurred(payback(a,b),I),instant(I).
⊥ ← repayed.
For the phrase “enforcer c always enforces violations” we assume that cases where c
does not enforce violations are those in which an obligation to apply a sanction exists
in the enforcement institution which is then violated. We write this as follows:
notenforced ← occurred(badgov,I),instant(I)
⊥ ← notenforced.
In the above query we also assume that a loan actually exists, so we constrain answer
sets to those containing at least one state in which a has a loan from b as follows:
loaned ← holdsat(loan(a,b),I),instant(I)
⊥ ← not loaned.
I.e. there should be no answer sets in which loaned does not hold.
Finally, we add rules which determine answer sets which contain unresolved loans as
follows:
resolved ← holdsat(loan(a,b),I),occurred(reimbursed(a,b),I),instant(I).
⊥ ← not resolved.
I.e. we exclude cases where a is reimbursed when it is in force and an event which
reimburses it occurs.
For the above query we get no answer sets for traces up to length 10, indicating that
the property holds at least in all of those cases. Additionally, as this depth exceeds the
maximum cycle depth of the transition system for the above scenario with only three
agents, this also proves the property for scenarios of this kind.
1825.8 Summary and Discussion
In this chapter we have deﬁned a mapping from the formal semantics for single institu-
tions deﬁned in Chapter 3 and multi-institutionsdeﬁned in Chapter 4 into the language
answer set programs. We proved that these answer set programs embody precisely the
semantics deﬁned by the original speciﬁcations and outline other properties of these
programs. We then showed how given a translation of a single or multi-institution
speciﬁcation it is possible to verify properties of these institutions using two small
examples.
The translation to ASP deﬁned in this chapter is suited to verifying and reasoning
about speciﬁcations institutions as a whole. While this translation may also be used
for some agent reasoning problems (as we show in Section 6.3 page 201), it may be the
case that other translations to ASP may be better suited to other circumstances such
as cases where we must account for agents’ knowledge about the environment. We
discuss these as extensions to our approach as further work in Chapter 7.
It should be noted that, while ASP is particularly well suited to the types of model-
based reasoning that we use for reasoning about institution, there is no intrinsic de-
pendency between our formal semantics and ASP. For instance, if we simply wished
to implement an observer which builds the institutional state based on the messages
which are exchanged in the environment, we could equally implemented the semantics
of the transition function TR using a procedural program. We could also have con-
sidered verifying institutional speciﬁcations using tools other than ASP, in this case
could produce a translation similar to the one described above for the relevant target
system. We discuss one such alternative reasoning approach in Section 7.1.2 page 229
where we consider the possibility of using symbolic model checking to verify institu-
tion speciﬁcations.
Given that ASP is limited to solving programs containing a ﬁnite number of ground
rules referring to a ﬁnite set of ground terms and literals, we are necessarily limited
to verifying scenarios where we know in advance that we have a ﬁnite set of events
and ﬂuents (and hence a ﬁnite set of states) in advance. In addition by the nature of
the translated programs described above, we must also know, in advance the maxi-
mum number of instances over which a given institution should be investigated. This
limitation only extends to particular veriﬁcation scenarios, and not to the institutions
183themselvesas the full set of events and ﬂuents which may possibly appear in an institu-
tionneed notnecessarily beknowninadvance(seetheprocess ofspecifyinginstitution
domains described the following Chapter in Section 6.2.1 page 189. From a pragmatic
perspective there will be practical limits on the size of scenario which can be veriﬁed
in reasonable time. Given that the set of rules in a ground program must be determined
advance with current ASP solvers, we are limited to programs which can be stored in
memory for instance.
There may also be intrinsic limits caused by the computational complexity of investi-
gating models of institution. The upper bound on the number of models of an scenario
with k events l ﬂuents for a n time points is 2k+l+n. In practice most speciﬁcations will
have a considerably smaller number of models, as the set of ﬂuents which can be true
in a given state and the set of events which can be generated in a given transition will
be limited by the semantics of the institution (and hence its translation). While there is
a fundamental theoretical limit based on the complexity of the institution, answer set
solvers include heuristics which can curb this complexity in many cases (consider for
example the class of solvers based on state of the art SAT solvers) to a tractable level.
From the point of view of veriﬁcation we are often more interested in whether or not
a particular property is present or not than in how long the process of veriﬁcation will
take. While it is unlikely that a developer would be prepared to wait for years for a
result, hours (or even days) may be acceptable under some circumstances. We discuss
the empirical complexity of analysing a more complex example than those discussed
in this chapter in Section 6.4 page 222.
In the following chapter we discuss this problem in more general terms and examine a
more complex case study.
184Chapter 6
Speciﬁcation and Analysis of
Institutions in Practice
6.1 Introduction
In Chapters 3 and 4, we introduced a model for specifying both single and composed
institutions using a formal set-based notation. In Chapter 5, we then demonstrated
how answer set programs based on these speciﬁcations may be used to reason about
institution properties.
In the previous chapter, we hand-wrote the answer programs which describe the in-
stitutions in question by manually translating a formal speciﬁcation. This process is
cumbersome and may lead to programming errors that in turn may result in the pro-
gram failing to capture the institution speciﬁcation correctly. Given the possibility
for this type of error and the level of complexity inherent in specifying institutions as
answer set programs (consider the translation of the relatively simple institutions de-
scribed Section 5.5 page 174) it is desirable to have a more succinct language which
is semantically closer to our formalisation of institutions. Speciﬁcations written in this
language can then be automatically translated into answer set programs, which can in
turn be analysed.
Action languages (such as A and C+ discussed in Section 2.10) have evolved over re-
cent years as a means for providing human-readable and human-writable descriptions
185of the effects of actions on a world. In addition to this, action languages also have for-
mal semantics which may be used to query about action descriptions written in these
languages.
The semantics of action languages are typically described over a transition system
where each state (or situation) is composed of the valuations of zero or more ﬂuents
and each transition is accounted for by one or more action symbols. In this chapter
we introduce our own action language InstAL for modelling institutions, based on the
semantics deﬁned in Chapters 3 and 4.
Previous chapters have included somewhat simpliﬁed examples to demonstrate the
process of modelling institutions and translating them into ASP, in this chapter we
use the InstAL language to demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by giving an
extended case study. The case study analyses the speciﬁcation of an auction protocol,
which we specify in full and then investigate using the techniques described in the
previous chapter.
6.2 The Action Language InstAL
In this section we describe our action language InstAL , before we introduce the lan-
guage itself we should ﬁrst answer the question as to why we propose a new language
for representing descriptions of institutions rather than directly using an existing lan-
guage such as A or C+ .
Action languages such as A and C+ have evolved to meet certain needs, in particu-
lar these languages consider the problems of assimilating models of cause and effect
in the real world, and how an agent may reason about the environment in which it
exists, including reasoning about the observations it makes and planning its actions
in order to achieve its goals. While many of these problems will exist in the con-
text of institutions, we must bear in mind that the institutional semantics are not the
same as real-world semantics, instead the institutions act as an overlay on some other
real-world semantics providing an institutional interpretation of the events that have
occurred. This distinction between modelling the world and assimilating observations
leads to a number of problems in the use of action languages such as A and C+ which
we discuss further in Section 6.5. In addition to these problems, we wish the language
186we use to naturally model institutional behaviour, including conventional generation,
institutionalised power and permissions. If we had chosen to base our implementation
on an existing action language, we must express the semantics of these things directly
within our descriptions rather than implicitly as part of the language, possibly leading
to a loss of clarity in speciﬁcations.
We start by giving an outline of the syntax of our language InstAL , the material in this
section represents an extensionto the outline of the language described in [CDVP06d].
We deﬁne the language InstAL in order to simplify the process of specifying institu-
tions. Individual institution speciﬁcations and multi-institutionspeciﬁcations are writ-
ten as single InstAL programs in a human-readable ASCII text format, these ﬁles can
then be automatically translated into answer set programs that directly represent the
semantics of the institutions speciﬁed in the original descriptions.
An InstAL reasoning problem consists of the following:
• One or more InstAL institution descriptions each of which describes a single
institution or a multi-institution that should be processed.
• A domain deﬁnition that grounds aspects of the descriptions. This provides
the domains for types and any static properties referenced in the institution and
multi-institution deﬁnitions.
• A trace program (deﬁned in Chapter 5 page 152) which deﬁnes the set traces of
exogenous events that should be investigated.
• A query program (deﬁned in Chapter 5 page 168) which describes the desired
property which should be validated by the InstAL reasoning tool.
The process of reasoning over InstAL speciﬁcations is illustrated in Figure 6.1
page 188. In the diagram processes are shown as shaded boxes, input documents as
white boxes with solid borders, and intermediate (automatically generated) documents
as white boxes with dashed borders.
The reasoning process is summarised as follows:
1. The InstAL to ASP translator takes one or more single or multi-institution de-
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Figure 6.1: Overview of the InstAL translation process
188scriptions (in the InstAL syntax described below), and domain deﬁnition ﬁles
(described below) as input. Using these ﬁles, the translator generates a set of
answer set programs (in the form described in Chapter 5) which describe the
semantics of the input institutions.
2. The translated institution programs along with a trace program and query are
then grounded by the LParse program (part of the Smodels toolkit).
3. This grounded program description is then given as input to the Smodels answer
set solver. This produces zero or more answer sets. Each answer set corresponds
toapossiblemodeloftheinputinstitutionforagiventracedescribedby thetrace
program that matches the given query.
4. These answer sets may then be visualised (see Section 5.4.3 page 172) and in-
terpreted by the designer.
We start by describing the syntax of single institution descriptions in InstAL and then
go on to describe how multi-institutions are speciﬁed. The syntax consists of a set
of declarations which deﬁne the institution name, types, ﬂuents and events which are
supported by the institution and a set of rules which deﬁne the operational semantics
of the institution. We illustrate the syntax of InstAL using the formalised loan contract
described in Section 4.3.3 and Figure 4.4 on page 134 as an example.
Each InstAL speciﬁcation starts with a declaration of the institution being modelled
using the institution keyword, as follows:
institution loan_contract;
The following sections give an overview of the other aspects of the language’s syntax.
6.2.1 Type System
In the formalisations of institution speciﬁcations given in Chapter 4, we used a set-
based notation based on our formalised model for institutions. Within these descrip-
tions, we used externally deﬁned sets to allow for the deﬁnition of properties such as
agent identiﬁers (Agents in the loan contract institution). While these sets may be
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the speciﬁcation itself as they may change depending on the particular instance of the
institutionwe are dealing with. Instead the domains of types are deﬁned externally, we
do this in InstAL by deﬁning a set of types each of which corresponds to a particular
set of atomic values (such as agent identiﬁers, role names etc.).
Within speciﬁcations, types are declared by including zero or more type declarations
using the type keyword. An example of such a type deﬁnition is that of the set of
agents discussed above. In an InstAL language speciﬁcation this type would be de-
clared as follows:
type Agent;
As we have said, the domain of each type corresponds to a set of literal values, these
literal values are speciﬁed externally in one or more domain deﬁnition ﬁles. A domain
deﬁnition ﬁle speciﬁes a set of literals that may appear in the domain of a given type.
In the case of the Agent type, an example deﬁnition is as follows:
Agent: agent1 agent2 agent3
This deﬁnes three values agent1, agent2 and agent3 as members of the type
Agent. Domain deﬁnitions are read by the translator at the same time as institution
deﬁnitions and serve to ground variables in the body of institution rules (see Variables
in Section 6.2.4 below).
In addition to user-deﬁned types, InstAL deﬁnes three internally-deﬁned types which
are speciﬁed automatically by the translation tool using the speciﬁcation(s) being pro-
cessed. These types are described as follows:
Fluent : This type is deﬁned as the set of all grounded ﬂuent literals that occur in all
speciﬁcations being processed (see Fluent Declarations in Section 6.2.2 below).
Event : This type is deﬁned as the set of all event literals (see Event Declarations in
Section 6.2.3).
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included in the current multi-institution or the name of the institution being pro-
cessed in the case of a single institution.
6.2.2 Fluent Declarations
Fluent declarations in InstAL declare the types of domain ﬂuents which may occur in a
given institution. In our formalisation of institutions in Chapter 3, we stated that each
institution includes a set of domain ﬂuents that may be considered to be true at a given
time in the institution, this set of domain ﬂuents is described in InstAL using one or
more ﬂuent declarations using the fluent keyword.
A ﬂuent declaration in InstAL consists of a ﬂuent name and the types of the ﬂuent
parameters if any.
The following declaration for example:
fluent loan(Agent,Agent);
deﬁnes a ﬂuent with name loan with two parameters which range over the type
Agent.
Each ﬂuent declaration corresponds to a set of possible domain ﬂuents which may be
used in the institution, the full set of ﬂuents described by a given ﬂuent declaration is
dependant on the types of the parameters of that ﬂuent. For example if the type Agent
includes the values agent1, agent2 and agent3 then loan(agent1,agent2)and
loan(agent2,agent3) are valid ﬂuents in the institution. We refer to all of the
literals corresponding to a particular ﬂuent as the domain of the ﬂuent. In the case
where a ﬂuent has no parameters then the domain of the ﬂuent declaration contains
only a single literal corresponding to the ﬂuent name.
Fluent declarations in an InstAL speciﬁcation correspond to the deﬁnition of domain
ﬂuents in the formal model (see Section 3.4.2, page 101), such that every ﬂuent literal
in a ﬂuent declaration corresponds to a member of the set D for the institution being
speciﬁed .
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ﬂuents are implicitly deﬁned (based on events described in the institution, see below):
(i) pow(Event): A given event is empowered.
(ii) perm(Event): A given event is permitted.
(iii) obl(Event,Event,Event): A given obligation exists.
Static Properties
In addition to ﬂuents that change over time, it is sometimes useful to refer to external
properties that will not change during the execution of an institution, but which we
do not wish to make explicit at the time of speciﬁcation. In order to do this we use
what we call static properties which have a similar syntax to ﬂuents. As with ﬂuents,
static properties consist of a unique name and zero or more typed parameters, and are
declared using the static keyword. For example the declaration:
static roleof(Role,Inst);
deﬁnes a staticproperty with name roleofand parameters which range overthe types
Role and Inst. A declaration of this form may be used to indicate which roles are
present in the institution. As with ﬂuents, static property declarations correspond to a
set of literals with a name and signature that matches the declaration. The domain of
a static property is speciﬁed in a domain deﬁnition in a similar way to the declaration
of a type’s domain by giving a list of the literals that may be assigned to that property.
For example, the property roleof(Role,Inst) may be grounded by the following
statements in a domain deﬁnition:
roleof(buyer,shopinst).
roleof(seller,shopinst).
roleof(manager,shopinst).
Unlike ﬂuents static properties may not be changed, and hence may not be included
in the heads of initiates and terminates rules (see below), instead they may be
used to alter theways in which rules are grounded using static expressions(see below).
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the institution is created, and never changed by any rules of the institution. As well
as allowing for the deﬁnition of static domain information independently of the insti-
tution these properties also serve to decrease the size of the translated ASP programs.
Static properties eliminate the overhead of their ﬂuent equivalents, and also allow the
rules that are generated for a given institution to be constrained to only those which
correspond only to the properties in the domain of the institution in question.
6.2.3 Event Declarations
Each speciﬁcation may deﬁne zero or more event types, each of which describes the
event’s status (exogenous, institutional action, violation, creation or destruction), its
unique name and the types of any parameters associated with the event.
An event declaration consists of the event type that may be :
create : Indicating that the event is a creation event.
exogenous : indicating that the event is an exogenous event.
inst : Indicating that the event is an internal institutional event.
violation : indicating that the event is a violation event.
dest : Indicating that the event is a destruction event.
This is followed by the keyword event, and a unique name (which may be any lower-
case identiﬁer) and the types of the event parameters (if any).
For example, in the loan contract institution the declaration:
..
create event borcreate;
..
corresponds to the creation event for the loan contract institution. The deﬁnition:
..
exogenous event borrowed(Agent,Agent);
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corresponds to events where money is borrowed by one agent from another, and the
deﬁnition:
...
inst event newloan(Agent,Agent);
...
correspond to events where a loan is created between two agents.
As with ﬂuents, event signaturesmay be parameterised usingthe types described in the
institution such that each event signature describes one or more event literals (derived
from the domains of the types of the event’s parameters). As with ﬂuents, we refer to
the set of all event literals for a particular event type as the domain of that event. In
the case that an event has no speciﬁed parameters, the domain of the event declaration
contains a single event with the same name as the declaration (as with borcreate
above).
Event declarations correspond directly to the deﬁnition of events in the formal model
(see Section 3.4.1 page 99) as follows:
1. Every literal in the domain of a create event corresponds to a member of the
set of create events E+.
2. Every literal in the domain of an exogenous event corresponds to a member of
the set of exogenous events Eex.
3. Every literal in the domain of an inst event corresponds to a member of the set
of institutional actions Eact.
4. Every literal in the domain of a violation event corresponds to a member of
the set of violation events Eviol.
5. Every literal in the domain of a dest event corresponds to a member of the set
of dissolution events E×.
1946.2.4 Institution Rules
The ﬁnal part of an institution speciﬁcation in InstAL consists of the declaration of
zero or more institution rules.
Following from our deﬁnition of institutional rules in Chapter 3, the applicability
of rules in InstAL may be qualiﬁed by an expression. Recall that in Section 3.4.2
(page 101) of our formal model of institutions,expressions indicatewhich ﬂuents must
be true or false in a given state for the corresponding rule to be applicable in that state.
Each expression consists of a conjunction of zero or more (possibly negated) ﬂuent
literals.
Expressions in InstAL are expressed similarly: each InstAL expression consists of a
comma-separated list (indicating conjunction) of ﬂuent literals, with each literal each
coming from the domain of one of the ﬂuent declarations in the institution deﬁnition.
For example the expression:
loan(a,b),not owns(a,obj)
corresponds to all states where the literal loan(a,b) is true and where the literal
owns(a,obj) is not true.
In addition to ﬂuent expressions we also permit static expressions in InstAL , these
expressions do not refer to ﬂuents directly but may be used to change the way in which
variables are grounded in a given rule, these are not translated directly into the model,
but effect the types of rules which will be generated when the institution is translated.
Static expressions are discussed below.
The set of all ﬂuent expressions possible in a given InstAL speciﬁcation corresponds
to the set of expressions X in the formal model of the institution in question.
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Variables are indicated in the language by capitalised strings or the special unbound
variable ‘ ’ (which behaves in a similar way to its counterpart in other programming
languages such as Prolog).
Variables may appear in theparameters of ﬂuent and eventexpressions withinthe body
of rules or within the conditions of rules. Variables are locally scoped to each rule and
each variable is automatically assigned a type corresponding to the ﬁrst instance it is
used in the rule. In the case where variables are used in parameters with conﬂicting
types an error is raised.
During translation, a rule containing variables is expanded into a set of rules con-
taining all valid possible assignments of each variable based on the domain of the
type assigned to that variable. For example given a ﬂuent with declared signature
alive(Person)andan eventwithdeclared signature dies(Person),and aground-
ing of owen, zach for the type Person the rule:
dies(X) terminates alive(X);
would cause the variable X to be assigned the type Person and would cause the rule
to be expanded into the ground rules:
dies(owen) terminates alive(owen);
dies(zach) terminates alive(zach);
Static expressions may be used to constrain how variables are expanded within rules.
These expressions appear alongside rule conditions and at present equality, inequality
and static property expressions are permitted in InstAL .
Given two variables, A and B, in a rule when the static expressions:
A!=B
and
196A=B
appear in the condition of a rule, the variables A and B will only be grounded to values
which are equal or different respectively.
Static property expressions look similar to ﬂuent expressions, however instead of
changing the condition of a rule, they change the way in which the rule is grounded.
For example given the static property roleof(Role,Inst) described above, a rule
of the form:
act(A) initiates pow(assumeRole(A,R)) if
roleof(R,shopinst).
would expand to a set of rules where the variable R was assigned to each role of the
institution shopinst.
We now go on to describe the three types of rules that may be speciﬁed in InstAL .
Initial Rules
Initial rules describe which ﬂuents will be initiated when a given institution is cre-
ated. An initial rule is declared using the keyword initially followed by one or
more ﬂuent expressions. For example the following initial rule in the loan contract
institution:
initially pow(newloan(A,B)),perm(loanexpired),
perm(resolved(A,B)),perm(borrowed(A,B)),
perm(defaulted(A)),perm(payedback(A,B)),
perm(newloan(A,B))
if A!=B;
This rule states which of the ﬂuents will be true when the loan contract institution is
created. The rules is qualiﬁed for all pairs of agents A and B where A and B are not
equal (making it impossible for an agent to create a loan with themselves).
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model of institutions. Every ﬂuent literal in an expanded initially rule corre-
sponds to a member of the set ∆ for the institution in question.
Causal Rules
Causal rules describe when ﬂuents change in response to the occurrence of events. A
causal rule consists of:
(i) A trigger event expression which denotes which events may activate the rule.
(ii) An operation which indicates whether the rule initiates or terminates the ﬂuents
in therulebody,thismay beeitherofthekeywords initiatesor terminates.
(iii) A set of ﬂuents that are initiated or terminated by the rule.
(iv) A (possibly empty) condition consisting of an expression describing ﬂuents
which must be true in order for the rule to have an effect, and/or a static
expression deﬁning how the rule should be expanded.
In the loan contract institution we have the following initiates rule:
newloan(A,B) initiates pow(resolved(A,B)),pow(defaulted(A)),
obl(resolved(A,B),loanexpired,defaulted(A)),loan(A,B);
This rule states that every occurrence of the event newloanbetween two agents A and
B initiates the power for the loan to be resolved and defaulted. The rule also creates an
obligation for the loan to be resolved before the loan period expires lest it be defaulted
and the state of there being a loan between A and B. The same syntax is used for causal
rules that terminate ﬂuents.
Each causal rule corresponds to the deﬁnition of the sets C↑ndC↓n the underlying for-
mal model of the institution.
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A generation rule description in InstAL consists of:
(i) A trigger event expression that denotes which events may activate the rule.
(ii) A set of generated events that are generated by the occurrence of the trigger
event.
(iii) A (possibly empty) condition consisting of an expression describing ﬂuents that
must be true in order for the rule to have an effect, and/or a static expression
deﬁning how the rule should be expanded.
The following rule, taken from the loan contract institution:
borrowed(A,B) generates newloan(A,B) if A!=B ;
causes a borrowedevent to generate the creation of a loan (if this is empowered) only
if the two agents involved in this event differ.
Generation rules correspond to the deﬁnition of the event generation relation G de-
scribed in Section 3.4.4 page 104 of our formal model of institutions. In the formal
model, the generation relation G consists of a mapping between a condition expression
and a single event to a set of generated event literals. For a given generation rule, after
the rule is expanded (see Variables above) the following components correspond to
the formal model: The event literal represented by the trigger event of the rule cor-
responds to a trigger event in G. The conditions of the expanded rule correspond to
ﬂuent expressions in the G relation for the given trigger event. The generated event
literals described by the rule correspond to set of events in the range of the G relation
for the given trigger event and condition.
6.2.5 Multi-institutions in InstAL
So far, we have explained the syntax of a single-institution speciﬁcation in InstAL .
We also use InstAL to specify the relationships between single institutions in a multi-
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deﬁnition which shares most of the syntax of single-institution descriptions.
Following from the formal deﬁnition of a multi-institution in Chapter 4 a multi-
institution speciﬁcation M consists of a set of single-institutions, Insts, a set
of environment events EM, and a set of multi-generation rules GM. In a multi-
institution deﬁnition in InstAL the individual institution deﬁnitions are derived from
InstAL institution speciﬁcations in the format described above. The institutions
referenced by a multi-institution are speciﬁed implicitly by the inclusion of those in-
stitution descriptions in the translation process. The remainder of the multi-institution
is included in a multi-institution deﬁnition written in the InstAL language.
To illustrate the deﬁnition of a multi-institution we use the formalised enforced loan
contract example (shown in Figure 4.5 page 138) from Chapter 4.
A multi-institutiondeﬁnition in InstAL starts with a declaration using the multi key-
word, this identiﬁes the multi-institution with a unique name. For the enforced loan
contract example this is stated as follows:
multi enfloan;
The set of environment events of the multi-institution is speciﬁed in a similar way to
the declaration of exogenous events in a single institution, however the env keyword
is used in place of exogenous. The environment events of the enforced loan contract
are speciﬁed as follows:
env event borrowed(Agent,Agent);
env event payedback(Agent,Agent);
env event expireloan;
env event applysanction(Enforcer,Agent,Sanction);
env event enftimeout(Agent,Sanction);
The types used in these events correspond to the types deﬁned in the individual insti-
tutions.
The deﬁnition of the environment events in a multi-institution description in
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of a multi-institution.
Finally, a multi-institution deﬁnition speciﬁes the generation rules for the multi-
institution. These rules correspond exactly to the syntax of generation rules for
single institutions above, however trigger events may be chosen from the environment
events of the multi-institution or the institutional events of related institutions, and the
generated events may refer to any exogenous events in related institutions.
The generation rules for the enforced loan contract example above are speciﬁed as
follows:
defaulted(A) generates illegalact(A,fine);
sanctioned(A,fine) generates payback(A,X) if loan(A,X);
Where defaulted(A)and payback(A,X)are events in the loan contract institution
and illegalact(A,fine) and sanctioned(A,fine) are events in the enforce-
ment institution.
6.2.6 Translation into ASP
The semantics of InstAL are based directly on those of our formalisations given in
Chapters 3 and 4 as such we refer to Chapter 5 for a formal account of how these
semantics are translated into answer set programs.
6.3 Case Study : Analysis of an Action Protocol
Our framework ascribes a social interpretation to a sequence of events that are con-
sidered to have occurred in some environment, the sources for these events may stem
from the performance of actions by particular agents, or the occurrence of other events
within the environment such as timeouts. In previous chapters, we focused on the
off-line analysis of speciﬁcations however, one of our objectives for specifying such
systems is their use in on-line reasoning by agents.
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cations we discuss above, is that of the agent determining whether or not a particular
sequence of actions which has occurred in the past was effective and whether a given
action or sequence of actions will be effective in the future. The underlying problem
in both cases can be summarised as the agent’s ability to determine some or all of
the current institutional state according to our model. It is clear that in a completely
open and heterogeneous environment that this problem is undecidable in general (as
it is not possible for agents to take into account those actions of which they have no
knowledge). We could place restrictions on speciﬁcations themselves to ensure that,
for instance each agent broadcasts its actions to all other agents, however this is not
scalable, and does not take into account the fact that some information contained in
messages may be private.
For this case study we assume a semi-open model of agent society (contrast with
Davidson’s taxonomy in [Dav01], discussed in Section 2.6.2 page 45). Where we
make some assumptions about the underlying communication framework that agents
use to exchange information, but put no explicit restrictions on the acts (expressed as
messages) which may be performed by agents.
The assumption we make about the environment is that in a given interaction, agents
have complete knowledge of the initial social state and bounded partial knowledge of
theeventsthat occur in the system. Forthe basisof this assumptionwe followthework
of Venkatraman and Singh [VS99] and use vector clocks to assist in the inference of
the possible worlds which may exist after a given agent interaction, we discuss the
deﬁnition of vector clocks below.
Westartbydescribingtheauctionprotocolthatwewilluseasthebasisforthisscenario
and then go on to demonstrate how, with the use of vector clocks, agents may reason
about the institutional state. The full InstAL source code to this case study is included
in Appendix A.1 page 261.
6.3.1 Dutch Auction Round Protocol
The protocol we use as a case study is a fragment of the Dutch auction protocol with
only one round of bidding. Protocols such as this have been extensively studied in the
area of agent-mediated electronic commerce, as they are particularly suited to com-
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In this protocol, a single agent is assigned to the role of auctioneer, and one or more
agents play the role of bidders. The purpose of the protocol as a whole is either to
determine a winning bidder and a valuation for a particular item on sale, or to establish
that no bidders wish to purchase the item. The protocol is summarised as follows:
• Round starts: Auctioneer selects a price for the item and informs each of the
bidders present of the starting price. The auctioneer then waits for a givenperiod
of time for bidders to respond.
• Upon receipt of the starting price, each bidder has the choice as to whether to
send a message indicating their desire to bid on the item at that price, or to send
no message indicating that they do not wish to bid on the item.
• At the end of the prescribed period of time, if the auctioneer has received a
single bid from a given agent, then the auctioneer is obliged to inform each of
the participating agents that this agent has won the auction.
• If no bids are received at the end of the prescribed period of time, the auctioneer
must inform each of the participants that the item has not been sold.
• If more than one bid was received then the auctioneer must inform each agent
that a conﬂict has occurred.
• In the case where the item is sold or unsold, the protocol is ﬁnished.
• In the case where a conﬂict occurs then the auctioneer must re-open the bidding
and start the round again in order to resolve the conﬂict.
We focus on the protocol for the round itself, in order to do this, we omit a deﬁnition of
the item in question and the starting price from these messages. While the inclusion of
these aspects in the protocol is possible, their inclusion does not change the structure
of the protocol round so we omit them for simplicity.
We now go on to outline the InstAL speciﬁcation of this protocol, the full deﬁnition of
the protocol is included in Appendix A.1.
The protocol deﬁnition uses two InstAL types: the ﬁrst of these, Auct, refers to agents
assuming the role of the auctioneer, and the second, Bidder,refers to agents who may
bid in the protocol.
Based on the protocol description above, the following agent messages are deﬁned in
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agents’ physical performance of the action (preﬁxed with ann) and a corresponding
institutional action that accounts for when the physical action was performed validly
according to the institution. In all cases the two events are linked by an unconditional
generates statement in the description.
annprice(Auct,Bidder), price(Auct,Bidder): The auctioneer sending a
message to a bidder indicating the initial price.
annbid(Auct,Bidder), bid(Auct,Bidder): A bidder sending a message to the
auctioneer indicating a bid for the current item under consideration.
annunsold(Auct,Bidder), unsold(Auct,Bidder): The auctioneer sending a
message to a bidder indicating that the item is unsold.
annsold(Auct,Bidder), sold(Auct,Bidder): The auctioneer sending a mes-
sage to a bidder indicating that the item has been sold.
annconflict(Auct,Bidder), conflict(Auct,Bidder): The auctioneer
sending a message to a bidder indicating that there were two bids in conﬂict.
In addition to the agent actions, we also include timeouts indicating the three exter-
nal events (which are independent of agents’ actions) which affect the protocol. For
each timeout, we deﬁne a corresponding institutional event sufﬁxed by dl indicating
a deadline in the protocol
priceto , pricedl: A timeout indicating the deadline by which the auctioneer must
have announced the initial price of the item on sale to all bidders.
bidto , pricedl: A timeout indicating the expiration of the waiting period for the
auctioneer to receive bids for the item.
desto , desdl: A timeout indicating the deadline by which the auctioneer must have
announced the decision about the auction to all bidders.
We assume that the timeouts will occur in the order speciﬁed (i.e. that due to their
durations it is impossible for this to be otherwise) however we have no way of directly
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corresponding institution events in the protocol description and constrain the order in
which they are empowered in the institution. This ensures that while the exogenous
eventsmayoccurinanyorder, theinstitutioneventswhichtheycorrespondtomayonly
occur once and in the order speciﬁed. The ordering is speciﬁed using the following
rules within the deﬁnition of the institution:
priceto generates pricedl;
pricedl terminates pow(pricedl);
pricedl initiates pow(biddl);
bidto generates biddl;
biddl terminates pow(biddl);
biddl initiates pow(desdl);
desto generates desdl;
desdl terminates pow(desdl);
Wedeﬁneasingleadditionalinstitutionevent notified(Bidder)whichrepresents
the event of a bidder being validly notiﬁed of the result of the auction. We additionally
specify a dissolution event finished which indicates the end of the protocol.
We do not focus in detail on what the effects of the auctioneer violating the proto-
col are, instead we deﬁne a dissolution institutional event badgov which accounts
for any instances when the auctioneer has violated the protocol. Once an auctioneer
has violated the protocol, we choose to treat the remainder of the protocol as invalid
and dissolve the institution. We could have extended the protocol to include, for in-
stance, sanctioning the auctioneer and recovering to an acceptable state in the case that
this happens (as was the case in the enforced loan contract example in Section 4.3.3
page 133) however for the sake of simplicity we omit this from the case study.
The rules of the institution are driven by the occurrence of the timeouts described
above and hence may be broken down in to three phases as follows:
In the ﬁrst phase of the protocol the auctioneer must issue price statements to each of
the bidders, we represent this in the InstAL protocol by deﬁning an initial obligation
on the auctioneer to issue a price to each bidder before the price deadline as follows:
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In this case the statement represents a number of obligations, one for each bidder in
the protocol.
Once a price has been sent to the bidder, that bidder is empowered and permitted to
bid in the round as follows (note that we permit both the action of validly bidding itself
(bid(B,A)) as well as the action of sending the message that may count as bidding
(annbid(B,A))):
price(A,B) initiates pow(bid(B,A)),perm(bid(B,A)),
perm(annbid(B,A));
In the second phase of the protocol bidders may choose to submit bids, these must
be sent before the bid timeout event. In order to account for the ﬁnal phase of the
protocol, we must capture the case when one bid, no bids or multiple bids (a conﬂict)
has occurred. In addition, in a given round, we must also take into account that bids
may be received asynchronously from different agents over a period of time. In order
to capture which outcome of the protocol has occurred we use three ﬂuents to record
the state of the bidding as follows:
fluent onlybidder(Bidder);
fluent havebid;
fluent conflict;
The ﬁrst of these ﬂuents denotes the case where a single bid has been received and no
others (and records the bidder which made this bid), the second ﬂuent records cases
where one or more bids have been received and the third records cases where more
than one bid has been received.
These ﬂuents are determined in the second phase of the protocol using the following
three rules:
bid(B,A) initiates havebid,onlybidder(B) if not havebid;
bid(B,A) terminates onlybidder(_) if havebid;
bid(B,A) initiates conflict if havebid;
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ous bids have been made. The second rule accounts for any further bids and terminates
the onlybidderﬂuent when a second bid is received. The ﬁnal rule records a conﬂict
if a bid is received and a previous bid has occurred.
Once a bid has been submitted we do not wish to permit an agent to submit further
bids, or for those further bids to be valid. In order to account for this we introduce a
rule of the form:
bid(B,A) terminates pow(bid(B,A)),perm(bid(B,A)),
perm(annbid(B,A));
In the third and ﬁnal phase of the protocol the auctioneer must notify the bidding
agents of the outcome of the auction. This phase is brought about by the occurrence
of the biddl event that denotes the close of bidding. In order to account for this, we
terminate each agents’ capacity to bid further in the auction as follows:
biddl terminates pow(bid(B,A));
and correspondingly initiate the auctioneer’s power to bring about a resolution to the
auction as follows:
biddl initiates pow(sold(A,B)),pow(unsold(A,B)),
pow(conf(A,B)), pow(notified(B));
Finally, we create an obligation upon the auctioneer to issue the right kind of response
depending on the determined outcome of the protocol as follows:
biddl initiates perm(annunsold(A,B)),perm(unsold(A,B)),
obl(unsold(A,B),desdl,badgov) if not havebid;
biddl initiates perm(annsold(A,B)),perm(sold(A,B)),
obl(sold(A,B), desdl, badgov) if havebid, not conflict;
biddl initiates perm(annconf(A,B)),perm(conf(A,B)),
obl(conf(A,B), desdl, badgov) if havebid, conflict;
207For each outcome, the auctioneer is obliged and permitted to issue the appropriate
response to every bidding agent before the decision deadline. If an auctioneer fails to
issue the correct outcome to any agent before the ﬁnal deadline then a violation will
occur.
Once an agent has been notiﬁed we wish to prohibit the auctioneer from notifying that
agent again, we do this by introducing a rule which terminates the auctioneer’s power
and permission to issue more than one notiﬁcation to any one agent as follows:
notified(B) terminates pow(unsold(A,B)), perm(unsold(A,B)),
pow(sold(A,B)), pow(conf(A,B)), pow(notified(B)),
perm(sold(A,B)), perm(conf(A,B)), perm(notified(B)),
perm(annconf(A,B)),perm(annsold(A,B),perm(annunsold(A,B);
Finally. in the case where a conﬂict occurs, the auctioneer must re-open the bidding
with a new round. We represent this by adding two rules, the ﬁrst of which terminates
the intermediate ﬂuents which were used to represent the outcome of the protocol
(havebid and conflict), and the second of which initiates the obligation for the
auctioneer to re-open the round by issuing a price to the bidders and all associated
powers and permissions:
desdl terminates havebid,conflict;
desdl initiates pow(price(A,B)), perm(price(A,B)),
perm(annprice(A,B)), perm(pricedl),pow(pricedl),
obl(price(A,B),pricedl,badgov) if conflict;
6.3.2 Verifying the Speciﬁcation of the Auction Round Protocol
We now turn to the analysis of the auction round protocol.
Illustrating the States of the Protocol
Using the description above we may obtain an ASP program based on the translation
of the semantics described in Chapter 5. This program may then be combined with
208a trace program and query, allowing us to query properties and determine possible
outcomes of this protocol.
The simplest type of veriﬁcation procedure we can do is to execute the program with
no query, in this case all possible traces of the protocol will be provided as answer sets
of the translated program.
Each answer set represents all possible sequences of states which may occur in the
model, these may in turn be used to visualise all reachable states for the protocol
(for a given number of agents). In our ﬁrst example, we do exactly this. In order
to execute the protocol we must give domain deﬁnitions for the types described in
the protocol (Auct and Bidder) using a domain deﬁnition. Assuming that we had a
single auctioneer a and a single bidder b the domain deﬁnition would be speciﬁed as
follows:
Auct: a
Bidder: b
We could execute the translated program as is, howeverthe answer sets of the program
would include all traces of the protocol, including those containing actions which have
no effect. Transitions of this kind may be of interest in some cases (we may be inter-
ested in the occurrence of associated violations for instance) however in this case we
would prefer to omit them in order to reduce the number of answer sets we must anal-
yse. We do this by specifying a query program of the form described in Section 5.3.1
page 152 that limits answer sets to only those containing traces in which a change in
state occurs.
Solving the translated program with the associated query program yields 60 answer
sets corresponding to each possible trace where an effect occurs in each transition.
By extracting the states from the answer set we may generate a graphical representa-
tion of the transition system which the protocol creates using the process described in
Section 5.4.3, page 5.4.3.
In order to include all possible states of the protocol we must select a large enough
upper bound for the length of traces such that all possiblestates are reached. In general
the selection of this upper bound depends on the program and query in question and it
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Figure 6.2: States of the auction round for a single bidder
should be noted that the answer sets of the program represent only those solutions to
the query which can be found in the given trace length.
In the case of the auction protocol, we established this upper bound empirically by
iterating the process of solving and determining the states until no more states are
found. For the example above, with only two agents, the longest traces that yield new
states are of length 7, yielding 33 answer sets.
Figure 6.2 illustrates all possible states for a single round of the protocol with one
bidder (for a larger number of bidders, the state space will be considerably larger).
Note that as there is only one bidder participating in the protocol conﬂicts cannot
occur. For the sake of clarity, we omit ﬂuents relating to powers and permissions from
the ﬁgure.
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Figure 6.3: States of the auction round without violations
We can also use this process to illustratethe possibletraces for queries on the program,
for instance if we wish to show only those traces where no violations occur we could
introduce a simple query program of the form:
bad ← occurred(badgov,I),instant(I).
⊥ ← bad.
These two rules state that all models which include a transition where the event
badgov occurs are considered bad, and that these models should be omitted. For
this query we obtain the set of traces illustrated in Figure 6.3.
211Verifying Outcomes in the Protocol
In the above protocol we stated that when there was a conﬂict in the bidding for the
protocol (i.e. when two or more bidders issue valid bids) that the bidding should re-
open. In order to ensure that this new round continues as before we would like to
ensure that the institutional state at the beginning of a re-opened round is the same as
the institutional state when the original round opened.
This property may be speciﬁed as a query program in our framework discussed as
follows. In this case we are only interested in traces where a conﬂict has occurred, we
specify this by adding the following constraints to the query program:
hadconflict ← holdsat(conflict,I),instant(I).
⊥ ← not hadconflict.
The ﬁrst rule states that if any state where the conflict ﬂuent occurs then the literal
hadconflict should be included in the answer set. The second rule states that we
should not include any answer sets where the literal hadconflict is not included.
We are also only interested in traces where the protocol is re-started and bidding is
re-opened. We add this constraint in a similar way, using two rules as follows:
restarted ← occurred(desdl,I),
holdsat(conflict,I),instant(I).
⊥ ← not restarted.
Theﬁrst oftheserules statethat ifthedesdl eventhas occurred at any timewe include
the literal restarted in our answer set and the second rule states that we should only
include answer sets where this literal is included.
In order to determinethe ﬂuents (if any)which differ between a statefollowingthecre-
ation of the institution and a state following a protocol re-start, we mark these ﬂuents
using the literals startstate(F) indicating that ﬂuent F is true in the start state of this
trace, and restartstate(F) indicating that the ﬂuent F was true in a state following
a protocol re-start.
Literals of the form startstate(F) are deﬁned using the following rule:
212startstate(F) ← holdsat(F,I1),
occurred(createdar,I0),
next(I0,I1),ifluent(F).
Which states thatF is aﬂuent in thestart state, ifFholds at timeinstantI1 and creation
eventcreatedar occurred atinstantI0and thatinstantI1immediatelyfollowsinstant
I0.
We similarly deﬁne the ﬂuents which hold in the re-start state with the rule:
restartstate(F) ← holdsat(F,I1),occurred(desdl,I0),
holdsat(conflict,I0),next(I0,I1),ifluent(F).
WhichstatesthatFholdsintherestart state, ifitheldinthestateI1whichimmediately
followed the occurrence the decision deadline desdl when a conﬂict held in that state.
We then deﬁne the following rules which indicate the differences between the start
state and the re-start state:
missing(F) ← startstate(F),notrestartstate(F),ifluent(F).
added(F) ← restartstate(F),notstartstate(F),ifluent(F).
These rules indicate that a ﬂuent is present in the start state, but missing from the
restart state (indicated by missing(F)), or missing in the start state, but present in the
restart state (indicated by added(F)) respectively.
Finally, we deﬁne the query constraint, in this case we are only interested in traces
where a difference occurs between the start state and the restart state. We add these
constraints using following rules:
invalid ← missing(F),ifluent(F).
invalid ← added(F),ifluent(F).
⊥ ← not invalid.
The ﬁrst two rules state that if a ﬂuent F is either missing or added, then the literal
invalid is true. The third rule constrains answer sets of the program to only those
containing the literal invalid.
213These rules, when combined with the translated program of the institution allow us
to determine which ﬂuents have changed between the start state and end state of the
protocol. It should be noted that in accordance to Deﬁnition 31, the heads of the rules
in this program are disjoint from those of the translated answer set program.
As we showed in the previous section, it is only possible for a conﬂict to occur in the
auction protocol when more than one bidder is present. To verify the above constraint
we add a second bidder c and update the domain deﬁnition accordingly.
Given the translated program and the query program described above, we obtain no
answersetsfortheprotocolas deﬁned, indicatingthatitis indeedthecasethatthereare
no ﬂuents which differ in the state following a protocol restart and the state following
the creation of the institution. This result is consistent with the original description
of the protocol and will permit subsequent rounds to continue in the same way as the
original after a conﬂict has occurred. The same query holds true for auctions including
three or four bidders.
Supposing however that the rule accounting for the removal of permissions and
powers to re-notify bidders was changed to the following (omitting the ﬁnal
perm(annunsold(A,B))ﬂuent):
notified(B) terminates pow(unsold(A,B)), perm(unsold(A,B)),
pow(sold(A,B)), pow(conf(A,B)), pow(notified(B)),
perm(sold(A,B)), perm(conf(A,B)), perm(notified(B)),
perm(annconf(A,B)),perm(annsold(A,B);
In this case we obtain answer sets for each trace which, after removing all liter-
als referring to the state of ﬂuents and the occurrence of events, we obtain liter-
als of the form missing(perm(annunsold(A,B))). These indicate that the ﬂuent
perm(annunsold(A,B)) differed between the start state and the restart state.
6.3.3 Verifying Compliance at Run Time
In this example, we are interested in investigating the possible outcomes of a protocol
from the perspective of a single agent rather than analysing an institution as a whole
214as we have done in the previous two sections.
In this case, agents may be party to no or only partial information about the inter-
actions in which they were not directly involved. In this example we are interested in
cases where agents may have partial informationabout the interactions of other agents,
assumingthat agents may not observeevery aspect ofevery interaction, it is reasonable
to ask how agents this information might be derived.
Vector Clocks
One possible source of this partial information may come from the environment (such
as the agent system or communication layer that is used by the agents) and a possible
mechanism for deﬁning partial information is the use of a message time-stamping
scheme. Vector clocks represent one such time stamping scheme.
Vector clocks [Mat89] are a distributed algorithm proposed by Mattern as an extension
to Lamport’s logical clocks [Lam78]. Vector clocks help to establish causal or paral-
lel relationships between observed events in a particular process or distributed system
where events pass between components of that system (as is the case of message ex-
changes).
The distributed algorithm is enacted by each agent (party, process) maintaining an
internal vector clock consisting of a sequence of integers, one for each party of the
protocol (which must be known in advance). Whenever an agent sends a message to
another agent, they include a vector time-stamp, based on their internal vector clock,
along with each message they send.
Thevectorclocksforeach partyare updatedwhenevertheysendand receiveamessage
according to the following algorithm for a given agent i in the set of n agents:
• For a set of n agents, such that 0 ≤ i ≤ n, let the vector clock vci of agent i be
215a vector of length n such that
vci =



 




k0
. . .
ki
. . .
kn



 




and initially all elements of the vector are zero.
• Upon sending a message agent i increments element i of its internal vector clock
and copies the new vector clock into the message as the vector time-stamp.
• Upon receiving a message containing a vector time-stamp
vt =




t0
. . .
tn




of size n, agent i increments element i of its internal vector clock vci, and then
updates vci such that each element of the new clock vc′
i is set to the pairwise
maximum of elements in vci and the vector time-stamp vt:
vc
′
i =




max(k0,t0)
. . .
max(kn,tn)




Figure 6.4 shows the vector clocks and message time-stamps for a protocol involving
three agents.
With a given pair of time vectors u and v, it is possible to establish the following
ordering relationships (from [Mat89, page 8]):
u   v ⇐⇒ ∀j,0 ≤ j ≤ n   u[j] ≤ v[j] u is not after v
u ≺ v ⇐⇒ u   v ∧ u  = v u is strictly before v
u||v ⇐⇒ ¬(u   v) ∧ ¬(v   u) u and v are concurrent
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Figure 6.4: Example vector clock values for three agents.
The ﬁrst two relations represent a partial ordering on time vectors and are transitive,
the third is the “simultaneity” relation indicating that ordering of a pair of time vectors
is indistinguishable.
Vector clocks may be used in protocols where messages are transmitted point to point
from one agent to another, as is the case in the Dutch auction round protocol discussed
above where the auctioneer interacts with bidders independently of one another. They
may be used to determined both the number of messages which have been exchanged
out of band relative to a particular agent in a given time interval as well as reﬁning the
possible set of interactions which may have occurred.
Reasoning with Partial Information
We assume that the environment in which our agents interact includes a vector-clock
time-stamping system, such that every message is associated with a valid and truthful
vector time-stamp based on internal vector clock of the sending agent at the time at
217which that message was sent. Given this assumption, we must now determine how this
partial information may be used by agents.
In the following example, we act from the perspective of a bidder in the auction and
analyse traces of a round of the auction protocol described above. We assume that
there are two bidders with identiﬁers b and c and one auctioneer with identiﬁer a.
We assign indexes (for the vector clocks) to each agent as follows: a = 0, b = 1,
c = 2.
Supposethat thebidderin questionisparty tothefollowingmessageswithcorrespond-
ing vector time-stamps (we assume that the institution has already been created):
Message Sent/Received Time-Stamp
1 annprice(a,b). received



1
0
0



2 annbid(b,a). sent



1
1
0



3 annsold(a,b). received



5
1
0



The above time-stamps indicate a course of events as follows:
i The ﬁrst message received by the bidder from the auctioneer was the ﬁrst message
sent by the auctioneer.
ii When the third message was received by the bidder was sent, the auctioneer had
not received any messages from agent c.
In order to reason with this information, we ﬁrst deﬁne a query program Πvc that
constrains traces to only those which are consistent with the agent’s vector clock ob-
servations. The program Πvc models how the vector time stamps and vector clocks of
messages are deﬁned according to the messages that have occurred in the correspond-
ing trace. The entailment of Πvc is such that each message that appears in the trace
218has a corresponding time-stamp, and for each time instant in the trace, each agent has
corresponding internal vector clock.
While we omit a full description Πvc here (see Appendix A.2 for a full listing), we
summarise its entailment as follows:
Given a set of n agents, the vector clock for an agent a at a given time instant T is
deﬁned by literals of the form:
vholdsat(vc(a,a1,c1),T)
...
vholdsat(vc(a,ai,ci),T)
...
vholdsat(vc(a,an,cn),T)
Such that the value of index i for agent a is the value ci.
We assume that exactly one timestamped message occurs at each time instant. For a
given time instant T, the corresponding vector time-stamp for the message that oc-
curred at T is deﬁned by literals of the form:
vholdsat(vt(a1,c1),T)
...
vholdsat(vt(ai,ci),T)
...
vholdsat(vt(an,cn),T)
It should be noted that we use literals of the form vholdsat(X,T) rather than
holdsat(X,T) to ensure that the head literals of the query program remain disjoint
from the institution program.
In addition to the above rules, we also deﬁne an observability relationship for mes-
sages that indicates which agents are party to which events when they have occurred.
We do this for each exogenous eex event that represents a message in the institution by
deﬁning the literals:
219sndr(eex,A)
to indicate that agent A was the sender of the message associated with event eex and
literals:
rcvr(eex,A)
to indicate that A was the recipient of the message associated with message eex.
For the message events described in the auction institution we deﬁne the associations:
sndr(annprice(A,B),A) ← agent(A),agent(B),A! = B.
rcvr(annprice(A,B),B) ← agent(A),agent(B),A! = B.
sndr(annbid(A,B),A) ← agent(A),agent(B),A! = B.
rcvr(annbid(A,B),B) ← agent(A),agent(B),A! = B.
sndr(annsold(A,B),A) ← agent(A),agent(B),A! = B.
rcvr(annsold(A,B),B) ← agent(A),agent(B),A! = B.
sndr(annunsold(A,B),A) ← agent(A),agent(B),A! = B.
rcvr(annconf(A,B),B) ← agent(A),agent(B),A! = B.
In all cases, we simply assign the sender and receiver of a message to the correspond-
ing agent in the event literal, ignoring the possibility of agents sending messages to
themselves.
For timeout events, we do not have a sender or a receiver however, we include these
events in a similar way by treating a timeout event as if it were a message sent by
the agent who observes the timeout but not received by any other agents. In the case
of the auction institution, we assume that the timeout events are only observable by
the auctioneer. It may be the case that the bidders could infer the intervals in which
timeouts occur however, we do not consider that here. The observation literals for the
timeout events in the auction institution are deﬁned as follows:
sndr(biddl,a).
sndr(pricedl,a).
sndr(desdl,a).
Using these deﬁnitions as its domain, the program Πvc ensures that each agent’s vec-
tor clock is consistent with the traces described by the translated institution program.
220Given this, we can translate agents’ knowledge about vector timestamps and their in-
ternal clock directly into constraints in the query program.
These constraints may then be used to establish possible traces that are
consistent with those timeouts. For instance given the trace of messages
annprice(a,b),annbid(b,a),annsold(a,b) described above and their corre-
sponding internal vector clock values of the bidder b, we obtain the program:
ts1 ← vholdsat(vc(b,a,1),J),
vholdsat(vc(b,b,0),J),
vholdsat(vc(b,c,0),J),
occurred(annprice(a,b),I),
next(I,J).
⊥ ← not ts1.
ts2 ← vholdsat(vc(b,a,1),J),
vholdsat(vc(b,b,1),J),
vholdsat(vc(b,c,0),J),
occurred(annbid(b,a),I),
next(I,J).
⊥ ← not ts2.
ts3 ← vholdsat(vc(b,a,5),J),
holdsat(vc(b,b,1),J),
vholdsat(vc(b,c,0),J),
occurred(annsold(a,b),I),
next(I,J).
⊥ ← not ts3.
These rules state that the trace must contain an occurrence of each of the described
events, and that the state of the vector clock for agent b after the occurrence of each
event must be consistent with the speciﬁed values.
When combined with Πvc, the resulting query program limitsthe answer sets produced
to only those consistent with the given vector timestamps. The information provided
by the vector time stamps entails not only the ordering of messages, but also how
221many messages have occurred which may have a causal effect on the agent up until
the reception of the last message. The total number of causal messages that may be
considered as being causally related to the ﬁnal state of the agent after the occurrence
of the last event is equal to the sum of each of the vector clock indexes for the agent
at that state. For instance, the trace above indicates that at the point of receiving the
last message, no more than 6 messages (or events) have occurred which could have a
causal effect on the bidder at that point. Additionally the zero value for the clock index
of agent c indicates that these messages were either exchanged between the bidder and
the auctioneer, or were events internal to the auctioneer or the bidder b.
We still have no guarantee that the auctioneer complied with the protocol, however
these constraints allow us to consider only those traces which may have occurred,
signiﬁcantly reducing the number of traces the agent must consider.
For instance, suppose that the agent assumes that the auctioneer has complied with
the protocol, if we add a further constraint to the query program described above, we
obtain three answer sets corresponding to the sequences of events:
1 2 3 4 5 6
a) annprice(a,b) annprice(a,c) priceto annbid(b,a) bidto annsold(a,b)
b) annprice(a,b) annbid(b,a) annprice(a,c) priceto bidto annsold(a,b)
c) annprice(a,b) annprice(a,c) annbid(b,a) priceto bidto annsold(a,b)
In the case that we obtained no answer sets for this query, we could conclude that a
violation must have occurred.
6.4 Analysis
The complexity of evaluating a given query against a given institutional model is
broadly dependant on three factors: the size of the grounded answer set program gen-
erated by the institution, the number of branches or choice points which must be eval-
uated by the answer set solver, and (in the case where more than one answer set exists
for the program) the number of answer sets produced by the solver.
We include the empirical complexity results for the queries described above in Ta-
ble 6.4. We list the results for the display example with all answer sets (DA), the
222display example excluding violating traces (DB), the veriﬁcation example in which
we determined that the re-start state was equivalent to the start state (VA) and the com-
pliance veriﬁcation problem described above(VB). Each speciﬁc problem listed in the
table is sub-scripted with the number of time instants investigated and super-scripted
with the number of bidders modelled in the run.
For each run, we list the following factors:
The number of answer sets nas: While this is not a factor in the underlying
complexity of solving a given problem, it does have implications for any
post-processing of the problem’s results.
The number of ground atoms na: This indicates the total number of ground atoms
after grounding of both the institution program and the query program and cor-
responds to the size of the Herbrand base for that program. Given that current
solver implementations require that the full ground problem be stored in mem-
ory while the solver runs this is the ﬁrst limiting factor for the size of problems
which we can attempt to solve.
The number of ground rules nr: This corresponds to the total number of ground
rules of both the institution program and the query program, recall from Sec-
tion 2.9.1 page 59 that each unground rule in the program is expanded to zero
or more ground rules, based on the variables included in rules of the original
program. As with atoms, each ground rule must be stored in memory by current
solvers. This leads to the second limiting factor on the size of programs which
we can attempt to solve.
Grounding time gt: This is the total time in seconds that the LParse tool took to
produce a ground instance of the original on disk.
Solving time st: This is the total amount of time spent by the solver producing all (if
any) answer sets of the ground program.
Total time tt: This is the total time spent solving the problem (gt + st).
The results presented in table indicate the timings and proﬁling informa-
tion obtained for each of the problems described in the previous section
(DA
1
7,DB
1
7,VA
2
20,VA
3
20,VA
4
20and VB
2
7). The results were obtained using LParse
1.0.17 and Smodels 2.28 on a machine containing a single Pentium M processor with
2Gb of physical ram running Ubuntu Linux 6.05. The numbers of atoms and literals
listed are taken from the Smodels output and the timings are based on the mean total
time listed by the UNIX time command for 5 runs of each problem.
223Case nas na nr gt st tt
DA
1
7 60 1566 8967 0.85 0.91 1.76
DB
1
7 23 1567 8985 1.03 0.54 1.57
VA
2
20 0 6465 65088 2.56 1.92 4.48
VA
3
20 0 9326 108089 4.01 2.88 6.89
VA
4
20 0 11725 173224 6.34 4.78 11.12
VA
10
40 - - - -
VB
2
7 3 4325 103601 3.59 4.71 8.30
Table 6.1: Empirical Complexity Results For Case Study
For the problems listed in the section above, each is solved in a reasonable amount of
time (a small number of seconds). To show the limits of our approach with the Smod-
els solver we also include an intentionally large problem VA
10
40which attempts to prove
the state property over 40 time instants with 10 agents, this produces a 560Mb ground
program for which Smodels failed to produce a solution after 25 minutes of execution
at 100% CPU. As we have said, the solving times for the remainder of these programs
are reasonable. In the case of veriﬁcation we are often more interested in getting an
answer at all than we are in getting that answer quickly. In the case that a veriﬁcation
problem did require a large amount of computing time and we have the computing re-
sources available we could also have considered using the distributed solver Platypus
[GJM+05] which distributes the solving problem over two or more networked ma-
chines. The grounded size of the programs is large (of the order of tens of thousands
of rules for this relatively simple case) and in the case of the examples described in Ta-
ble 6.4 takes up over a half of the total query time in most cases. This problem of large
ground program represents the largest perceived barrier to wider application of our
approach, with larger problems including more atoms and rules the size of the ground
program will increase correspondingly. In part, this large grounding may be mitigated
by eliminating impossible rules in our translated program. Our current approach had
the intention of translating the institution into a generic program, speciﬁcally the deﬁ-
nition of the trace program may lead to the generation of large number of unnecessary
atoms and rules.
The ground program enumerates over all possible exogenous events at each possible
time instant, this leads to the deﬁnition of |Eex|n atoms of the form occurred(e,ti),
e ∈ Eex, 0 ≤ i < n, with the number of rules being a multiple of that. In many cases,
the problems we are interested in only deal with a subset of these events and a corre-
sponding subset of traces and we may remove atoms and rules relating to these event
224from the ground-program a priori as we know that the rules will never be applicable
and the atoms will never appear in the resulting answer sets.
For instance, in the ﬁrst example we immediately constrain all atoms of the form
occurred(badgov,T) from the answer sets of the program, despite this the ground
program still contains T of these atoms as they appear in the body of ground rules,
albeit ones which will subsequently never be applicable in the models of matching
traces.
These grounding problems are largely seen as limitations of current grounding tech-
nology, recent investigations into the possibility of unground solvers (see for instance
[Bra04, HNV06]) may over come these problems. These solvers seek to build an in-
ternal representation of the ground program from rules containing variables on the ﬂy,
rather than computing the ground program before hand.
6.5 Discussion and Summary
In this chapter, we have presented the action language InstAL for representing institu-
tion speciﬁcations based on the semantics we deﬁned in Chapters 3 and 4 which may
then be translated into answer set programs using the mapping described in Chapter 5.
We then examined a speciﬁcation case study where we described an auction protocol
using the language and investigated a number of properties about that speciﬁcation.
The syntax and underlying semantics of the action language InstAL here are similar
to those of the action languages A and C+ . Besides a direct implementation of the
support for the semantics of institutions, our approach speciﬁes the effects of actions
(in particular the termination of inertial ﬂuents) in a different way. The semantics
of A and C+ are designed to naturally model the possible states of the real world
(i.e. models of programs are each meant to represent a possible model of what could
happen in the real world). For example, in A and C+ the rules
a causes f.
a causes ¬f
will necessarily lead to a being non-executable, and any trace containing the action a
225will not be a model of the program. Our semantics on the other hand are intended to
be denotational in that we assume that any sequence of events may occur in the real
world albeit with the possibility of them having no institutional effect. For example
given rules of the form:
a initiates f;
a terminates f;
in InstAL , the trace a will still be a valid model of the program (leading to f holding
immediately after a), and the presence of a in a trace does not inhibit the generation
of models of this trace. In this respect our approach is similar to the treatment of
ﬂuents in the event calculus [KS86] (hence our choice of the terminology initiates
and terminates). The choice of our semantics stems from a desire to assimilate
actions in the real world rather than produce accurate models of that world, in this
case the semantics of the institution should always be able to generate consistently a
consequent institutional state (albeit one in which no effect has occurred), regardless
of the originating event.
In the last part of the case study, we examined the assimilation of traces of messages
for agents, where only partial information is present. While we were able to reason
with these traces in the example, this represents only part of the problem of imple-
menting institutional reasoning, based on our system, within agents. These matters are
discussed as further work in Section 7.1.4 page 231.
The tools described in this section, including the InstAL translator, answer set visu-
aliser and graph generator are available from the author web site 1 as open source
software.
1http://www.cs.bath.ac.uk/∼occ/instal/ (as of 27/9/2006)
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Summary and Future Directions
The previous chapter concludes the original research contained in this dissertation,
in this chapter we summarise our contributions and examine possible extensions and
further work.
7.1 Summary of Contributions
The key contributions and implications of this dissertation are summarised as follows:
i) In Chapter 3, we established the necessary principles for deﬁning speciﬁcations
of electronic institutions that may be enacted by computational agents.
ii) We outlined the applicability of the notion of constructed social reality, in partic-
ular the notion of conventional generation to the deﬁnition of actions and events.
iii) We then established a simple model for regulating institutions based on obliga-
tions with deadlines, and used these notions to deﬁne a formal model for the
representation of single institutions and their semantics. Within this model, we
also included a deﬁnition of the institution’s life-cycle.
iv) In Chapter 4, we discussed the relationships that may arise between institutions
and argued that modelling these relationships explicitly may lead to beneﬁts in
terms of simplifying the speciﬁcation and analysis of the individual institutions.
227v) We used these observations to deﬁne notion of a multi-institution as a context
in which single institutions may be composed and where relationships between
those institutions may be deﬁned based on the same principle of conventional
generation that we used in single institutions.
vi) In Chapter 5 we outlined how single institutions and multi-institutions may be
represented as or translated into answer set programs. We deﬁned the syntax for
such programs and proved that the semantics of the programs are equivalent to
those of the institutions that they represent.
vii) We then discussed the types of veriﬁcation procedure to which these programs
may be applied and outline how queries may be speciﬁed over these programs to
determine if particular properties hold or not in the underlying institutions.
viii) We then demonstrated how our approach based on answer set programming may
be applied to the veriﬁcation of both single and composed institutions.
ix) In Chapter 6 we noted that while answer set programming was sufﬁcient for the
veriﬁcation of institutions,a morenatural, human-readablelanguage may bemore
suited to the deﬁnition of speciﬁcations.
x) We deﬁned such a language (InstAL ) based directly on formal syntax of single
and multi-institutions described in Chapters 3 and 4, to the low the generation of
answer set programs which describe institutions in a human-readable and human
writable fashion.
xi) Finally weshowedhowthis language, and ourapproach ingeneral maybe applied
by demonstrating how compliance may be veriﬁed in a simple auction protocol.
7.1.1 Further Work
In this dissertation we have focused on the answer set programming paradigm for
reasoning about institution speciﬁcations. We chose answer set programming as the
basis for our approach because of its rigorous formal semantics and efﬁcient solving
tools. In this sense and separately provides a very general framework in which a large
variety of reasoning tasks may be conducted.
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Apart from ASP, a number of other techniques could be applied to the problem of
reasoning about institution speciﬁcations. One of these techniques, which has had
considerable attention in ﬁeld of multi-agent systems is symbolic model checking.
The generality we obtain from using answer set programming comes at a cost. Our
encoding of institutions as answer set programs described in Chapter 5 allows us to
investigate the properties of institutions over only a ﬁxed number of time instants.
This ﬁxed interval subsequently limits veriﬁcation problems to only those institutional
states that can be reached in the given time interval considered. While this is suitable
for most veriﬁcation problems, the number of institutional states itself may be much
larger than this and hence it is possiblethat our veriﬁcation technique will fail to detect
certain class of error.
Symbolic temporal logic model checking is a technique for verifying ﬁnite state sys-
tems with a large number of states. The technique was ﬁrst described in [CES86]
and has been applied to the veriﬁcation of electronic circuit design as well as more
complex software design in general, including multi-agent systems (see [WHFP02,
HEP+02, CP02] for examples).
A temporal logic model checking problem consists of a description of a transition
system and a temporal logic formula which describes the correctness property which
we wish to check the system against. The structure of the transition system and the
formula are then taken as input by a model checker which investigates the state space
in order to determine the validity or otherwise of the property.
Typically either computational tree logic (CTL) or linear time logic (LTL) are used for
expressing correctness properties. In both cases efﬁcient model checking tools (such
as SMV [K.L92] and NuSMV [CCGR00] for CTL, and Spin [Hol97] for LTL) have
been developed which have been used to verify systems containing very large numbers
of states.
Model checkers typically take an encoded symbolic representation of the transition
system, which will be checked as their input, this is then compiled and expanded in-
ternally into an efﬁcient structure (typically a binary decision diagram in the case of
CTL model checking) which may be used to test the validity of the given temporal
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a transition system (see the deﬁnition of the TR function in Chapter 3 page 110), in
order to model check our speciﬁcations we must translate the structure described by
this relation into the input representation of the model checker. This translation may
either be done using the answer set programs which we describe, or directly from the
InstAL language.
In previous work, we have investigated the translation of Islander [EdlCS02] speciﬁ-
cations for institutions (an alternative formalisation of electronic institutions based on
protocol descriptions summarised in Section 2.7.1 51) into the input language of the
NuSMV model checking tool with some promising results. An initial investigation of
the translation of InstAL into the NuSMV input language, which is not documented
here, suggests that a similar technique may be applied to our speciﬁcations.
While model checking may be applied to much larger state spaces than those which
can be studied using ASP we are limited to queries which can be expressed in the
temporal logic used by the underlying model checker. In the case of CTL for instance
we are limited to formulae which are quantiﬁed over all future paths — making some
queries impossible to specify. As such temporal logic model checking may be seen as
a complementary method for checking properties that require the full investigation of
the state space, but not do not require the expressive power of ASP.
Other types of automated model checking exist, in particular bounded temporal logic
model checking. In this case, the correctness properties that can be investigated are
limited to those which can be detected in a ﬁnite trace of the system. Unlike symbolic
model checking, bounded model checking may be conducted using more expressive
logics such as CTL*, relaxing the expressiveness constraints of logics such as CTL
and LTL. Such systems typically use an approach to model investigation which is
comparable to our own system in ASP, and in fact ASP has already been applied to the
problem of bounded model checking in a different domain (see [HN01] for an example
of the investigation of Petri in this context). It should be noted that we expect this
techniqueto be applicablewithoutchanging theunderlyingsemantics ofthe institution
speciﬁcations. The application of this technique to our models is left as further work.
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In the model we selected an institution is speciﬁed by its institutional state that in turn
is affected by the speciﬁcation of the transitions brought about by the occurrence of
one or more actions or events. In Chapter 2 we discussed a number of alternative
semantics for the representation of events and time including the event calculus and
the situation calculus.
Up until recently, using the event calculus for performing the types of model-based
reasoning we are interested in this dissertation was not considered to be practical. The
work of Mueller described in [Mue04] overcomes some of these limitations by de-
scribing a translation from a derivative of the event calculus, the discrete event calcu-
lus (DEC), to satisﬁability problems which may be solved using boolean satisﬁability
solvers. Mueller’sworkoriginated(based on hisaccount in[Mue06])by deﬁningcom-
monsense reasoning problems using DEC as answer set programs and hence a parallel
may be drawn with our own ASP semantics.
The syntax of discrete event calculus is similar to our own approach in that change
is speciﬁed by the description of the time instants at which ﬂuents are initiated and
terminated. The semantics of DEC are however derived in a different way and the use
of these semantics and an analysis of the relationship with our own work are left as a
topic for future investigation.
7.1.4 Implementation Within Agents
We now consider the problem of how our speciﬁcations may be used as part of the
reasoning process within agents.
We have focused on the general problem of analysing institutions and have not dis-
cussed in detail how speciﬁcations of these institutions may be utilised by agents di-
rectly (although one possible application is discussed in Chapter 6).
In order for our institutions to be incorporated into agents at run time the agents must
be able to use institutional speciﬁcations to reason about the effects of their own ac-
tions and the actions of other agents. While our approach forms the basis for this
231process, some key aspects were omitted which were not necessary for the design-time
investigation of speciﬁcations.
Agent implementation typically focuses on a cycle of the agent sensing events that
have occurred in its environment, planning toward its internal goals and/or updating
existing plans, and then acting upon those plans. These activities must all be taken into
account in relation to the semantics of institutions.
Observation of Events
Our formalisation does not deﬁne a direct association between the performer of an ac-
tion and the corresponding exogenous event associated with that action. The deﬁnition
of this relationship is necessary in order for agents to reason about which agents were
responsible for other actions. In Section 6.3 we overcame this problem by deﬁning the
relationship explicitly for each event in order to model the vector clocks protocol.
In our formalisation we did not base the syntax of exogenous events on a standardised
language for agent interaction (such as FIPA ACL) we chose instead to allow exoge-
nous events to be deﬁned freely as atoms.
In our examples the types of events that an agent must take into account may be broken
down into messages and time-outs and we expect these two broad classes of events to
be sufﬁcient for the majority of speciﬁcations. Speciﬁcally, the exogenous events that
an agent will have to take into account will be derived from:
i) Events relating to messages that the agent sends.
ii) Events relating to messages that the agent receives (including broadcast mes-
sages).
iii) The occurrence of time-out events for which the agent was able to observe the
event that initiated the time-out.
In our original formalisation of events in Section 3.3.2 we assumed that each exoge-
nous event is universally observable by each agent. In reality this constraint is unlikely
to be met and agents will only be party to certain types of events. In particular we
232expect that in an implementation of our system agents will only be able to observe
certain types of events. In order to account for this relationship between certain types
of events and agents in our system we could deﬁne an observation relation as part of
the speciﬁcation that makes the events that an agent would know about and would not
know about explicit.
In previous examples, such as the auction protocol described in Chapter 6, we deﬁned
the parameters of exogenous events to refer to the agents that were involved in those
events. One approach to the deﬁnition of the observation relation may be to simply
prescribe that for certain types of exogenous event (such as messages) the sender and
recipient are explicitly included as the ﬁrst and second parameters of the message (for
example).
In multi-agent systems it is typical for agents to communicate using a standardised
agent communication language that describes the permissible syntax of messages. An
alternative approach to linking the observation of messages to the semantics of their
interpretation would be to follow the example of [VC03] and deﬁne a common un-
derlying ontology for message interchange as an institutional speciﬁcation in its own
right. This deﬁnition may then be used in a normative context to deﬁne a set of con-
versational norms that are common to all agents in a given system as well as deﬁning
how the occurrence of messages may be associated with given agents. This underlying
communication institution could then be used as a component of a multi-institution
deﬁnition to provide an account of valid messages (as opposed to simply events) to
drive the evolution of other more abstract institutions.
Agent Reasoning
From the point of view of an agent, sensing within an institution corresponds to the
problem of determining the current institutional state, or states in the case where there
is the possibility of uncertainty.
In the case that agents can observe all events which occur in their environment (i.e. in
thepresenceoffullinformation)sensingissimplytheproblemoftakingthelastknown
institutional state and then projecting the sequence of observed events onto that state
to give the current institutional state. This is trivial using our system as each transition
associated with a single institutional event corresponds to a single subsequent state
233(see the deﬁnition of the TR function in Chapter 3).
In the case where agents are not party to all events in their environment, (i.e. in the
presence of partial information) sensing may lead the agent to conclude that the insti-
tution is in one of a number of possible states, and this may also be determined using
our system as we showed in Chapter 6 with the auction example. In this case, given a
set of observed events from the perspective of a single agent, the problem for the agent
is to determine which event traces may have occurred (this may either be a subset or
the set of all possible traces), and then use this information effectively to plan and act.
The problem for the agent is that it does not know exactly which of these states is
the actual institutional state. Indeed, it may be the case that no agents interacting
in a system know the current state. Given this kind of information, one possibility
approach may be for the agent to take the set of ﬂuents which are common to all of
these possible states (these are guaranteed to be true if the set of states is correct)
and act only upon that information. This approach (known as skeptical reasoning)
guarantees that the agent always acts upon valid information. In some situations, this
common subset may however be small or empty, making this kind of reasoning of
limited use. This could remedied by modifying the design of the institution to ensure
thateach agentsendsandreceivesasmuchup-to-dateinformationaspossible,however
in many situations this may also be impractical. In the context of normative systems
the use of declarative power (see [JGAG02] for an overview) where in some cases we
permit agents to declare institutional states. In this case whatever the agent says must
be true in the institution and hence may be relied on for the purposes of reasoning.
Alternatively we may consider trying to live with the non-determinism inherent in the
system, by introducing some form of default, or preferred reasoning into the agent. In
this case givencertain types of messages or communicationsfrom certain agents, some
default assumptions about what has or has not occurred may be made. We make these
kinds of assumptions in the human world all the time. For instance, in the case of a
library where a book loan is only empowered if the book is signed-off by a registered
librarian, we would rarely stop to consider whether the person handing the book to us
over the counter of the library was not in fact a librarian.
One approach to the use of this kind of reasoning in the context of our model may be
to link the occurrence of exogenous event with the speciﬁc institutional events such
that when an exogenous event occurs the agent assumes by default that a given institu-
234tional event was intended and may have happened. For instance if an agent transmits a
message, where the exogenous event related to that message generates an institutional
eventwemightassumethatunlesswehaveanyinformationtothecontrary, thatinstitu-
tional event occurs. This corresponds exactly to the kinds of assumptions about event
occurrence and their intended cognitive semantics which we shied away from when
we discussed mentalistic models for agent communication in Section 2.5.1 page 39.
In this case however, we permit the default relationships between events and their in-
tended semantics to be deﬁned internally to each agent, rather than by speciﬁcation for
all agents.
Before wecan expresssuchdefaultsinan agentprogram wemustextendoursemantics
to permit reasoning about unknown information about ﬂuents. This can easily be done
within ASP using existing mechanisms for default and auto-epistemic reasoning based
on both negation as failure and classical negation.
In this case, when we know that a ﬂuent is true at a given time, we assert that ﬂuent
as true in the same way as we did before (i.e. holdsat(f,I)). In the case that we
know a ﬂuent is false (when for instance we know that an event which always termi-
nates that ﬂuent has occurred), we would assert the classical negation of the ﬂuent (i.e.
¬holdsat(f,I)) and then add a constraint to the program which allows ﬂuents for
which neither of the above cases hold to range over the values true or false.
We may then express defaults by adding rules of the form:
holdsat(f,I) ← not ¬holdsat(f,I),instant(I).
(i.e. f holds if we cannot show that it is false).
For instance an agent may assume that all institutional events are empowered, unless
we have any information to the contrary, in this case we would have rules of the form:
holdsat(pow(E),I) ← not ¬holdsat(pow(E),I),
evtype(E,inst),instant(I).
This type of reasoning is commonplace in the knowledge representation and reasoning
literature and falls into a broader class of problems relating to the representation of
235choices and defaults in logic programs.
One example of such an attempt to formalise internal choices and beliefs for agents
using logic programs may be found in [DVCP+06] where we1 investigate the use of
the ordered choice logic programming (OCLP) paradigm for this purpose (not in the
context of institutions). OCLP is a choice-logic programming language that represents
a decision problem as a hierarchy of sub-programs linked with an ordering relation
representing preference. In the case that a rule in one component cannot be satisﬁed,
a rule from a less-preferred component is chosen. This leads to a rich system which
can be used specifying both agents’ objectives knowledge and preferences about those
objectives and knowledge. The incorporation of institutional semantics into such de-
cision processes is left as an area for future work.
Planning, or the problem of determining which action or actions to perform next in
order to achieve some goal in the context of institutions corresponds directly to the
problem of agent planning in other dynamic domains. In essence the institution may
be seen as the environment, or part of the environment in which the agent may interact
withotheragentsaccordingtoasetofrules. Answersetprogramminghasalready been
applied to the problem of planning in such domains (for examples see [Bar03]) and we
expect planning problems with respect to a given institution or set of institutions to
follow from this work, taking into account the permissions and powers associated with
particular actions.
Of interest in this area is how agents consider both their own violations and the vio-
lations of other agents in a given institution. Our framework allows such violations to
be made explicit (as violation events) and one of the reasons for this inclusion was the
possibility of these violations affecting agents’ behaviour.
This change in agent behaviour would be manifested as part of an agent’s planning
process; and as such agents may choose to avoid situations where their actions will
lead to them violating institutional rules or making decisions because they know that a
given action will lead to a violation.
In addition to violations affecting agents’ choices about their own behaviour, agents
may also take the violations of other agents into account when considering interac-
1Joint work between Marina De Vos, Martin Brain, Julian Padget, Jonty Needham, Tom Crick and
the author
236tions with agents who have committed violations in the past. This process may be
manifested through, for example, a trust model that could be updated based on previ-
ous observations of agent behaviour.
Exploiting Institutional Composition in Agent Reasoning
Just as agent may use the performance of other agents in an institution to guide their
choices about future interactions with those agents, a similar model may be applied to
the consideration of institutions as a whole.
Our system allows for the speciﬁcation of institutions as independent entities, and by
accounting for which events are associated with which institutions an agent may form
a model of the performance of the institution as a whole based on previous experience
withthat institution. Thismodelmay then beused toassistan agents’decisionwhether
or not to participate in an institution. It should be noted that the performance of an
institution may differ with respect to different agents with differing implementations
and as such this model of institutional performance may not be the same in different
agents.
While this approach would lead to a course-grained ordering of which institutions
were preferable, in some cases the agent will have no prior information about the
performance of the institution. A possible application of our system may be to use
the speciﬁcation and corresponding structure of the institutions in question to make
decisions about which institution to use.
Suppose that an agent has the purchase of an item of clothing (a T-shirt for example) as
a goal. Suppose also that the same type of T-shirt is available for purchase from both
an online auction site (eBay for example) and an online shop (e.g. The Gap) and the
agent must choose between which of these two sources to purchase the T-shirt from.
Assuming that both of these organisations are described by the institutional speciﬁ-
cations IeBay and Ishop embedded in the context of a multi-institution that represents
the agents’ environment Menv. Suppose that both institutions have the outcome of the
item being delivered however, in the auction institution the item will be delivered by
the seller and in the shop institution it will be delivered directly from the shops’ ware-
house and in both cases a violation will occur if the item is not delivered. In the case
237of the auction however this violation may only be associated with a limited sanction,
whereas in the shop institution the sanction on the shop entails an obligation for the
shop to supply a full refund.
By speculatively reasoning about both institutions using our framework, an agent may
be able to conclude that the outcome in the auction institution is dependant on the non-
violation of the seller as well as the non-violation of the organisation providing the
auction whereas in the shop institution it may only be dependant on the non-violation
of the shop company. In either case these dependencies may affect an agent’s decision
to participate in either institution.
This type of reasoning may be applied not only in the case where agents must de-
cide which of a set of existing institutions to participate in, but also at the point of
institution creation. In the case where an institution in a multi-institution relies upon
another institution for the purposes of enforcement (a delegation relationship using the
terminology of Chapter 4). The agent or agents responsible for the creation of the in-
stitution may elect to be governed by one of a number of enforcement bodies, all of
which, while providing the same function (that of sanctioning violating agents), may
operate using different procedures or have differing associated costs.
7.1.5 Extending our Model
A number of extensions may be considered to the syntax and semantics of our model
for institutions and we discuss some of these below.
Time and Timeouts
We stated in Section 3.3.2 page 92 that we assume that exogenous events may occur
at any time in order to account for the fact that our institutions are intended to capture
observations about the world without making any assumptions about how that world
was constructed. While this is especially true for events such as messages in the case
of time-related events such as timeouts may be implicit relationships about the order
in which these events may be considered to have occurred.
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may be considered to have occurred at any time. While this was sufﬁcient for our
purposes, we had to incorporate the implicit relationships between the initiation of a
timeout and its expiration as institutional events in the speciﬁcation.
In order to account for timeouts in our existing speciﬁcations (such as the auction
protocol described in Chapter 6.3) we deﬁned a single exogenous event that accounts
for the expiration of a timeout and a corresponding institutional event which accounts
for the valid expiration of the timeout. In order to account for the period in which the
timeout may validly expire (i.e. it may not occur more than once, and it must occur
after the timeout had started ) we changed the empowerment of the institutional event
representing the expiration of the timeout correspondingly.
We expect timeouts to be a common feature of protocols and hence it would be prefer-
able to include the encapsulation of their semantics implicitly rather than having to
encode them explicitly as part of each institution speciﬁcation. One approach to this
would be to deﬁne the semantics of timeouts directly in our speciﬁcations in following
way:
Each timeout consists of an event that corresponds to the starting of the timeout and
an event which corresponds to the expiration of that timeout. The ﬁrst event may be
treated as an institutional event, such that the initiation of a timeout corresponds to
the generation of that institutional event in the speciﬁcation. In order for a timeout
to operate successfully the second event (the expiration) must not occur before the
corresponding event which started the timeout, and if it does occur it must occur no
more than once after the timeout is initiated. These constraints may be speciﬁed in
ASP and added to the underlying trace program for the institution.
We could do this by deﬁning a set of timeouts in the institution using an ASP literal
(as we do for events and ﬂuents) as follows:
timeout(t1).
timeout(t2).
...
Then, for each timeout deﬁne a pair of institutionaland exogenous events correspond-
ing to the initiation and expiration of the timeout:
239event(expire(TO)) ← timeout(TO).
evtype(expire(TO)),ex) ← timeout(TO).
event(started(TO)) ← timeout(TO).
evtype(started(TO)),inst) ← timeout(TO).
and a single ﬂuent corresponding to whether or not the timeout is active:
ifluent(active(TO)) ← timeout(TO).
The semantics of timeouts may then be expressed as rules of the following form:
initiated(active(TO),I) ← occurred(started(TO),I),
not holdsat(active(TO),I),
timeout(TO),instant(I).
terminated(active(TO),I) ← occurred(expire(TO),I),
holdsat(active(TO),I),
timeout(TO),instant(I).
That is, a timeout is considered as active if the initiated event occurs for that
timeout and it is not already active, and a timeout ceases to be considered active if the
expire event occurs for that timeout.
These rules still permit expire events to occur when the timeout is not active, so we
must also extend the trace program of the institution to disallow traces where this is
the case. We do this by adding a constraint of the form:
⊥ ← observed(expire(TO),I),not holdsat(active(TO),I),
instant(I),timeout(TO).
i.e. it is not the case that a timeout expiration can be observed when the timeout is not
active.
Another aspect of timeouts that we have not considered is modelling and exploiting
duration relationships between timeouts. In this case we assume that timeouts have a
ﬁxed duration. In our existing model, once a timeout becomes active it may expire at
any point following that point in time. For example, given a timeout toa which starts
240t0 t1 t2 t3 t4
Timeout 1
d(to1)
Timeout 2
d(to2) d(to2) d(to2) d(to2)
time
Figure 7.1: Visualisation of two timeouts with differing durations
at time instant t0 with duration d(toa) and a second timeout tob which also starts at
time instant t0 duration of d(tob) such that d(tob) < d(toa) our model will permit the
expiration of timeout tob to occur before that of toa. In the analysis of speciﬁcations
this may lead to false-positives for some veriﬁcation queries. For the above example,
we can limit traces containing invalid occurrences of expiretoa with constraints of
the form:
⊥ ← observed(expire(toa),I),holdsat(tob,I),
initiated(tob,I1),initiated(toa,I2),before(I1,I2),
before(I1,I),before(I2,I),
instant(I1),instant(I2),instant(I).
i.e. toa may not expire if tob is active, and tob was initiated before toa.
Within institutions we expect timeouts to be expressed with explicitly grounded with
time intervals, in this case as with the above mechanism it is possible that a similar
technique could be used to limit traces based on interval arithmetic. One such example
of where this may be applied is shownin Figure 7.1. In this case, we have two timeouts
with the second timeout having a duration of one quarter of the ﬁrst. Given these
properties we can infer properties such as the fact that no more than four instances of
timeout 2 may occur between the start of timeout 1 and its expiration.
This process could be automated as part of the translation giving a set of constraints of
the form described above. This corresponds to the approach taken to handle intervals
when model checking dense real-time systems (see [ACD93] for a discussion of the
topic). The analysis of applications of this technique in our model are left as future
work.
241Representing Roles and Social Order
We have not considered the representation of social roles (discussed in Section 2.6.1).
A role may be considered as an association between an agent and a particular identi-
ﬁer that is in turn associated with particular capabilities and responsibilities within an
institution.
We can represent the concept of a role in our framework without changing the seman-
tics. A ﬂuent (roleOf(Agent,Role) for example) may be used to take into account
which roles an agent has. Roles are also dynamic and the assumption and departure of
an agent to or from a role, and the event of an agent acting in a role may similarly be
represented as institution events. The underlying process by which an agent assumes
a role may differ from institution to institution, and the deﬁnition of how the events
relating to role assumption, departure, and enactment would be generated by the se-
mantics of the institution in question. We may also choose to represent role conﬂicts
(cases where, for instance, assuming two given roles is considered as a violation) in a
similar way.
Roles and other features will be common to many institutions. Given this fact, we
could extend the InstAL language with a set of modules for representing such common
features.
Institutional Change
In all of our work, we assume that once an institution has been instantiated its rules
and structure will remain static. In reality as with in software engineering in general
this may not be the case, and institutionsmay need to change overtime. These changes
may come from a realisation (by the designer) that the institution is not, for instance,
adequately sanctioning existing violations, or that certain types of behaviour, which
were permitted before should no longer be permitted.
The process of institutional change is complex and raises a number of questions. In
particular one must take into account that certain agents may not be aware of a change
of rules. One approach may be to represent the institution’s rules as ﬂuents in their
own right (perhaps in some broader super-institutional context) this, however would
242necessarily lead to a signiﬁcant increase in complexity.
In the context of our existing approach, these changes may be taken into account as
follows: In such cases the institution we wish to change may be in existence with
a number of (possibly long-standing) ﬂuents that govern the institution present in its
state. One option would be to simply dissolvethe existing institution,and then create a
new institutionusing the mechanisms for institutioncreation and dissolutiondescribed
in Chapter 3, this however may fail to transfer any existing states from the old insti-
tution into the new one. This may be overcome by deﬁning a transition event which
simultaneously creates the new institution, transfers any relevant state from the exist-
ing institutioninto the new one, and then immediately destroys the existing institution.
Institutional change may also be considered as a process that comes from within the
institution. One aspect that we have not considered at all in this dissertation are pro-
cesses by which agents may themselves change the rules of the institution. We stated
in Section 3.2 page 84 that it is unlikely that current technology will allow reasoned
changes to the rules or structure of the institution to be made by agents directly. While
this may be the case in general there may be some types of change which can be made
by agents such as setting levels of particular sanctions or opting to apply certain sets
of rules or not. Allowing such changes within the deﬁnition of an institution may lead
to more robust speciﬁcations where there is less need for a (human) designer to inter-
vene and revise the rules of the institution. We leave an investigation of the means for
implementing such changes and their impact as a topic for future research.
7.2 Concluding Remarks
We have focused on the applications of answer set programming to the problem of
reasoning about speciﬁcations of institutions. The application of this technique and
others described elsewhere should be seen as a means to an end, rather than an end
itself. It is clear that by their nature, institutions are complex beasts, and that the
speciﬁcation and analysis of institutions forms only a small part of the larger puzzle of
how to build effective, and efﬁcient multi-agent systems. We hope that in some small
way that the work described here contributes to that larger picture, but it is clear that
before institutions and multi-agent systems can be applied to the kinds of real-world
problems for which we feel they are destined, a large am mount of work remains to be
243done.
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260Appendix A
Source Code for Veriﬁcation Scenario
A.1 InstAL Description
The followingsource code describes thecomplianceveriﬁcation scenario in Chapter 6.
institution dutch_auction_round;
type Bidder;
type Auct;
% single creation event
create event createdar;
% the deadline by which the price must be announced
exogenous event priceto;
% the deadline by which bids must be sent.
exogenous event bidto;
% the deadline by which a decision must be announced.
exogenous event desto;
% The messages:
% auctioneer announces a price to a given bidder
exogenous event annprice(Auct,Bidder);
% bidder bids on the current item
exogenous event annbid(Bidder,Auct);
% auctioneer announces a conflict to a given bidder
261exogenous event annconf(Auct,Bidder);
% auctioneer announces that the item is sold and unsold respectively
exogenous event annsold(Auct,Bidder);
exogenous event annunsold(Auct,Bidder);
% the institutional deadline events which correspond to valid
% timeout occurrences
inst event pricedl;
inst event biddl;
inst event desdl;
% Institutional actions referring to valid message performances
% A valid price is sent.
inst event price(Auct,Bidder);
% a valid bid has been received
inst event bid(Bidder,Auct);
% bad governance and decisions dissolve the institution
dest event badgov;
% institution events corresponding to the valid performance of the
% bidder actions annconf, annsold annunsold
inst event conf(Auct,Bidder);
inst event sold(Auct,Bidder);
inst event unsold(Auct,Bidder);
dest event finished;
inst event notified(Bidder);
% fluents
fluent conflict;
fluent onlybidder(Bidder);
fluent havebid;
% the base initial state
initially pow(price(A,B)), perm(price(A,B)),
perm(annprice(A,B)),
perm(badgov),pow(badgov),
perm(pricedl),pow(pricedl),
perm(priceto),
perm(biddl),
perm(bidto),
perm(desto);
262%--------------------------------------------
% PHASE 1 :
% auctioneer must send bids to each participant before the
% timeout
initially obl(price(A,B),pricedl,badgov);
% any price announcement generates a price if this is empowered.
annprice(A,B) generates price(A,B);
% and terminates the power to send another (prices cannot be
% validly sent twice)
price(A,B) terminates pow(price(A,B));
% a valid price announcement empowers an agent to bid.
price(A,B) initiates pow(bid(B,A)),
perm(bid(B,A)),
perm(annbid(B,A));
% ---------------------------------
% PHASE 2 - bidding
annbid(A,B) generates bid(A,B);
% bidding terminates an agent’s power to bid again (only one bid
% per round)
bid(B,A) terminates pow(bid(B,A)),
perm(bid(B,A)),
perm(annbid(B,A));
% the first bidder gets noted in onlybidder(B).
bid(B,A) initiates havebid,onlybidder(B) if not havebid;
% if we get a subsequent bid we terminate any onlybidder fluent
% and generate a conflict
bid(B,A) terminates onlybidder(_) if havebid;
bid(B,A) initiates conflict if havebid;
%--------------------------------
% PHASE 3 - resolution
% at this point we have three possible states:
% if "havebid" is false then we have no bids
% if havebid is true and conflict is true then we have a
% conflict
% if havebid is true and onlybidder(B) is true then B is the
% winner
263% once a bid deadline has occured, it is valid for a decision
% deadline to occur
annsold(A,B) generates sold(A,B);
annunsold(A,B) generates unsold(A,B);
annconf(A,B) generates conf(A,B);
% the bid deadline disempowers each agent from bidding any more.
biddl terminates pow(bid(B,A));
% the bid deadline empowers the auctioneer to legitimately notify
% the bidder of any outcome;
biddl initiates pow(sold(A,B)),pow(unsold(A,B)),
pow(conf(A,B)), pow(notified(B)),perm(notified(B));
% if unsold, unsold or in conflict we must announce this to each
% bidder
biddl initiates perm(annunsold(A,B)),perm(unsold(A,B)),
obl(unsold(A,B),desdl,badgov) if not havebid;
biddl initiates perm(annsold(A,B)),perm(sold(A,B)),
obl(sold(A,B), desdl, badgov) if havebid, not conflict;
biddl initiates perm(annconf(A,B)),perm(conf(A,B)),
obl(conf(A,B), desdl, badgov) if havebid, conflict;
unsold(A,B) generates notified(B);
sold(A,B) generates notified(B);
conf(A,B) generates notified(B);
% once an agent has been notified it may not be notified again
notified(B) terminates pow(unsold(A,B)), perm(unsold(A,B)),
pow(sold(A,B)), pow(conf(A,B)), pow(notified(B)),
perm(sold(A,B)), perm(conf(A,B)), perm(notified(B));
% if there was not a conflict then the institution is over.
desdl generates finished if not conflict;
% if there was a conflict then the item must be re-listed
desdl terminates havebid,conflict,perm(annconf(A,B));
desdl initiates pow(price(A,B)), perm(price(A,B)),
perm(annprice(A,B)), perm(pricedl),pow(pricedl),
obl(price(A,B),pricedl,badgov) if conflict;
%-----------------------------------
264% deadlines
% each may only happen once in the protocol
priceto generates pricedl;
pricedl terminates pow(pricedl);
pricedl initiates pow(biddl);
bidto generates biddl;
biddl terminates pow(biddl);
biddl initiates pow(desdl);
desto generates desdl;
desdl terminates pow(desdl);
A.2 Vector Clocks Query Program
The following ASP program Πvc entails the semantics of vector clocks for messages,
as described in the compliance example in Chapter 6.
It should be noted that the atoms occurred(E,T) are mis-spelledoccured(E,T) in this
program but spelt correctly in the dissertation, this was due to typographic error in the
InstAL to ASP translator(which consistentlyuses the mis-spellingtheliteral occured)
which was spotted at a late state and has not been corrected in the resulting programs..
% Vector Clocks Semantics:
% all vector clocks start at 0 in the initial state
holdsat(vc(A,B,0),i00):- agent(A),agent(B).
% there is exactly one vector clock event per time instant
% this is identified by vcmsg(E,I).
vcmsg(E,I):- occured(E,I),
sndr(E,A),event(E),agent(A),instant(I).
vcmsg(E,I):- occured(E,I),
rcvr(E,A),event(E),agent(A),instant(I).
:- vcmsg(E,I),vcmsg(F,I), E!=F,event(E),
event(F),instant(I).
265% if an agent neither sends nor receives
% a message then their clock stays the same
vholdsat(vcchanged(A),I):-
vcmsg(E,I),sndr(E,A),agent(A),instant(I).
vholdsat(vcchanged(A),I):-
vcmsg(E,I),rcvr(E,A),agent(A),instant(I).
vholdsat(vc(A,B,C),J):-vholdsat(vc(A,B,C),I),
next(I,J),not vholdsat(vcchanged(A),I),
agent(A),agent(B),count(C).
% the time stamp for the current message is set to the vector
% clock of the current sender
% in the first case the time stamp for all non-sender indexes
% is equal to the senders internal clock
vholdsat(vt(B,C),I):-
% the message at I is E
vcmsg(E,I),
% the sender of E is A
sndr(E,A),
% the value of the current clock for B is C
vholdsat(vc(A,B,C),I),
A!=B,
agent(A),agent(B),
count(C),instant(I),event(E).
% the timestamp for the sender is incremented
vholdsat(vt(A,C+1),I):-
vcmsg(E,I),
sndr(E,A),
% the value of the current clock for B is C
vholdsat(vc(A,A,C),I),
agent(A),
count(C),instant(I),event(E).
% for a sender the new vector clock is set to the new timestamp
vholdsat(vc(A,B,C),J):-
vcmsg(E,I),
sndr(E,A),
vholdsat(vt(B,C),I),
next(I,J),
agent(A),agent(B),
266count(C),instant(I),
instant(J),event(E).
% for a receiver the clock is set to the maximum of the receivers
% own clock and the current timestamp
vholdsat(vc(A,B,C),J):-
vcmsg(E,I),
rcvr(E,A),
vholdsat(vc(A,B,D),I),
vholdsat(vt(B,C),I),
C>=D,
next(I,J),
agent(A),agent(B),
count(C),count(D),instant(I),
instant(J),event(E).
vholdsat(vc(A,B,D),J):-
vcmsg(E,I),
rcvr(E,A),
vholdsat(vc(A,B,D),I),
vholdsat(vt(B,C),I),
D>=C,
next(I,J),
agent(A),agent(B),
count(C),count(D),instant(I),
instant(J),event(E).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%Domain information for the compliance example
% the maximum count for a given clock/index.
count(0..5).
% the agents
agent(a;b;c).
sndr(annprice(A,B),A):-agent(A),agent(B),A!=B.
rcvr(annprice(A,B),B):-agent(A),agent(B),A!=B.
sndr(annbid(A,B),A):- agent(A),agent(B),A!=B.
rcvr(annbid(A,B),B):- agent(A),agent(B),A!=B.
sndr(annsold(A,B),A):- agent(A),agent(B),A!=B.
rcvr(annsold(A,B),B):- agent(A),agent(B),A!=B.
sndr(annunsold(A,B),A):- agent(A),agent(B),A!=B.
267rcvr(annconf(A,B),B):- agent(A),agent(B),A!=B.
sndr(biddl,a).
sndr(pricedl,a).
sndr(desdl,a).
268